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I. THE PROBLEM STATED 
A. The Plight of the QAnon Shaman 
 In the violence and rioting that culminated in the ransacking of the 
United States Capitol and that temporarily disrupted the Congress’ counting 
of electoral votes on January 6, 2021, one figure became an emblem of the 
day’s events2—the so-called Q-Anon Shaman, Jacob Chansley, who is also 
known under the stage name of Jake Angeli. Dressed in animal skins, 
wearing a fur cap replete with buffalo horns, he bellowed his entry into the 
United States Senate Chamber3 and is alleged to have left a threatening note 
for then Vice President Michael Pence.4 
 For around a year prior to the storming of the US Capitol, Angeli, 
wearing his characteristic dress, had been a regular on the streets of Phoenix 
Arizona, professing his enthusiasm for Donald Trump and the conspiracy 
theory known as Q-Anon.5 In February, 2020, he addressed a crowd as a kind 
of emissary from Q.6 In May, he was present in the crowd that gathered to 
 
2 See, e.g., Scott Hollifield, Mr. Shaman, Good Luck on the Job Hunt, STAR-
HERALD (Feb. 17, 2021), https://starherald.com/opinion/editorial/scott-hollifield-
mr-shaman-good-luck-on-the-job-hunt/article_f5d540c4-f7af-55a5-bc41-
920e959cdfa1.html (QAnon Shaman “the poster boy for the capitol insurrection”).  
3 Jamie Johnson, Jake Angeli: The “QAnon Shaman” From Arizona at the 
Heart of the Capitol Riots, TEL. ONLINE (Jan. 12, 2021, 8:38 AM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/01/12/jake-angeli-qanon-shaman-arizona-
heart-capitol-riots/. 
4 Tim Dickinson, QAnon Shaman’s Alleged Note to Mike Pence: “It’s Only a 
Matter of Time, Justice is Coming,” ROLLING STONE (Jan. 15, 2021, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/qanon-shaman-note-mike-
pence-justice-coming-overthrow-government-1115014/. 
5 Richard Ruelas, Unsealed Indictment Reveals More Counts Against Jake 
Angeli, QAnon Shaman, For U.S. Capitol Raid, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 13, 2021, 
12:01 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-
breaking/2021/01/13/federal-indictment-jake-angeli-chansley-fur-horn-hat-qanon-
shaman-capitol-raid/4145493001/; Richard Ruelas & Rob O’Dell, Before QAnon: 




6 Rob O’Dell & Richard Ruelas, How Arizona Patriots Build Community 
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welcome Trump to Phoenix.7 In November, after the election was called for 
President Joseph Biden, Angeli was outspoken in his claims that the election 
results would be overturned.8  
 Long before his fixation with Donald Trump, Angeli was 
experiencing problems that might be summarized as a “failure to launch.” 
Now in his early thirties, Angeli had served in the United States Navy (2005-
2007),9 and may have been discharged for refusing the anthrax vaccine.10 He 
had also sought periodic work as an actor,11 had done voice-over work, and 
owned a spiritual self-help business,12 but at the time of his arrest lived with 
his mother.13 His mother, perhaps not surprisingly, defended her son 
vigorously: “‘my son is a great patriot, a veteran, a person who loves this 
country.’”14 In light of all of this, it might have been inevitable that Angeli 
would find his way to the mob that looted the American seat of government. 
 Let us think about that word “inevitable.” In recent legal filings, 
Angeli has taken the position, through his lawyer, that Donald Trump 
 
7 Ronald J. Hansen, Trump in Arizona: Air Force One Departs Phoenix, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (May 5, 2020, 4:45 PM), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2020/05/05/live-trump-
updates-president-visits-phoenix-arizona-honeywell/3080872001/. 
8 Claire Galofaro, Tears of Joy, Sorrow After News Breaks of Biden Win; 
Trump Supporters Still Defiant as Race Called for Democrat, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 8, 
2020). 
9 Gina Harkins, “QAnon Shaman” Arrested for Storming the US Capitol Is a 
Navy Veteran, MILITARY.COM (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.military.com/daily-
news/2021/01/11/qanon-shaman-arrested-storming-us-capitol-navy-veteran.html. 
10 James Clark, The “QAnon Shaman” Guy Got Kicked Out of the Navy for 
Refusing a Vaccine, TASK & PURPOSE, (Jan. 12, 2021, 1:59 PM), 
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/qanon-shaman-guy-navy-veteran-vaccine/. 
11 Graig Graziosi, Jake Angeli: What We Know About the “QAnon Shaman” 
Who Stormed the US Capitol, INDEP. (Jan. 8, 2021, 10:30 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election-2020/jake-angeli-
qanon-shaman-stormed-capitol-b1784091.html. 
12 David Leibowitz, No Reason for Pride with Arizona’s Sixth “C”, 
GLENDALE STAR (Feb. 11, 2021), 
https://www.glendalestar.com/news/article_a48f025c-6bd8-11eb-b235-
db5f22f26ab7.html. 
13 Kate Ng, Horned Capitol Rioter Is “Failed Actor and QAnon Conspiracy 
Theorist Who Lives with His Mother,” INDEP. (Jan. 10, 2021, 4:33 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/capitol-riot-jacob-angeli-
chansley-qanon-trump-b1785089.html. 
14 Graig Graziosi, Mother of “QAnon Shaman” Jacob Chansley Defends Her 
Son and Repeats Election Conspiracies, INDEP. (Mar. 4, 2021, 9:43 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/mother-qanon-
shaman-jacob-chansley-election-conspiracy-b1812693.html. 
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“routinely used . . . mass communication” to “groom” not only Angeli but 
“millions of Americans.”15 Trump had been so effective in persuading Angeli 
of the rightness of his cause, that he had become infatuated with the forty-
fifth president.16 Feeling betrayed, Angeli has even offered to testify against 
Donald Trump, should the need arise.17 Indeed, it seems increasingly clear 
that the strategy that Angeli’s lawyer, Albert Watkins, has adopted is to put 
Donald Trump on trial.18 
 
15 Gustaf Kilander, Q Anon Shaman Jacob Chansley Says Trump “Groomed” 
Him and Other Rioters, INDEP. (Feb. 26, 2021, 11:42 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/video/qanon-shaman-trump-jacob-chansley-
b1808319.html. 
16 Quint Forgey, “He Has an Obligation to Them:” Attorney for “QAnon 
Shaman” Asks Trump to Pardon Rioters, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 2021, 8:52 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/15/attorney-qanon-shaman-trump-pardon-
459608. 
17 Jamie Ross, Now Even the QAnon Shaman Disowns Trump: I Was Duped, 
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 22, 2021, 7:46 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/qanon-
shaman-jacob-chansley-disowns-trump-saying-he-was-duped; Mayank Aggarwal, 
Jacob Chansley QAnon “Shaman” Offers to Testify Against Donald Trump, INDEP. 
(Jan. 29, 2021, 7:32 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-
politics/qanon-shaman-capitol-riots-testify-trump-b1794522.html. 
18 Jacob Shamsian, The Lawyer for the “QAnon Shaman” Wants to Use 
Trump’s Speech Before the Insurrection as Part of His Defense, INSIDER (Mar. 1, 
2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.insider.com/qanon-shaman-lawyer-trump-
insurrection-speech-legal-defense-discovery-2021-3. More recently, and more 
offensively, in an interview with Talking Points Memo, Watkins described his 
client as having “Asperger’s syndrome,” and declared, concerning some of 
Chansley’s co-defendants: “they’re all . . . short-bus people.” Matt Shuham, 
Capital Rioters’ Trump Defense Comes Up Again and Again. Will It Make a 
Difference? TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 18, 2021, 7:01 AM), 
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/capitol-rioters-trump-defense-comes-up-
again-and-again-will-it-make-a-difference. Nor are Watkins and the QAnon 
Shaman alone in mounting the “Trump made me do it” defense. Attorneys 
representing other clients have begun to make it clear that this will be their strategy 
also. See, e.g., Jan Wolfe, “He Invited Us:” Accused Capitol Rioters Blame Trump 
In Novel Legal Defense, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2021, 5:12 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-capitol-defense/he-invited-us-
accused-capitol-rioters-blame-trump-in-novel-legal-defense-idUSKBN2A219E; 
Rachel Axon & Josh Salman, They Rioted at the Capitol For Trump: Now, Many of 
Those Arrested Say It’s His Fault, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 2021, 4:06 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2021/02/10/trump-blamed-capitol-riot-
some-who-were-arrested/4361411001/; Michael Kunzelman & Alanna Durkin 
Richer, The Blame-Trump Defense Looks Like a Longshot For Those Charged in 
Capitol Siege, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2021, 5:38 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-02-27/blame-trump-defense-in-
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 There is little question that the QAnon Shaman, whether he goes by 
the name of Jake Angeli or Jacob Chansley, is a figure who commands little 
sympathy. But he is as entitled to a criminal defense as anyone charged with 
serious offenses. And although neither Chansley or Watkins have put the 
matter this bluntly, one might ask, whether it is perhaps the case that 
Chansley/Angeli really could not help himself?19 He might be particularly 
susceptible to propaganda; he might feel a psychological attraction to 
Trump’s brand of defiant leadership; he might be delusional; he might 
genuinely believe, for reasons outside of his control, in the QAnon 
conspiracy, or in the false claims of a “stolen” election. Trump’s “grooming,” 
in other words, and the continuous messaging from right-wing sources, might 
have overcome his autonomy. Or perhaps he lacked autonomy in the first 
place. If criminal responsibility is predicated on the choice to break the law, 
and if Jake Angeli lacked autonomy, then on what basis can he be found 
guilty? 
 And if we harbor these doubts about one criminal defendant, then are 
we entitled to press the analysis further and ask: What is free will, exactly? 
Do human beings consciously choose, in a meaningful sense, to do or to 
refrain from doing or saying certain things? And if they do, then ought they 
to be held responsible for whatever ensues, good or bad? Or is free will 
nothing but an illusion? Are the actions and words that we believe are freely 
chosen actually nothing more than the predetermined outcome of a series of 
neurological, sociological, and/or economic factors? And if that is the case, 
then do we, must we, jettison the concept of personal responsibility? Of just 
deserts? Of reward and punishment? And what would take their place? 
 The legal order has depended upon the idea of free will as a bedrock 
conception probably for millennia. Certainly, the Anglo-American legal 
system would face an existential crisis if it could no longer find criminal 
defendants guilty or contracts enforceable because of the presumed 
involuntariness of the actors. 
 Yet free will has not always reigned unquestioned in philosophical, 
 
capitol-riot-looks-like-a-long-shot; Zoe Tillman, They Said Trump Told Them to 
Attack the Capitol: Judges Are Keeping Them in Jail Anyway, BUZZFEED NEWS 
(May 6, 2021, 1:09 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/trump-
january-6-incitement-defense-courts. 
19 Jacob Shamsian, The Lawyer for the “QAnon Shaman” Wants to Use 
Trump’s Speech Before the Insurrection as Part of His Defense, INSIDER (Mar. 1, 
2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.insider.com/qanon-shaman-lawyer-trump-
insurrection-speech-legal-defense-discovery-2021-3. 
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religious, or scientific circles. Indeed, Free Will Vs. Determinism is a debate 
with a longer pedigree than most might imagine. It has roots in the ancient 
world. In the fourth century BCE, we discover that free will had become a 
controversial topic among the philosophical schools of Athens. In the first 
century CE, we find that one of the founders of a new world religion—the 
founder is the Apostle Paul, the religion is Christianity—made enduring 
contributions, for better or worse, to this discussion. In the twentieth century, 
it became the turn of scientists who studied the human mind. Sigmund Freud 
proposed a theory of the mind that put him at odds with free will, and B.F. 
Skinner pondered how public policy might respond to an awareness that true 
human autonomy was illusory, and that human behavior was nothing more 
than a complex response to genetics, environment, and prior conditioning. 
 The symposium to which this essay is an introduction explores the 
modern parameters of this debate. Still, it is useful, by way of background, 
to examine this controversy’s rich and varied history. For if we do, we shall 
discover that questions of free will, autonomy, and personal responsibility 
have a deep and complicated past. 
 
B. Ancient Foreshadowing 
1. Epicurean Free Will 
 Whether our dreams and doubts, our exertions and our endeavors, 
are consciously willed and chosen was raised for the first time by members 
of an ancient school of thought known today as the “pre-Socratics.” So called 
because their careers either predated or coincided with that of the famous 
Socrates (c. 470—399 BCE), this group of thinkers was obsessed with 
discovering the first principles of nature. They often called themselves 
physicists, “students of nature,” —the Greek noun for nature being 
“physis”—and they simultaneously asked questions about the largest 
structures in the universe—the stars, the planets, and all that lay beyond what 
was visible on earth—and about the composition of the smallest elements of 
the world around them.20 
 
20 JEAN-LOUIS TASSOUL & MONIQUE TASSOUL, A CONCISE HISTORY OF 
SOLAR AND STELLAR PHYSICS 4–6 (2014); JOE MCCOY, EARLY GREEK 
PHILOSOPHY: THE PRESOCRATICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF REASON 1–2 (2013); 
KLAUS MAINZER, SYMMETRIES OF NATURE: A HANDBOOK FOR PHILOSOPHY OF 
NATURE AND SCIENCE 65–75 (1996); JAMES WARREN, PRESOCRATICS 23–40 
(2007). 
2021] State Of Mind, State Of Law 7 
 A particular concern they had was to identify what all matter had in 
common.21 It was in attempting to resolve questions about matter and its 
composition that the Pre-Socratics challenged for the first time the concept 
of free will. We must take stock of what we have just said. The two 
questions—matter and free-will—seem to be unrelated. Indeed, at first 
glance, they seem to have nothing to do with each other. If, however, we but 
examine the Pre-Socratic discussion of matter and its composition, we shall 
discover that the two questions are tightly interconnected. 
 The problem of matter, as the Pre-Socratics saw it, was the problem 
of the transitoriness of its forms. Consider a tabletop, they might have said. 
It once grew organically, as part of a larger tree. Sap ran through it, tree rings 
piled up. It was then harvested and turned into a smooth, flat surface by 
skilled carpenters. It was thereby rendered hard, and polished, and finished, 
but also lifeless and inert. But this is not its final condition, for if the table 
were buried in the soil, it would decay. If it were burnt, it would turn to smoke 
and ash. 
 So, what is this thing we call wood, exactly? Even in its hardened, 
finished form, it exists not as something permanent, but as a transitional 
object that can and will turn into something else. And if a wooden tabletop 
can transform from organic substance, to finished product, and finally to 
smoke, and dust, and ash, then what does each form have in common with 
the others? Varieties of answers were proposed to this question. But the one 
we should single out, because it proved crucial to future speculation about 
free will, was the one proposed by Leucippus and Democritus. 
 Master and disciple, Leucippus and Democritus lived in the fifth 
century BCE, although so little is known of them that it is possible that 
Democritus only died around the year 360 BCE, near the great old age of 
100.22 They proposed to answer the question, “what is common to all 
matter?” by suggesting the existence of tiny, essentially invisible particles, 
which they called “atoms”—the Greek atomon meaning “that which cannot 
be further subdivided.”23 
 
21 Harold Cherniss, The Characteristics and Effects of Presocratic 
Philosophy, 12 J. HIST. IDEAS 319, 329–33 (1951). 
22 CONSTANTINE J. VAMVACAS, THE FOUNDERS OF WESTERN THOUGHT—
THE PRESOCRATICS: A DIACHRONIC PARALLELISM BETWEEN PRESOCRATIC 
THOUGHT AND PHILOSOPHY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES 209 (2009). 
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 The third-century CE writer Diogenes Laertius,24 in a work known 
as the Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, summarized Democritus’ teaching 
on atoms and matter. To understand atoms, Democritus maintained, one must 
first grasp the essential character of the universe. And that universe, he 
continued, was infinite and the number of worlds it contained was similarly 
infinite. Nothing, furthermore, is permanent. “They come into being and 
perish”—so Democritus taught about entire universes unseen and 
unknowable except by inference.25 
 What then caused this continuous transitoriness? The birth of new 
worlds and the destruction of old? In a single word, it was “atoms.” All things 
from the largest structures to the smallest, are comprised of atoms. The forms 
of matter with which we are familiar—distant stars, the neighboring forest, 
living human beings, all of them sharing the nature of “composite things”—
came into being through atomic motion.26 They are composite because they 
are entirely constructed of atoms. How? The atoms, Democritus supposed, 
whirled in continuous motion, a phenomenon he labeled the “vortex.”27 Thus 
impelled, atoms cluster together and form all the familiar objects we 
encounter in nature, even ourselves.28 “The sun and the moon have been 
composed of such smooth and spherical masses [i.e., atoms], and so also the 
soul, which is identical with reason.”29 
 There are grounds for objecting to the proposition that atomic 
motion, without more, creates all of the objects of this world and all other 
ones. Why should atomic motion—which Leucippus and Democritus taught 
was purposeless and lacking in direction—produce, over and over again, the 
same predictable patterns, such as human beings who all roughly correspond 
to each other in appearance? Shouldn’t atomic motion rather produce a series 
of magnificent “one-offs”—such as three-eyed, horned human beings, 
walking snakes, cannibalistic koalas, and hippopotamuses that sing? 
Randomness, not replicability, should be the governing principle. And 
 
24 We know little about Diogenes, but his work remains an invaluable 
resource for early Greek philosophy. See JAMES WYATT COOK, Diogenes Laertius, 
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT LITERATURE (2d ed. 2014). 
25 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS, VOLUME II: 
BOOKS 6-10 at 453 (R.D. Hicks trans., 1925). 
26 Id. at 455. 
27 JEFFREY S. PURINTON, Democritus, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLASSICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 169–70 (Donald J. Zeyl ed., Routledge 2013) (1997). 
28 DEMETRIS NICOLAIDES, IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF EVERYTHING: THE 
PHILOSOPHY BEHIND PHYSICS 32–33 (2020). 
29 Laertius, supra note 25, at 455. 
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perhaps Democritus, or Epicurus, or some other ancient writer addressed this 
problem in a now lost text. But our concern is not to critique ancient atomic 
theory, but to probe its implications for the free will versus determinism 
debate. 
 And once we investigate that question, we discover that Democritus 
allowed no room for free will. If atomic motion brought all things into being, 
such motion also determined everything about the course of future events. 
“All things happen by virtue of necessity,” Diogenes paraphrased 
Democritus, “the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things, and this 
[Democritus] calls necessity.”30 
 The noun translated as “necessity” is ananké, which is a word of 
particularly rich significance. It is that which binds.31 In the hands of 
Thucydides, it meant the inexorable geopolitical pressure that drove Athens 
and Sparta to war.32 The word might include coercion, either physical or 
psychological, and was often put into deified form33—ananké, the goddess 
of necessity, whose will was final and whose name was a curse.34 Ananké 
might, in other words, mean “fate,” that which is pre-destined to occur, and, 
thus, that which is removed from any possibility of personal agency or free 
will.35  
 While Diogenes Laertius, in his summary of Democritus’ thought, 
did not quite put it this way, the following inferences are justified: If human 
reason, and the human soul, were made entirely of atoms, and atomic motion 
were the source of all things, then the motion of the atomic particles of the 
soul determines human behavior. When we think, when we act, when we 
feel, and see, and understand, it is not because we have freely chosen to do 
these things, but because the motion of the atoms that comprise the cognitive 
and volitional parts of the human intellect have moved in one direction and 
not in another. Leucippus, who was likely Democritus’ teacher, said much 
 
30 Id. 
31 Allan D. Wooley, Ananke, 88 AM. J. PHILOLOGY 228–32 (1967) (book 
review). 
32 DARREN SHANSKE, THUCYDIDES AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF 
HISTORY 165–67 (2006). 
33 SHLOMO GIORA SHOHAM, AN EXISTENTIALIST THEORY OF THE HUMAN 
SPIRIT (VOLUME 1): TO LOVE AND CREATE… OR NOT 289 (2020). 
34 Christopher A. Faraone & Joseph L. Rife, A Greek Curse Against a Thief 
from the Koutsonglia Cemetery at Roman Kencherai, 160 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
PAPYROLOGIE UND EPIGRAPHIK 141, 144–45 (2007). 
35 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN RELIGIONS 339 
(Eric M. Orlin ed., 2015). 
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the same thing as Democritus, and it is fair to impute the same teaching to 
him.36 
 The strong determinism of Democritus and Leucippus was at least 
plausible if one granted the premise that atomic motion was universal and 
governed animate beings as much as inanimate objects. It was therefore 
surprising to find it challenged not by outsiders to the Greek atomist tradition, 
but by one of its foremost proponents, the philosopher Epicurus (c. 341–270 
BCE). 
 If we do not otherwise know the works of Epicurus, speakers of 
English can at least gain a sense of his philosophy by the noun his 
philosophical movement has bequeathed to us— “epicurean,”—a lover of 
sensuality and pleasure. The historical Epicurus argued that our only access 
to reality was provided through our sensory organs;37 that the two great 
motivators of human conduct were pain and pleasure;38 and that the good life 
consists in the avoidance of one and the pursuit of the other.39 If Epicurus 
sounds like Jeremy Bentham, it is the case that Bentham borrowed from the 
ancient writer’s works when he formulated his theory of utilitarianism.40 
Still, although Epicurus spoke of his philosophy as “hedonistic,”41 he 
certainly did not mean by that word the connotations associated with it 
today.42 He argued that human beings should be content with simple 
pleasures and pursue tranquility rather than seek a life of unbridled 
 
36 Leucippus was recorded as saying, “everything [happens] according to 
necessity . . . nothing happens at random, but everything for a reason and as the 
effect of necessity.” EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY, VOLUME VII: LATER IONIAN AND 
ATHENIAN THINKERS, PART 2 139 (André Laks & Glenn W. Most, eds. & trans., 
2016); cf. JONATHAN BARNES, METHOD AND METAPHYSICS: ESSAYS IN ANCIENT 
PHILOSOPHY I 298 (Maddalena Bonelli ed., 2011) (Leucippus criticized by ancient 
writers for excluding all possibility of “freedom”). 
37 HAROLD JOHN BLACKHAM, THE HUMAN TRADITION 95 (1954). 
38 Laertius, supra note 25, at 655–57. 
39 Id. 
40 Geoffrey Scarre, Epicurus as a Forerunner of Utilitarianism, 6 UTILITAS 
219, 219–31 (1994); Philip Schofield, The Epicurean Universe of Jeremy Bentham: 
Taste, Beauty, and Reality, in BENTHAM AND THE ARTS 21, 24 (Anthony Julius et 
al. eds., 2020). 
41 Voula Tsouna, Hedonism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EPICURUS AND 
EPICUREANISM 141, 145–49 (Phillip Mitsis, ed., 2020). 
42 Stephen E. Rosenbaum, Epicurus on Pleasure and the Complete Life, 73 
MONIST 21, 22 (1990). 
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appetites,43 even though his personal habits were not without controversy.44 
 If Epicurus was a devoted hedonist, however, he was an equally 
dogmatic proponent of atomic motion as the source of all existence. Epicurus, 
like Democritus, posited the existence of an infinite universe with an infinite 
number of atoms, but suggested that atoms did not circle in a vortex, but had 
a natural downward movement, rushing to fill the void beneath them. Still, 
there was a chaotic aspect to this motion, as atoms tumbled into one 
another,45 causing “composite bodies”— the familiar objects and living 
beings of everyday existence—to come into existence.46 
 So far, we are on familiar ground. But Epicurus seemingly rejected 
the determinism that Leucippus and Democritus imputed to atomic motion 
in what has been called the “First Discovery of the Freewill Problem.”47 I 
used the word “seemingly,” however, because we lack clear statements by 
Epicurus on the subject. Rather, scholars have had recourse to two different 
sources to reach this conclusion. 
 The first, more traditional source scholars use is the Roman poet 
Lucretius’ (c. 97—55 BCE) defense of Epicureanism. In Book II of his De 
Rerum Natura, Lucretius claimed that human beings possessed voluntas—
“Will”—and that it was Will that set into motion the atoms of the brain and 
soul,48 although this reading has been disputed in some quarters.49 
 Voluntas—“Will”—this, for Lucretius, is the source of our agency, 
our freedom, our capacity for autonomous choice. It is voluntas that precedes 
and activates the atoms of our mind and psyche. If we accept this reading of 
 
43 Julia Annas, Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness, 15 PHIL. TOPICS 5, 6 
(1987). 
44 KONSTANTINOS KAPPARIS, PROSTITUTION IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD 
132 (2018). 
45 Laertius, supra note 25, at 573. 
46 Id. at 571. 
47 Pamela Huby, The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem, 42 PHIL. 353, 
353–62 (1967); cf. Suzanne Bobzien, Did Epicurus Discover the Free Will 
Problem?, 19 OXFORD STUDIES ANCIENT PHIL. 287, 287–337 (2000) (disputing 
Epicurus’ originality). 
48 LUCRETIUS, DE RERUM NATURA 114–15 (3d ed. rev. Loeb Classical 
Library 1959) (1937); CYRIL BAILEY, THE GREEK ATOMISTS AND EPICURUS: A 
STUDY 320 (1964). 
49 See, for instance, the differing accounts of Elizabeth Asmis, Free Action 
and the Swerve, 8 OXFORD STUD. ANCIENT PHIL. 275, 275–91 (1990) (book 
review); DAVID J. FURLEY, TWO STUDIES IN THE GREEK ATOMISTS 232 (1967). 
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Lucretius—and at least one notable scholar, Jeffrey Purinton dissents50—
then we must concede an arbitrariness to Lucretius’ claim that Will precedes 
the atomic motion of the human mind and soul. After all, he did not defend 
the proposition so much as took it as axiomatic. But since scholars consider 
Lucretius a faithful expositor of Epicurus’ views, this position has been 
imputed back to his older Greek source. 
 Second, in the last several decades, scholars have gained access to 
fragments of a formerly lost text of Epicurus, his De Natura (“On Nature”). 
Carbonized papyrus rolls of this text were found to have survived the 
eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in 79 CE and have been deciphered.51 While only 
a handful of pages are legible, the surviving material sheds light on Epicurus’ 
conception of the human person. 
 David Sedley was among the first scholars to investigate what 
Epicurus’ De Natura said about free will. He read this recovered text as 
indicating that Epicurus had articulated, parallel to his theory of atomic 
motion, a theory of human development that eventuated in free will. All 
persons, he read Epicurus to say, learned from experience, developed their 
character, and so acquired the capacity to choose.52 Julia Annas further 
elaborated upon Sedley’s insight by proposing that as human beings acquire 
knowledge of the external world, they grow in creativity and adaptability, 
and that this steady growth in wisdom and insight confers upon them 
“agency.”53 Most recently, the Hungarian scholar Attila Németh worked 
through this body of material to conclude that Epicurus’ conception of the 
human person was of a “unified psychophysical being” capable of reflective 
choice grounded in the individual’s own circumstances.54 
 What larger conclusions can we draw? At the very beginning of the 
philosophical tradition, we have encountered thinkers—Leucippus and 
 
50 Jeffrey Purinton, Epicurus on ‘Free Volition’ and the Atomic Swerve, 44 
PHRONESIS 253, 257 (1999). 
51 For the reconstructed texts, including translation and commentary, see 
Simon Laursen, The Early Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book, 25 CRONACHE 
ERCOLANESI 5, 5–109 (1995); and Simon Laursen, The Later Parts of Epicurus, On 
Nature, 27 CRONACHE ERCOLANESI 5, 5–82 (1997). 
52 David N. Sedley, Epicurus’ Refutation of Determinism, in SYZĒTĒSIS, 
STUDI SULL’EPICUREISMO GRECO E ROMANO OFFERTI A MARCELLO GIGANTE 11, 
21 (1983). 
53 Julia Annas, Epicurus on Agency, in PASSIONS AND PERCEPTIONS: STUDIES 
IN HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 53, 70 (Jacques Brunschwig & Martha 
Nussbaum eds., 1993). 
54 Attila Németh, EPICURUS ON THE SELF, at xiii (2017). 
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Democritus—capable of confronting the everyday experience of freedom 
with a cogently argued defense of determinism grounded on atomic motion. 
But their successors—the atomists Epicurus and Lucretius—failed to sustain 
the determinist cause. Why? That is a more difficult question to answer 
because it calls for speculation as to the authors’ motives. Perhaps, we can 
guess, Epicurus and Lucretius looked into themselves and concluded that 
determinism ran contrary to their experience as human beings. We have just 
enough of Epicurus’ writings to infer that he did this. So, we find at the origin 
of the debate a tension—on the one hand, human action conceived of as the 
product of forces outside of autonomous control, and, on the other, 
misgivings that we could be the plaything of alien power. After all, we 
seemingly experience freedom in our daily lives, so we think of ourselves as 
free, even if we are not quite sure whether or how that experience can be 
justified. 
2. The Apostle Paul and Predestination 
 Something happened in Judea around the year 30 CE. An apocalyptic 
preacher named Jesus55 disrupted services at the Temple in Jerusalem,56 was 
publicly proclaimed to be the messiah by at least some followers,57 and so 
came to the attention of the Roman authorities during the tension-filled days 
of Passover.58 Fearing unrest, the Roman governor Pontius Pilate had him 
executed by crucifixion.59 
 Jesus did not leave any written texts. His message was transmitted, 
 
55 Bart Ehrman, Jesus as an Apocalyptic Prophet, 27 PERSP. RELIGIOUS STUD. 
153, 155–59 (2000). 
56 It is unclear what this disruption consisted of or what it meant, but it seems 
to be well-attested in the sources. For one view, see Craig A. Evans, Jesus and the 
“Cave of Robbers”: Toward a Jewish Context for the Temple Action, 3 BULL. 
BIBLICAL RSCH. 93, 93–110 (1993); Craig A. Evans, Jesus’ Action in the Temple: 
Cleansing or Portent of Destruction?, in JESUS IN CONTEXT: TEMPLE, PURITY, AND 
RESTORATION 395–439 (Bruce Chilton & Craig A. Evans eds., 1997). 
57 J.F. Coakley, Jesus’ Messianic Entry into Jerusalem (John 12:12-19), 46 J. 
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 461, 480–81 (1995).  
58 PAULA FREDRIKSEN, WHEN CHRISTIANS WERE JEWS: THE FIRST 
GENERATION 59–60 (2018); RICHARD A. HORSLEY, JESUS AND THE POLITICS OF 
ROMAN PALESTINE 29 (2014). 
59 Paula Fredriksen, Why Was Jesus Christ Crucified but His Followers Were 
Not?, 29 J. STUD. NEW TESTAMENT 415, 417–18 (2007); Paul L. Maier, The 
Inscription on the Cross of Jesus of Nazareth, 124 HERMES 58, 67 (1996). 
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at least at the outset, through oral tradition.60 His following, furthermore, 
could not have been large since no independent record of his career survives 
(aside from a disputed and at least partially interpolated one in Josephus’ 
Jewish Antiquities).61 Still, Jesus had a core group of adherents who 
remained devoted to his message even after his humiliating death. Some were 
family—his mother, Mary,62 his brother, James.63 Others had been close 
associates in his preaching—the youthful John and the fisherman Peter were 
among them and had now assumed leadership positions.64 They continued to 
worship in the Temple and to disseminate Jesus’ teachings even as they 
nurtured the first stirrings of a movement which they hoped would transform 
the Jewish religion.65 
 The movement—which we shall call “the Jesus Movement,”66 since 
the word “Christian” had not yet been coined67—might have survived the 
trouble and turmoil that followed the fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of 
 
60 Kelly R. Iverson, Orality and the Gospels: A Survey of Recent Research, 8 
CURRENTS BIBLICAL RSCH. 71, 71–106 (2009). 
61 Louis H. Feldman, On the Authenticity of the Testimonium Flavianum 
Attributed to Josephus, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON JEWISH-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS 
13, 28 (Elisheva Carlebach and Jacob J. Schachter, eds., 2011) (text likely 
“adjusted or even falsified for apologetic reasons”); John P. Maier, Jesus in 
Josephus: A Modest Proposal, 52 CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY 76, 84–87 
(1990) (text interpolated, but original version can be identified). 
62 GREG W. FORBES & SCOTT D. HARROWER, RAISED FROM OBSCURITY: A 
NARRATIVAL AND THEOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE CHARACTERIZATION OF WOMEN IN 
LUKE-ACTS 150 (2015); DAVID A. FIENSY, CHRISTIAN ORIGINS AND THE ANCIENT 
ECONOMY 174 (2014). 
63 V. GEORGE SHILLINGTON, JAMES AND PAUL: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AT 
THE TURN OF THE AGES 323–24 (2015); James S. McLaren, Ananus, James, and 
Earliest Christianity. Josephus’ Account of the Death of James, 52 J. THEOLOGICAL 
STUD. 1, 14–19 (2001). 
64 Galatians 2:9. 
65 SEÁN FREYNE, THE JESUS MOVEMENT AND ITS EXPANSION: MEANING AND 
MISSION 200–32 (2014); Stephen J. Patterson, Didache 11-13: The Legacy of 
Radical Itinerancy in Early Christianity, in THE DIDACHE IN CONTEXT: ESSAYS ON 
ITS TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRANSMISSION 313–29 (Clayton N. Jefford, ed., 1995). 
66 Following what is becoming increasingly common practice. See, Torleif 
Elgvin et al., Introducing JJMJS: A New Interdisciplinary Journal, 1 J. JESUS 
MOVEMENT JEWISH SETTING 1, 1–4 (2014). 
67 David G. Horrell, The Label “Christianos:” 1 Peter 4:16 and the 
Formation of Christian Identity, 126 J. BIBLICAL LITERATURE 361–81 (2007); cf. 
Elias J. Bickerman, The Name of Christians, 42 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 109, 
110 (1949) (“all agree that the term [‘Christianos’] was invented by non-
Christians”). 
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the Temple in the year 70 CE.68 But it would have taken on a very different 
character69 had it not been for the energies and enthusiasm of the Apostle 
Paul of Tarsus. 
 There are two principal sources for Paul’s life—the Acts of the 
Apostles and the autobiographical snippets Paul inserted among his genuine 
letters. Since Acts was written late70 and has among its purposes an effort to 
“domesticate” the character of Paul in order to present a pleasing picture of 
an early, unified, and institutionalized Jesus Movement,71 best to stick to 
Paul’s own words to summarize what we know of his life. 
 Tarsus of Paul’s day was a crossroad for East-West trade, and a place 
of both religious and philosophical ferment.72 Paul himself was likely raised 
in affluent—but not opulent—circumstances. In a time of widespread 
illiteracy, Paul was conversant in several languages and knew how to speak 
and write grammatical and rhetorically polished Greek.73 He also possessed 
considerable organizational skills—directing subordinates on mission 
ventures around the Mediterranean while conducting his own.74 This 
 
68 P.H.R. van Houwelingen, Fleeing Forward: The Departure of Christians 
from Jerusalem to Pella, 65 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL J. 181, 181–200 (2003). 
69 William Varner, Baur to Bauer and Beyond: Early Jewish Christianity and 
Modern Scholarship, in ORTHODOXY AND HERESY IN EARLY CHRISTIAN 
CONTEXTS: RECONSIDERING THE BAUER THESIS 89–113 (Paul A. Hartog ed., 
2015); Barbara C. Gray, The Movements of the Jerusalem Church During the First 
Jewish War, 24 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST. 1, 1–7 (1973). 
70 According to Richard Pervo, “Acts was written c. 115.” RICHARD I. PERVO, 
ACTS: A Commentary 5 (Harold W. Attridge ed., 2009). 
71 William Arnal, The Collection and Synthesis of “Tradition” and the 
Second-Century Invention of Christianity, 23 METHOD & THEORY IN THE STUDY OF 
RELIGION 193, 205–07 (2011). 
72 TACO P. TERPSTRA, TRADING COMMUNITIES IN THE ROMAN WORLD: A 
MICRO-ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 140–43 (2013) (trade); 
William V. Harris, Towards a Study of the Roman Slave Trade, 36 MEMOIRS AM. 
ACAD. ROME 117, 128 (1980) (Tarsus and the slave trade). Cicero, Plutarch and the 
ancient geographer Strabo all singled out Tarsus for its intellectual life. See 
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO DE OFFICIIS 3.12 (Loeb Classical Library ed., 
1913); GRETCHEN RAYDAMS-SCHILS, THE ROMAN STOICS: SELF, RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND AFFECTION 33 (2005) (Plutarch on Tarsus); STRABO, GEOGRAPHY, 14.5.13 
(Loeb Classical Library ed., Horace Leonard Jones trans., 1929). 
73 FREDERICK J. LONG, ANCIENT RHETORIC AND PAUL’S APOLOGY: THE 
COMPOSITIONAL UNITY OF 2 CORINTHIANS 1–14 (2004); JOSEPH FITZMYER, 
ACCORDING TO PAUL: STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY OF THE APOSTLE 6 (1992); F. 
Forrester Church, Rhetorical Structure and Design in Paul’s Letter to Philemon, 71 
Harv. Theological Rev. 17, 17–33 (1978). 
74 E.P. SANDERS, PAUL, at 11 (1991). 
16  U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y [Vol. XV No. 1 
 
background and these skills bespeaks a formal education which in turn 
implies a wealthy upbringing. 
 The Christian New Testament contains thirteen letters attributed to 
Paul. In truth, only seven (or possibly eight, if one counts 2 Thessalonians) 
are authentic. When we collate the autobiographical comments scattered 
through these texts, we see a trajectory to Paul’s life. Rabbinically trained, 
he used the Greek words zelos (“zealous”) and zelotes (“zealot”) to describe 
the intensity of his early religious commitment.75 Writing in the 50s CE, Paul 
knew that he was applying politically loaded words to himself. Zealots 
believed in the strictest interpretation of the Law and were known to use 
violence against their opponents76—as Paul confessed he had himself.77 
 As a young man, Paul had hounded the early Jesus Movement and 
might have had blood on his hands. Through some kind of revelation,78 he 
concluded that he had been wrong in his early persecution and embarked 
upon the unlikeliest of careers79—that of an itinerant missionary on behalf of 
the Jesus Movement in the larger Gentile Mediterranean world. Only loosely 
affiliated with the Movement’s founders in Jerusalem,80 he had to suppress 
challenges to his authority early in his career,81 but he gained both confidence 
and success in activities that must have spanned around 25 years, from the 
late 30s to the early 60s, or so, CE. 
 Why does this biographical detail matter? It helps to inform our 
reading of Paul’s Letter to the Romans and its commitment to determinism. 
The last of Paul’s letters, and the most sophisticated, Romans opens on a note 
of personal triumph. Note the Letter’s salutation: “Paul, a servant of Jesus 
Christ, called to be an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God, which he 
promised beforehand through his prophets in the holy scriptures, the gospel 
according to his son, who was descended from David according to the flesh, 
and was declared to be Son of God with power according to the spirit of 
 
75 Philippians 3:6 (zelos); Galatians 1:14 (zelotes). 
76 Shimon Applebaum, The Zealots: The Case for Reevaluation, 61 J. ROMAN 
STUD. 155, 155–70 (1971). 
77 Galatians 1:13. 
78 DOMINIC CROSSAN & JONATHAN L. REED, IN SEARCH OF PAUL: HOW 
JESUS’ APOSTLE OPPOSED ROME’S EMPIRE WITH GOD’S KINGDOM 8 (2004); cf. 1 
Corinthians 9:1; 1 Corinthians 15:8 (Paul’s encounters with the post-resurrection 
Jesus). 
79 Galatians 1:13-14. 
80 Galatians 2:1-6. 
81 2 Corinthians 11:12-16. 
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holiness by resurrection from the dead.”82 Wow. Son of God, resurrection, 
divinely appointed messenger. Pay attention in particular to the “divinely-
appointed messenger” language. Paul plainly never lost his zealousness; he 
merely transferred it to a new object. 
 The salutation is also in keeping with statements Paul had made in 
earlier letters. He genuinely believed that God had pre-selected him as 
nothing less than the hinge upon which the salvation of humankind turned.83 
Thus he explained his career to the Galatians: “But when God who had set 
me apart from my mother’s womb and called me through grace.”84 It was an 
audacious assertion that he reiterated in his Letter to the Romans when he 
spoke of how he had been “set apart for the gospel of God.” 
 But now Paul wished to take a further step. In an intricately argued 
letter to a community that he had not founded and that he was visiting for the 
first time,85 Paul intended to state the case that not only was he predestined 
by God, but so were they. Indeed, he was prepared to argue that it was God’s 
will, and not the human person’s, that determined destinies for all human 
beings. 
 He opened his case by claiming that sin was a universal experience.86 
He justified his claim in two ways. First, he turned to Hebrew Scripture. 
Thus, at Romans 3: 10-18, he produced a pastiche of phrases and paraphrases 
of scriptural texts in support of his view. “There is no one who is righteous, 
not even one,” he loosely paraphrased Ecclesiastes and perhaps also Psalms 
13: 1 and 52: 1.87 He further buttressed his claim by next inserting a more 
carefully transcribed quotation from Psalm 13: 3: “All have turned aside, 
together they have become worthless; there is no one who shows kindness.”88 
 
82 Romans 1:1-4. 
83 Compare Galatians 1:15-16 with Jeremiah 1:5-6 and Isaiah 49:1. In Paul’s 
Greek, he declared that he was sent to the ethn’—the word means “nations,” but, 
especially in Paul’s writings, it also meant “the world.” Ishay Rosen-Zvi & Adi 
Ophir, Paul and the Invention of the Gentiles, 105 JEWISH Q. REV. 1, 15, 18 (2015); 
cf. N.T. Wright, Paul, Arabia, and Elijah (Galatians 1:17), 115 J. BIBLICAL 
LITERATURE 683, 683–92 (1996) (Paul’s self-association with the Prophet Elijah). 
84 Galatians 1:15. 
85 ARNOLD J. HULTGREN, PAUL’S LETTER TO THE ROMANS: A COMMENTARY 
7–11 (2011). 
86 Romans 3:9. 
87 Ecclesiastes 7:20 (“No one on earth is so righteous as to do good without 
ever sinning”); Psalm 13:1 (“Their deeds are corrupt, depraved; no one does any 
good”); Psalm 52:1 (repeating Psalm 13:1); cf. Hultgren, supra note 85, at 143–44. 
88 Romans 3:12; cf. Psalm 13:3; Hultgren, supra note 85, at 144 (further 
evaluating Paul’s quotation). 
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 Why did universal sinfulness matter to his case for determinism? We 
shall have an answer as we consider what Paul said about sin and his own 
effective lack of free will. He wrote: “I can will what is right, but I cannot do 
it.”89 He continued: “I see in my members another law at war with the law of 
my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members.”90 
He added: “With my flesh, I am a slave to the law of sin.”91 And so Paul 
concluded that it was not free will that controlled his choices, but sin: “I do 
not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very 
thing I hate.92 . . . Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, 
but sin that dwells within me.”93 For Paul, sin negated free choice. And, since 
the experience of sin was universal, it was easy for Paul to extrapolate that if 
he could not control his temptations, neither could anyone else. 
 In Second Temple Judaism at the time Paul wrote—and Paul was a 
product, more or less, of Second Temple Judaism94—it was common to 
conceive of sin as a debt.95 Paul certainly conceived of sin as a type of debt 
obligation that required satisfaction,96 but plainly he also thought of it as 
moral failure and the erasure of free will. We are not in charge of our words 
or deeds; rather, our sinful predilections exercise command authority. It is 
helpful to bear in mind James Dunn’s point that Paul was not confessing to 
personal sins, or a personal inability to lead a moral life.97 His Letter to the 
Romans was not a confession of wrong-doing but a statement of principle: 
Human beings are flawed, that flaw can be appropriately labeled as “sin,” 
and sin always triumphs in the end over our personal desire for perfection. 
 For sure, there were other Jewish writers who took a very different 
view. One might consider the author of Sirach who worked in the early 
Second Temple period and who wrote: “[The Lord] created humankind in the 
beginning, and he left them in the power of their own free choice. If you 
choose, you can keep the commandments, and to act faithfully is a matter of 
 
89 Romans 7:18. 
90 Romans 7:23. 
91 Romans 7:25. 
92 Romans 7:15. 
93 Romans 7:20. 
94 Gabriele Boccaccini, Introduction: The Three Paths of Salvation of Paul 
the Jew, in PAUL THE JEW: REREADING THE APOSTLE AS A FIGURE OF SECOND 
TEMPLE JUDAISM 1,2 (Gabriele Boccaccini, et al. eds., 2016) (“Paul should be 
regarded as nothing other than a Second Temple Jew”). 
95 GARY A. ANDERSON, SIN: A HISTORY 27–54 (2009). 
96 Id. at 194. 
97 JAMES D.G. DUNN, THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL THE APOSTLE, 68–69 (1998).  
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your own choice.”98 Paul’s understanding of human powerlessness to 
overcome sin, however, and not Sirach’s, took root and flourished in large 
portions of what would become Christianity. 
 But before we discuss the reception of Paul’s teaching by later 
generations of followers, there are two interrelated points that need to be 
addressed. First, there is the matter of Paul’s understanding of the supremacy 
of divine power over human history. This question matters because we see 
Paul proposing a kind of divine historical drama—human beings might act, 
but they do so at the direction and under the will of God with little room left 
for human autonomy. 
 The central example of this way of thinking is found at Romans 9: 
17, where Paul subtly rewrites Exodus 9: 16 to insist that the Pharaoh who 
resisted Moses’ pleas to release the Israelites from captivity should be seen 
exclusively as an instrument in God’s hands. To appreciate how Paul 
manipulated the biblical text, we should first consult Exodus 9: 16. There we 
find God informing Pharaoh, after a succession of plagues, that “This is why 
I have let you live, to show you my power, and to make my name resound 
through all the earth.”99 Taken in isolation, the passage looks like God has 
instrumentalized Pharaoh. But the verse is part of a larger narrative, which 
features not only the infliction of plagues on Egypt, but Pharaoh’s considered 
responses. Pharaoh, the great ruler, the guarantor of his people’s prosperity, 
has seen his country laid low by the wrath of God. He thinks, he ponders, he 
frets about this state of affairs. And at least for a few brief moments he even 
changed his mind. Thus, we find a few verses later, at Exodus 9: 27, Pharaoh 
confessing: “This time, I have sinned. The Lord is in the right. I and my 
people are in the wrong.”100 Pharaoh, plainly, is more than a mere passive 
instrument, a convenient tool at God’s disposal. 
 What is going on here? Pharaoh in Exodus is clearly a stubborn, 
recalcitrant human being, who does not want to admit error. And God, of 
course, is God—the all-powerful creator and sustainer of the universe. No 
question, as Exodus narrates the encounter, God wished to display 
overwhelming, irresistible sovereign might. And while Pharaoh, the greatest 
sovereign of the ancient world, resists, that resistance is inevitably futile. But 
one can also detect a subtext—God wished to be an instructor. God wanted 
 
98 Sirach 15:14-15; cf. JOHN E. TOEWS, THE STORY OF ORIGINAL SIN 19–20 
(2013) (further analyzing the quoted passage). 
99 Exodus 9:16. 
100 Exodus 9:27. 
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to show Pharaoh something. Indeed, God wished to teach Pharaoh. Yes, 
Pharaoh’s heart was hardened, the text conceded, but it did not have to be 
this way. If Pharaoh was obstinate, he was also capable of reflection, insight, 
even, possibly, a change direction. Pharaoh, in other words, retained some 
small, vestigial capacity for human agency, to which God appealed. 
 It is this personal dimension, this element of God speaking to 
Pharaoh, hoping to change his mind, that is missing from Paul’s paraphrase 
of Exodus 9:16. Paul depersonalized Pharaoh. He turned Pharaoh into an 
instrument. He emphasized that Pharaoh was brought into the world chiefly 
to play a pivotal role in a divine drama: “For the Scripture says to Pharaoh: 
‘I have raised you up for the very purpose of showing my power in you, so 
that my name be proclaimed in all the earth.’”101 For Paul, Pharaoh was a 
means to a greater end. Pharaoh existed because he was necessary for God’s 
display of omnipotence. God did not teach Pharaoh or hold out any hope for 
him. On Paul’s reading, Pharaoh would not—could not!—be open to 
instruction. For Paul, Pharaoh—reputed in the ancient world as the most 
powerful of kings—was reduced to serving as God’s tool to bring about the 
divine plan for the world. His subjugation would be an awesome display of 
divine sovereignty. 
 But Paul did not stop his analysis with the high and mighty. God, 
Paul asserted, took the same kind of interest in all persons and exercised the 
same level of dominion and control over every human being’s actions and 
choices. God had a plan for every human being, though, to be sure, for most 
persons it was condemnation and death. After all, the human condition, was 
slavery to sin,102 although God might choose to rescue some persons from 
their sinful depravity. Paul explained: “So then he has mercy on whomever 
he chooses, and he hardens the heart of whomever he chooses.”103 Human 
beings, however, had no right to complain of God’s partiality. After all, “has 
the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one object for 
special use and another for ordinary use?”104 Mere potter’s clay—human 
beings, unaided by divine mercy, were powerless to effectuate salvation. 
 
101 Romans 9:17; cf. Exodus 9:16 (“But this is why I have let you live: to 
show you my power, and to make my name resound through all the earth.” Moses’ 
God is interested in enlightening Pharaoh; Paul’s God simply wanted to use 
Pharaoh to make a point.) 
102 Romans 6:17; cf. John K. Goodrich, From Slaves of Sin to Slaves of God: 
Reconsidering the Origin of Paul’s Slavery Metaphor in Romans 6, 23 BULL. FOR 
BIBLICAL RES. 509, 526 (2013) (further evaluating this concept). 
103 Romans 9:18. 
104 Romans 9:21. 
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Works—our collective choice to do good and avoid evil—availed humanity 
naught.105 
 This brings us to our second interrelated point. There were people 
whom God “foreknew” and had selected for eternal life.106 By what criterion? 
That remained a mystery: “How unsearchable are his judgments and how 
inscrutable his ways. For who has known the mind of the Lord?”107 
 But if we cannot answer the question, “why did God select some and 
not others for salvation?” then we at least have assurances that God has, in 
fact, selected some portion of humanity for ransoming. What form, then, did 
that act of mercy take? To answer this question, Paul borrowed a noun from 
the long history of Greek gift-giving—charis,108 a word that is customarily 
translated today as “grace.”109 The word “grace” is a theologically rich 
concept with long historical associations, but this is precisely the reason we 
should avoid its use and favor only the simple Greek rendering, “Gift,” at 
least for purposes of this essay. 
 Thus, we should take the approach of the historian John Barclay, who 
has written that “‘[g]race’ is a multi-faceted concept best approached through 
the category of gift.”110 There were at least four aspects to this gift as Paul 
understood it. First, it gave the assurance of eternal life.111 Second, it 
permitted believers to grasp through faith the redemptive acts and powers of 
Jesus.112 Third, it was non-reciprocal. Unlike the charis that Greek gift-givers 
exchanged, there could be no mutuality with God.113 Finally, charis was the 
source of “freedom” for the believer. The believer might choose to eat 
“anything,” or to follow an ascetic diet,114 or to judge whether or not to revere 
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one day a week as holier than the others,115 or not. “Let all be fully convinced 
in their own minds.”116 
 Paradoxically, then, after stating a compelling case for determinism, 
Paul returned to the subject of freedom. Having received God’s gift, the 
believer simultaneously receives freedom. Paul’s best statement of the 
content of this freedom is found not in Romans but in his letter to the 
Galatians. Written to address a crisis among recent converts in Galatia,117 the 
freedom Paul promised was not “self-indulgence” or the right to back-bite 
and “devour one another.”118 It was not the liberty to engage in “fornication, 
impurity, licentiousness, idolatry,” or other such offense.119 Liberty, the trite 
observation would have it, is not license. What freedom consisted in then is 
“love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and 
self-control.”120 Still, objections might be raised. This is a freedom denied to 
most persons. It is available only to the elect few who have received the 
“Gift”—charis.121 
 Reading Paul as I have done, it is clear that on the most important 
decisions—whether to believe, how to act on that belief—the individual has 
been deprived of meaningful choice. Absent charis, absent God’s mysterious, 
freely bestowed gift, genuine belief is not possible, no human action can 
substitute for it, and one’s fate is sealed. Damnation is now inevitable. To be 
sure, Paul might not have disputed that the individual retained a modest 
capacity for free choice. Do I paint the walls yellow or blue? Do I shop at 
Walmart, or Target, or do I order online from Amazon? Paul was not 
concerned with questions like these. In that respect, he is unlike the ferocious, 
unyielding determinist Democritus for whom atomic motion was the 
governing principle behind every human choice. Still, for Paul, in the end, 
human beings are clay, God is the potter, and God can do anything God 
wishes with his handiwork. If God saw fit, God might compel his followers 
to purchase only blue paint and to shop only at Target. 
 Theologians over the millennia have softened and qualified these 
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claims. This is not the place to explore those developments. Suffice it to say, 
however, that prominent thinkers like Augustine of Hippo122 and John 
Calvin123 embraced modified versions of Pauline predestination, although 
other writers in the Christian tradition, such as the Portuguese Jesuit Luis de 
Molina (1535–1600), offered cogently argued alternatives,124 while the 
Council of Trent anathematized those who denied a role to free will in the 
plan for salvation.125 What matters for us, however, is that in the ancient 
world the Free Will versus Determinism dichotomy could be identified both 
in philosophical and religious texts. But, the question occurs, what about the 
new age of science that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries represented? 
C. Twentieth-Century Science 
 To account for the contributions of the science of the last century and 
a quarter to the free will debate is a vast undertaking and impossible in this 
essay. Best to judiciously sample. Two names stand above the field—
Sigmund Freud and B.F. Skinner. They are worth paying attention to for their 
insights into human psychology and behavior, of course, but at least equally 
because of their public stature. Each of them contributed to the public’s 
understanding of free will and determinism in ways others did not. Indeed, 
the works of both scholars featured prominently—and occasionally still do—
in legal scholarship and public policy. 
1. Sigmund Freud 
 Vienna at the close of the nineteenth century was, in the words of 
Carl Schorske, shaking with “acutely felt tremors of social and political 
disintegration.”126 The disintegration, as Schorske saw it, was manifold.127 
Politically, there was the steady erosion of the seemingly timeless grandeur 
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of Habsburg Rule.128 The Habsburgs had hoped to reconcile with the modern 
world through a series of liberal reforms, creating space for principles of 
tolerance and free thought to flourish, but even those reforms had come under 
steady assault and had begun to falter.129 Plainly, the political order was 
slowly crumbling, giving birth to the very worst of modernity.130 Anti-
Semitism, intolerance, crude populist passions asserted themselves 
vigorously in late nineteenth-century Vienna.131 
 And as political structures slowly surrendered to hostile forces, the 
sense of connectedness with the past, with tradition, with what had been 
revered as ancient wisdom and eternal truth also fragmented.132 Still, a space 
was opened up for great creativity. Intellectual life itself had shifted on its 
foundations.133 This was the time of Gustav Klimt and his daring university 
paintings,134 the composer Gustav Mahler,135 the critics Julius Korngold and 
Max Graf,136 and, of course, Sigmund Freud. 
 Peter Gay, in his magisterial biography of Freud, sees two things as 
crucial to his development. First there was his birth into what we might today 
call a blended family. His father was in his forties, his mother barely twenty 
when young Sigmund was born. Indeed, his father—previously married and 
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widowed—had a son from his first marriage older than his second wife.137 
Second, there was Freud’s Jewishness.138 Freud’s father was not especially 
religious, and Sigmund even less so.139 But, like his father, the younger Freud 
had no interest in taking the easy path of assimilation.140 His writings, from 
his early Interpretation of Dreams141 to his late work, Moses and 
Monotheism, were filled with a consciousness of his Jewish 
distinctiveness.142 
 Freud’s first ambition was to train as a lawyer.143 As an “adolescent,” 
he toyed with political radicalism,144 and remained a committed liberal all of 
his life.145 But as for careers, Freud finally spurned the law and settled upon 
medicine, where he experienced quick success. By the middle 1880s, when 
Freud was around 30 years of age, “he had numerous publications to his name 
that dealt with human and animal neuro-anatomy and the recently discovered 
drug cocaine.”146 At this time, he received a grant permitting him a year’s 
study in Paris. He returned from the experience convinced that he should 
investigate mental illness, and specifically the topic of “hysteria,”147 which 
he understood, rejecting commonplace assumptions of the time, as a 
disabling psychological condition that might afflict men as well as women 
regardless of race or background and was the result, he asserted, of “the 
patient’s traumatic experiences.”148 
 For much of the late 1880s and 1890s, Freud’s work centered on 
private practice, where he explored, through elaborate, open-ended 
investigation, the roots of his patients’ hysterias— “neuroses,” he called 
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them—which he associated with childhood sexual experiences.149 We shall 
see that Freud’s interest in childhood sexuality remained a constant of his 
research, and that it formed the foundation of his case against free will and 
in favor of determinism. His argument, however, evolved in stages and is 
layered with complexity, which the following pages hope to unpack. 
 At an early stage in his research, Freud believed that his patients had 
suffered sexual trauma—abuse of some sort, usually at the hands of their 
fathers—in a process that acquired the misleading label of “the seduction 
theory.”150 Freud, however, soon rejected this hypothesis, since he could not 
believe that abuse was so pervasive.151 But if children did not in fact 
experience sexual trauma, Freud reasoned, it was still possible that they 
imagined it, “that they create such scenes in phantasy, and this psychical 
reality requires to be taken into account.”152 
 Freud therefore felt compelled to search for a replacement for the 
seduction theory and he found it in his theory of infantile sexuality. But 
before we explore this theory, we must focus this inquiry in two ways. First, 
we must remember that our principal concern is with the question of free will 
versus determinism. Freud never expressly addressed the problem of free 
will. But his theory of infantile sexuality constitutes an implicit repudiation 
of the concept. For Freud, what mattered were the hidden influences, the 
fortunate—or, much more often, the unfortunate—occurrences of infancy 
and childhood, that took place outside the subject’s control, but that 
continued to shape and mold the entirety of life’s trajectory.153 Second, we 
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must acknowledge and take account of the ways in which Freud’s theory of 
infantile sexuality is embedded within his larger world of ideas. In particular, 
we must first address his work on instincts, repression, and the unconscious, 
for it is in doing so that we will discover that his theory of infantile sexuality 
functions as the cornerstone of what has been called Freud’s “psychic 
determinism.”154 
 Identifying the proper entry-point into the body of Freud’s work is 
challenging. There is a coherence and a unity to his project that sparkles with 
intellectual elegance even if one disagrees fundamentally with the underlying 
arguments. It is tightly inter-connected, and the selection of an entryway is 
bound to feel arbitrary. That said, we must choose, and it seems that the best 
place to begin is with Freud’s important paper elucidating his theory of 
instincts, written in 1915. 
 The year 1915 was one of momentous significance in Freud’s life. 
World War I was raging, and Freud had grown deeply disillusioned not only 
in the war effort but in the entire civilizational project. He had hoped that 
“the great nations” of the world might “have acquired” such a strong sense 
of common purpose that the words “foreigner” and “enemy” would vanish 
from the vocabulary, but that was not to be.155 Nations had instead availed 
themselves of “every such misdeed, every such act of violence, as would 
disgrace the individual.”156 Far from being paralyzed with despair, however, 
Freud threw himself into his work with renewed energy and produced, in the 
course of a few months in the late spring and summer of 1915, his landmark 
studies on instincts, repression, and the unconscious. 
 “Instinct,” Freud commenced his investigation of the subject, “is 
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indispensable to . . . psychology.”157 It consisted in the first instance in a 
stimulus that was internal to the person.158 Because it was internal, and 
furthermore, continuous, it was impossible to flee.159 We might experience 
pain and endeavor to escape the source of the discomfort, but instincts were 
inescapable. Instincts also had in common a biological origin, although Freud 
acknowledged that some instincts were complex and social in character, such 
as the instincts for “play,” for “gregariousness,” or, for that matter, for 
“destruction.”160 Hunger and thirst were also among the instincts, and there 
were “numerous” sexual instincts, “emanat[ing] from a great variety of 
organic sources.”161 Fundamentally, however, Freud reduced the instincts to 
two types: “self-preservative” and “sexual.”162 
 If instincts were inescapable, then so was Freud’s logic, once one 
accepted its premises. If instincts were an essential component of animate 
organisms, and if they were a necessary feature of existence, then “the aim . 
. . of an instinct is in every instance satisfaction.”163 The German noun that 
Freud used and that is often translated as “instinct” is Trieb. We recognize 
the meaning of this noun in its close English equivalent, “Drive.” 
 Freud’s choice of the word Trieb captured this urge for fulfillment 
particularly well. Trieb might be a biological necessity, such as the need 
periodically to relieve oneself, but the word also has a cognitive dimension, 
and is often better translated as compulsion or propulsion.164 Trieb then 
becomes an unyielding pressure, an impelling force.165 It “is the driving force 
behind the mind compelled and fueled by unconscious desire.”166 In the 
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Greek of Democritus, Trieb might be rendered as ananké. Left unchecked, 
its propulsive force can lead to disorder, even chaos. Thus, instinctual drives 
needed to be restrained, which led Freud to declare some instincts might be 
“inhibited” or only partially satisfied;167 while others might be sublimated, or 
repressed,168 or even turned into their opposite.169 
 Let us pay particular attention to that word “repressed.” Repression 
was the subject of the second of Freud’s major investigations of 1915.170 
Freud opened that study by noting that an instinctive drive may encounter 
“resistances which seek to make it inoperative,” chief among them 
“repression.”171 It should seem, Freud reasoned, that such a phenomenon 
ought not to occur, because it was inherent in the instincts to seek pleasurable 
satisfaction. The fact that such obstacles existed hinted at the presence of 
hidden mechanisms capable of blunting instincts and turning pleasure into 
“unpleasure.” Such a phenomenon demanded explanation.172 
 This explanation must begin with a nod in the direction of Freud’s 
theory of the conscious mind. The conscious mind was the land of ideas. 
Instincts could not enter there except in the form of ideas.173 Consider how 
the process worked: I feel hunger. I respond in the first instance by forming 
the idea, “I am hungry.” It is the idea that has entered my conscious mind and 
causes me to search for ways to satisfy my appetite. Repression then serves 
to block or distort this process, either by preventing the formation of the idea 
altogether, or by turning the idea into something pathological, a 
“psychoneurosis,” to use Freud’s vocabulary.174 
 This process, furthermore, occurs outside of conscious control. We 
are unaware of its occurrence. Repression, Freud wrote, “proliferates in the 
dark, . . . and takes on extreme forms of expression.”175 If an instinct is an 
impelling force, then repression is an equal and opposing force. It is 
 
167 Id. at 122. 
168 Id. at 126. 
169 Id. at 133 (Freud gives the example of love turning into hatred). 
170 SIGMUND FREUD, Repression, XIV THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE 
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 146 (James Strachey ed. 
& trans., 1957). 
171 Id. at 146. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 152. 
174 Id. at 148. 
175 Id. at 149. 
30  U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y [Vol. XV No. 1 
 
“repulsion.”176 A completely successful repression, one that entirely blocked 
an instinct, might be invisible to patient and therapist alike and so “escape 
our examination.”177 Most repressions, however, were not like that. Rather, 
they create a set of counter-ideas, pathological in their operation, meant to 
persuade the sufferer not to go near the troubling instinct. 
 Freud illustrated the process with an example drawn from his 
practice. Suppose a young man who felt “a libidinal attitude towards [his] 
father, coupled with fear of him.”178 The young man repressed this idea, 
causing it to “vanish[] out of consciousness.”179 In its place, however, there 
was substituted—in a process known as “displacement”—another idea, a 
kind of animal phobia: “fear of a wolf, instead of a demand for love from the 
father.”180 The repression might have formed to assist the young man in 
suppressing complicated, even forbidden feelings, but it did so 
pathologically, causing the sufferer to feel enormous fear, “unpleasure,” and 
“anxiety.”181 
 Importantly, the young man had no volitional control over the 
process of repression and displacement. He never said to himself, “I must not 
think of my father and shall therefore fixate instead upon this wolf.” On the 
contrary, he was unaware both of his feelings towards his father and of the 
repressive functions of his unconscious mind. He had no conscious 
recollection of the tangled set of facts that triggered his overwhelming 
anxieties. He was aware only that he had a morbid fear of wolves.182 
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 Repression, it has been said, stands as a kind of boundary line and as 
evidence of “the phenomenon of knowing yet not knowing.”183 It causes 
“[c]onsciousness” to become “divided.”184 But if consciousness is divided, if 
the “I,” or at least the unexamined “I,” is not an integrated whole but 
something fragmented, then what was it that lay out of conscious sight, and, 
again, out of conscious control? These questions introduce us to the existence 
of the Freudian unconscious. 
 The process of repression, Freud argued, led to the creation and 
maintenance of the unconscious.185 All well and good. But if some idea, or 
some primal drive, has been crammed into an unconscious state, then how 
was it possible to know of its existence?186 If something is unconscious, after 
all, how do we know that it even exists? 
 Thus, Freud felt it necessary to prove the existence of the 
unconscious and did so through an example familiar to every reader: we all 
have a supply of latent memories. We can recall no more than a few of these 
memories at any given time, yet the others must reside in some hidden recess 
of our minds. An illustration proves the point: In my youth, I was an 
aficionado for baseball statistics, and can still recall, when prompted, that 
Henry Aaron hit 755 home runs in his career, and that Rico Carty hit .366 to 
win the National League batting championship in 1970. But I do not walk 
around continuously rehearsing these numbers out loud. That is Freud’s 
point. Memories like these exist, they can be summoned up when the need 
arises, but are not routinely a part of our consciousness. They must, in other 
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words, be unconscious, at least most of the time.187 
 And if we possess memories like these, if we feel confident that our 
minds are constituted as simultaneously possessing both conscious and 
unconscious aspects, then we can draw similar inferences about the mental 
states of others.188 Other human beings seem to be broadly similar to 
ourselves—they speak as we do, they think as we do, they have memories 
that serve them well. And so, all persons must have both a conscious and an 
unconscious mind. This awareness of the universality of human cognition 
then furnishes us with the necessary insight to examine more deeply the 
attributes of the unconscious.189 
 Freud’s next step was to add to this attribute of human nature the 
insights he had developed regarding repression. He was thus enabled to 
distinguish between two types of unconscious. There was the 
unconsciousness of our latent memories (all those batting statistics I can 
recall from my youth). These memories, however, are not repressed. I can 
bid them into my consciousness when I please to. They encounter no “special 
resistance.”190 To this body of latent memories and ideas Freud affixed the 
label “preconscious” (abbreviated Pcs).191 
 While this assertion might have served well as a starting point, still 
it was a fairly uninteresting observation. What Freud was keenly interested 
in was to come to an understanding of that part of the unconscious whose 
recall met with psychological resistance but whose undetectable force 
nevertheless impelled us to actions in the real world that we either did not 
choose or could not fully explain. Freud spoke of this part of the unconscious 
as “dynamic” and labeled it with the abbreviation Ucs.192 
 What made this aspect of the unconscious “dynamic” was the role 
played by repression in its creation and sustenance. Repression was a 
phenomenon made manifest through its visible effects on the patient’s well-
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being, and its impact was nowhere more visible than on the human emotions. 
The healthy patient manifested a healthy range of human emotions. But in 
the neurotic patient, Freud continued, “we are accustomed to speak of 
unconscious love, hate, anger . . . and find it impossible to avoid even the 
strange conjunction ‘unconscious consciousness of guilt.’”193 What has taken 
the place of love, hate, or anger? In a word, “anxiety.”194 The neurotic patient 
becomes anxious and so unconsciously creates “substitute ideas” that, 
through displacement, assume the role originally filled by those 
ideas/instincts/drives that were repressed.195 In this way, for instance, a fear 
of wolves displaced forbidden emotions about one’s father.196 
 An entire unconscious mental system was thereby created, one that 
has little regard for “time,” or inner “contradictions,” or even “external . . . 
reality.”197 Still, it was not an impermeable system. It revealed its inner 
workings in two different ways: through “dreaming” and through “neurosis” 
(i.e., anxiety).198 It thus became the role of the skilled analyst to examine the 
operations of this system and to assist the patient through a long and difficult 
struggle to become aware of these inner processes so as to appropriately 
address them, and perhaps even gain some semblance of control over them.199 
 But was the unconscious mind thus described the possession 
exclusively of a few disordered minds? Or was it a feature widely shared by 
humanity? Freud answered the first question negatively and the second in the 
affirmative. Every human being has an unconscious. An unconscious mind 
shaped and molded and maintained by repression is a universal phenomenon 
characterizing the whole of humankind. And this awareness returns us to 
Freud’s substitute for the seduction theory of infantile trauma—the theory of 
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infantile sexuality. 
 Freud first articulated his theory of infantile sexuality in a collection 
of three essays published in 1905 and reprinted subsequently in the Standard 
Edition of his works.200 As with so much else of his work, Freud commenced 
his investigation with a dilemma in need of resolution. Consider a small 
child. The child experiences joy, sadness, the full range of human emotions. 
The child is busy acquiring knowledge of the surrounding environment. The 
child learns, explores, speaks its first words. Yet that very same child retains 
no conscious recollection of these formative years. The amnesia of 
childhood—universal in scope—blocks direct access to those memories. The 
best anyone of us can hope for is to remember those stories told us by the 
loving adults in our lives in these first years of life. Why? Why such universal 
amnesia?201 
 Freud continued; childhood amnesia is not the only form of amnesia 
recognized by science. We know that neurotics can also experience amnesia. 
They are capable of blotting from conscious recall the terrifying, traumatic 
moments of their lives. “Hysterical” amnesia Freud called it, and it was the 
product of repression.202 We know further that many of these cases of 
neurotic amnesia have to do specifically with sexual disturbances. “Can it 
be,” Freud posed the question, “that infantile amnesia, too, is to be brought 
into relation with the sexual impulses of childhood?”203 
 Freud answered in the affirmative. In speaking of true infants, those 
children only a few weeks to a few months of age, Freud associated sexuality 
not with the genitalia but with other forms of stimulation and arousal—
thumb-sucking and the obvious joy it gives the small child, or other rhythmic 
tactile sensations. The infant’s greatest pleasure, after all, is derived from 
sucking its mother’s breast milk and it stands to reason that the child wishes 
to replicate it.204 As children grow a little older and gain control over their 
bowel movements, many derive satisfaction from their new-found ability to 
retain stool and then to expel it in a way that “produce[s] powerful 
stimulation.”205 The “anal phase” of childhood development this period 
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subsequently came to be called, although Freud himself rejected “a linear 
view of the person’s development.”206 
 Sometime around the age of five, finally, boys come to recognize 
that they have a penis and that they can derive satisfaction from its 
manipulation. Girls of the same age, on the other hand, understand that this 
is something they lack, they sense its absence, and so develop “envy for the 
penis.”207 The sexism implicit in these distinctions really requires no 
elaboration.208 
 Let us focus, however, not on the distinction Freud drew between 
young boys and young girls, but on the unspoken inferences in his entire line 
of argument. First, his argument depended on the mechanism of repression 
being a universal phenomenon that shaped both the conscious and 
unconscious minds of all human beings; second, it assumed that the 
memories being repressed were chiefly sexual; and third, he generalized, 
assuming that all or most persons had similar experiences of arousal and 
repression. 
 Only later did Freud develop from these observations and inferences 
the most famous part of his theory of infantile sexuality—the so-called 
“Oedipus Complex.” Among the clearest statements of this aspect of infantile 
sexuality is the one found in Freud’s General Introduction to 
Psychoanalysis.209 The complex was named, Freud averred, after King 
Oedipus of Greek mythology, who was prophesied to kill his father and sleep 
with his mother—deeds he accomplished in spite of his best efforts to avoid 
that fate.210 Freud dwelt on the inevitability of Oedipus’ act—he “did all in 
his power to avoid” it, but he found his destiny inescapable.211 It thus became 
easy for Freud to acknowledge the lack of free will inherent in the story, 
“[The Complex] sets aside the individual’s responsibility to social law, and 
displays divine forces ordaining the crime and rendering powerless the moral 
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instincts of the human being which would guard him against the crime.”212 
That becomes Freud’s theme as he pursued the Oedipus Complex. Human 
beings are powerless to resist this ugly, dark, and entirely ineluctable natural 
impulse, the successful management of which determines the whole course 
of our future. 
 The Oedipus Complex functioned similarly, Freud alleged, for both 
young boys and girls. “The little man wants his mother all to himself, finds 
his father in the way . . . [and] often expresses his feelings directly in words 
and promises his mother to marry her.”213 Similarly, with girls, “things 
proceed in just the same way, with the necessary reversal . . . The loving 
devotion to the father, the need to do away with the superfluous mother and 
to take her place . . ..”214 Barely latent in all of this are the dual passions of 
lust and murder. The birth of other, younger children does not dissipate the 
Complex, but only makes it more multi-dimensional, as sibling rivalry adds 
further complications.215 
 Yet all of this is quite forbidden. Incest is among the greatest of 
crimes, as are matricide and patricide.216 Adolescence and young adulthood 
are consumed with coming to terms with these impulses, grudging 
acceptance of the social prohibitions against their fulfillment, and in the 
process, the gradual attainment of “free[dom] . . . from the parents.”217 Alas, 
not everyone is successful in meeting these obligations. “In neurotics . . . this 
detachment from the parents is not accomplished at all.”218 “In this sense the 
Oedipus Complex is justifiably regarded as the kernel of the neuroses.”219 
 These are struggles, furthermore, that occur for the most part outside 
of the conscious mind’s control. But they have enormous ramifications, not 
only for the individual but for entire societies. In Chapter Four of Totem and 
Taboo, Freud proposed that organized society itself was founded on an 
original act of patricide, as brothers banded together to kill their father and 
seize the female harem he had accumulated for himself.220 Guilt, conscience, 
 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 291–92. 
214 Id. at 292. 
215 SIGMUND FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 293 
(Joan Riviere trans., 1943). 
216 Id. at 294. 
217 Id. at 295. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 296. 
220 SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO, 163–64, 175–78 (James Strachey 
trans., 1989). 
2021] State Of Mind, State Of Law 37 
remorse, and repression all have their foundation in this primal re-enactment 
of Oedipus’s crime.221 In Chapter Seven of Civilization and Its Discontents, 
Freud similarly traced to the Oedipus Complex the guilt and fear of authority 
that combine to serve most persons as internal mechanisms of self-control. 
Society functions, civilization is possible, because of “the human sense of 
guilt [that] goes back to the killing of the primal father.”222 
 Still, Freud left the door open to human self-determination, at least 
at some level. For that, he recommended psychoanalysis. In his General 
Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Freud boasted that his techniques 
“achieve[d] cures that are in no way inferior to the most brilliant in other 
fields of medical therapy.”223 Psychoanalysis was of self-evident benefit to 
neurotic intellects. But even seemingly healthy minds might come to a 
greater sense of self-awareness and consequent freedom from the 
introspection that comes with analysis. In his Interpretation of Dreams, Freud 
acknowledged that this was so in his own life, as analysis of the content of 
his dreams demonstrated, to his own satisfaction at least, the roots both of his 
strong commitment to Judaism224 and his ambition to attain “greatness.”225 
Freud made it plain that he was the person he was because of the events of 
his childhood, but that he had now attained self-awareness, even mastery, 
over those previously hidden features of his life. 
 Can one compare Paul and Freud? For Paul, sin is universal and 
blights the human capacity for choice. It is a very nearly all-embracing 
feature of the human condition. We want to do the right thing, but sin keeps 
tugging us in the opposite direction. One thing alone allows for escape: God’s 
gift, charis. God gives his gift to only a few. Most human beings are destined 
for a wretched life of transgressions and misdeeds, followed by eternal 
perdition. Only a lucky few are given the possibility of escaping. 
 For Freud, it is not sin, but the universality of infantile sexuality, its 
manifestation in the Oedipus Complex, and the real emotional and 
psychological struggle to navigate this reality that is the source of human 
misery. Everyone must undergo the trial and almost everyone represses 
recollection of the conflict. The human unconscious is thereby transformed 
into a great seedbed of emotional distress and neurosis. This is true on the 
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individual level, the level of the family, and even on the level of nations and 
civilizations. Only a lucky few have the opportunity to escape, by availing 
themselves of psychoanalysis. Free will versus determinism? The human 
condition itself stands as an obstacle to autonomous choice in all but the most 
exceptional of circumstances. 
2. B.F. Skinner 
 In 1944, the psychologist B.F. Skinner, then in his final year of 
teaching at the University of Minnesota, and his wife, Eve, experienced the 
birth of their younger daughter, Deborah. This fact, while of undoubted 
personal importance to the Skinners, grew into a serious national controversy 
the following year when Dr. Skinner published an essay in the Ladies’ Home 
Journal explaining and defending the unorthodox choices he made for baby 
Deborah’s care. 
 “Baby in a Box: The Machine Age Comes to the Nursery,” read the 
title.226 A picture gracing the story showed a smiling eleven-month-old infant 
staring out of a window inserted into the side of a large wooden box. Skinner 
explained that he sought to accomplish two objectives with the box: to ease 
his wife’s daily child-rearing efforts; and to see to the comfort of their new 
daughter.227 Skinner, however, was soon drawn to the relationship of the 
environment and young Deborah’s behavior. “Raising or lowering the 
temperature by more than a degree or two will produce a surprising change 
in the baby’s condition and behavior.”228 Skinner eventually determined that 
a steady seventy-eight degrees was optimal for the baby’s best behavior.229 
He acknowledged, furthermore, that temperature was especially important 
because he and his wife chose to keep their daughter naked nearly all of the 
time, again, with remarkable effects on her behavior: “A wider range and 
variety of behavior are . . . encouraged by the freedom from clothing. For 
example, our baby acquired an amusing, almost apelike skill in the use of her 
feet.”230 
 Contentiousness and emulation soon followed. The Minneapolis 
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Morning Tribune recommended the box.231 Dr. C.A. Aldrich, on the other 
hand, “a famous pediatrician at the Mayo Clinic,” voiced his disapproval.232 
The editors of the New Yorker were similarly skeptical. Interviewed by the 
New Yorker, Skinner defended himself: “It’s obvious that wrapping a baby 
in clothes and blankets is a primitive, clumsy, and sometimes dangerous 
method of keeping it warm. A baby needs absolute freedom from clothes.”233 
Two decades later, Skinner’s “Baby Box” was still drawing both critics234 
and tongue-in-cheek admirers.235 Three and a half decades later, Skinner 
himself continued to defend his device. His child enjoyed a comfortable 
infancy, he attested, and he was able to derive useful information from a few 
experiments and observations he conducted.236 He was also not above 
boasting that he had patented and licensed the device, marketed under the 
trade name “The Heir Conditioner.”237 
 B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) plainly was someone who knew how to 
call attention to himself. But who was B.F. Skinner? If one had to sum him 
up in a paragraph, he was quintessentially American—if, by American one 
means the product of Anglophone, old-stock, white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
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culture. Skinner’s grandmother was Josephine Penn—she claimed descent 
from the William Penn who founded Pennsylvania—while his grandfather 
James Skinner was an immigrant from England who was content with a life 
of house painting, odd jobs, and get-rich-quick schemes.238 Skinner’s father, 
on the other hand, obtained more stable employment as a lawyer, first in 
Susquehanna and then in Scranton, Pennsylvania.239 Young B.F. was 
inventive, with a gift for gadgets. He was a self-promoter, with a simply 
stated yet comprehensive worldview. And he had a simple yet boundless 
confidence in the power of his own genius. Thus, we have a thumbnail sketch 
of the father of the Heir Conditioner. 
 Skinner enrolled at Hamilton College in New York State dreaming 
of a life as a professional writer—and was even encouraged in those thoughts 
by the poet Robert Frost.240 Following college graduation, and after a year or 
two of working fitfully and fruitlessly as a writer—and at other odd jobs—
while living in his parents’ home,241 Skinner resolved to make something of 
himself by enrolling in graduate school at Harvard University. His father had 
been a keen observer of human conduct, and young B.F. acknowledged that 
he had himself been particularly interested in animal behavior.242 Perhaps—
the struggling young man thought—he might combine these paternal and 
personal tendencies and do something of note in the then-emerging field of 
the psychology of behavior.243 
 It was in these formative graduate-school years that Skinner 
encountered the work of John Watson (1878-1958), the founder of 
behaviorism. Indeed, upon reading Watson’s scholarship, Skinner confessed, 
“I became an instant behaviorist.”244 So, who was John Watson? Skinner 
himself went part of the way towards answering that question in a tribute to 
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Watson he penned in 1959.245 Watson’s ambition, during his short tenure as 
a professor at Johns Hopkins University, was to purge psychology of its 
“mentalistic explanations.”246 There would no search for unconscious 
phenomena, no room for self-reported cognitive states, no taking account of 
rationalizations or explanations.247 No accommodation would be made, for 
that matter, for therapeutic intervention. Watson was not a physician, like 
Freud, trying to improve the lives of patients. He was rather an investigator 
who proposed to focus—entirely and exclusively—on the externally 
observed behavior of study subjects.248 As Watson explained the matter: 
 
“Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective 
 experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the 
 prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential 
 part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent 
 upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to 
 interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his 
 efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no 
 dividing line between man and brute.”249 
 
 Enrolling at Harvard University in the fall of 1928, Skinner spent the 
next ten years at that institution seeking to make real the scholarly research 
agenda more or less defined by Watson. Watson had been provocative, 
speculative. Skinner, on the other hand, was young, ambitious, at least 
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somewhat iconoclastic, and hoped even as a graduate student to develop “a 
new, descriptive behavioral psychology.”250 By 1935, in papers and in 
experiments, Skinner demonstrated that “certain classes of environmental 
events were capable of eliciting certain classes of overt behavior” in subject 
animals.251 Only later, did Skinner become interested in extending his 
research to human behavior. But embedded in his work was the seed of a new 
idea—that it was not volition, choice, that shaped behavior, but 
environmental factors. Alter the environment, and the choices that get 
made—whether by rats, pigeons, or human beings—will take on different 
forms. Skinner was becoming a determinist.252 
 The capstone of this early research was Skinner’s book, The 
Behavior of Organisms, published in 1938.253 There he distinguished 
between two types of behavior, respondent, and operant. Respondent 
behavior was simply explained. It was an organism’s direct response to a 
stimulus. Suppose, Skinner suggested, someone gets a “cinder in the eye.”254 
The response to this stimulus was direct and predictable. One might close the 
eye, or flutter the eyelid, in the hope of dislodging the object.255 
 Most behavior, however, especially of complex organisms, did not 
fit this simple equation of stimulus/response. This was the range of behavior 
commonly thought to be “spontaneous,” such as a person bursting into 
song.256 This type of behavior Skinner labeled “operant.”257 Why operant? 
Skinner did not explain his choice of words particularly well, but it must be 
that he derived it from an active form of the Latin verb operor—“one who” 
or “that which operates.” Thus, operant conditioning is that which influences 
the behavior of an active and seemingly free agent to choose one course and 
avoid another. 
 Skinner criticized those who argued that complex spontaneous 
actions, such as singing, were in all respects similar to simple stimuli like a 
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cinder in the eye.258 But acknowledging complexity did not mean that our 
singer freely chose to sing her song. Her choice would have been dictated, 
Skinner surmised, by environmental factors, which he called “a reinforcing 
stimulus.”259 Suppose as a young child, her parents applauded and 
encouraged her musical talents. Even as an older woman, she might continue 
to feel reinforced by this early approval. Conversely, another person might 
have experienced negative reinforcement—people booed and jeered when he 
sang. His silence even now is reinforced by that earlier rejection. 
 By 1945, Skinner proclaimed himself a “radical behavior[ist].”260 
And in 1948, he published a novel, loosely belonging to the genre of science 
fiction, entitled Walden Two.261 The title is a deliberate borrowing from 
Henry David Thoreau’s 1854 book Walden, which chronicled the two years 
of solitary life he led on the banks of Walden Pond.262 Thoreau’s purpose has 
been much debated but it was at least this much—he wished to discern the 
difference between the natural, the artificial, the civilized, and the real, and 
he knew that he could only do that in relative isolation from his fellows.263 
 Skinner’s objective was very different. His view was communal, not 
individualist, and to that end he proposed to imagine what a utopian 
community, governed on behaviorist principles, might look like. While the 
book contains multiple characters, two main protagonists stand out—the old 
graduate-school classmates, T.E. Frazier, who founded the Walden Two 
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community;264 and a Professor Burris, who pursued a more conventional life 
as a university instructor.265 Skinner’s biographer, Daniel Bjork, sees in these 
two characters the two sides of Skinner’s own personality—Frazier, the 
radical social engineer, who harbored barely suppressed pretensions at 
divinity;266 and Burris, the seeker of more mundane pursuits and pleasures (it 
certainly cannot be coincidence that Professor Burris’ name so closely 
resembles B.F. Skinner’s own first name—Burrhus).267 
 The heart of the volume, however, was intended to explore how the 
science of behaviorism could shape and condition the management of an 
entire society. As early as chapter three, the reader is introduced to the 
concept of behavioral conditioning as Frazier explained how the communal 
sheep learned, through negative reinforcement to stay away from a fence that 
once was electrified but no longer needed to be.268 Are animals and human 
beings really so indistinguishable as the chapter suggests? The question is 
implicit in the passage, and it was a question that Frazier permitted to linger 
without resolution.269 
 But Frazier was not without a philosophical conception of the good 
life. Much later in the volume, in chapter twenty, he set forth three simple 
principles of social organization: human beings should ordinarily prefer good 
health over illness;270 they should avoid long hours of work, especially 
tedious, demanding physical labor;271 and they should have enough leisure 
time to cultivate their talents.272 
 Is that all there is? Certainly, many philosophers would question 
Frazier’s list. Our interest, however, lies not in challenging the sufficiency of 
Frazier’s world view, but in exploring the methods he chose to guide his 
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community towards the achievement of these ends. And that was relentless 
behavioral conditioning. 
 In chapter fourteen, Frazier set forth his justification for such 
massive reliance on conditioning. Consider, he suggested, the individual 
person confronting the whole mass of humanity. The mass was society. The 
individual might have interests or tastes that diverge from the mass, but the 
pursuit of those private pleasures is likely to be met with a stern response: 
“Society attacks early, when the individual is helpless. It enslaves him almost 
before he has tasted freedom.”273 In a world of crushing, unceasing social 
pressure and conformity, there is no freedom. Indeed, it can be said that 
society is already doing a fine job of conditioning the individual. If that is the 
reality that the individual confronts, then where is free will in that? And if 
society already conditions us to do some things and to avoid others, then 
would it not be preferable to be scientific in the conditioning that we apply? 
 As Frazier explained it, behavioral conditioning was the means by 
which the individual gained at least a conscious awareness of one’s 
environment and the expectations it imposes. “Behavioral engineering,” that 
was Frazier’s objective.274 Frazier insisted that such engineering had to start 
from earliest childhood and be “completed by the age of six.”275 At a 
minimum, he declared, children should be made to exhibit self-control and 
deferred gratification, since these traits were keys to a successful 
adulthood.276 How to achieve this outcome? We could, Frazier continued, 
preach to children, or scold them when they fall short, or make extravagant, 
unkeepable promises.277 Or we could modify their behavior through scientific 
principles.278 Frazier naturally favored the science. To demonstrate how this 
was done, Frazier pointed to the lollipops he made children wear around their 
necks279—like a crucifix280—with a reward to follow if the children resisted 
the urge to lick the lollipop during the day.281 
 Indeed, Frazier made plain, the whole community was organized on 
the basis of such conditioning. To ensure that the latest and best techniques 
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were always in use, Managers were placed in charge of various “divisions 
and services” such as “Food, Health, Play, Arts, Dentistry, Dairy” to ensure 
their smooth running, while the governance of the community was entrusted 
to a panel of six “Planners.”282 Their selection, furthermore, was not by 
democratic means but by careful screening by experts.283 
 Much could be made of this seeming infatuation with technocracy, 
but we should once again remain focused on the free-will versus determinism 
aspect of Skinner’s parable. And there, Frazier saw himself very much as the 
heir and legatee of Paul’s God. “I like to play God!” Frazier confessed.284 
And playing God was all about determining the fates of others. After all, 
Frazier conceded that everything that he had done in constructing and guiding 
the community of Walden Two implicated “the old question of predestination 
and free will.”285 And what about Skinner’s personal views? It is impossible 
not to see lurking just offstage B.F. Skinner, the proud parent, adjusting the 
knobs gently on Baby Deborah’s “Heir Conditioner” to ensure her best 
behavior. For Skinner, it was behaviorism all the way down. 
 In the 1940s, and through most of the 1950s, Skinner had not yet 
emerged as the public face of hard determinism. Most of his scholarly 
research had been done on animals,286 and Walden Two was, after all, a work 
of speculative fiction. But by the later 1950s, he was prepared to apply the 
lessons of behaviorism to what was assumed—by linguists and 
philosophers—as the distinctively human activity of speech.287 Thus in 1957, 
in the book Verbal Behavior, Skinner proposed to examine human speech 
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not as the free and autonomous product of human reason, but as the 
behaviorally conditioned response to external stimuli and reinforcement. 
 Skinner made clear at the outset that he wished to leave the issue of 
meaning out of his analysis.288 Indeed, Skinner believed that the separation 
between verbal behavior and meaning was so great that he could borrow 
freely from experiments conducted on other species.289 Relatedly, Skinner 
further believed that there was a strong biological component to verbal 
behavior. Thus, he wrote that “Vocal verbal behavior is executed by an 
extensive musculature—the diaphragm, the vocal cords, the false vocal 
cords, the epiglottis, the soft palate, the tongue, the cheek, the lips, and the 
jaw.”290 
 Why this level of biological detail? Two explanations are apparent. 
First, and most obviously, Skinner wanted to emphasize that human beings 
are biological, and that accordingly the physiological structures and 
limitations that shape and condition the way we speak should matter. But, 
second, there was a subtext lying just beneath the surface of this justification. 
If communication is a feature common to both human beings and the wider 
animal kingdom, Skinner’s more subtle claim went, then we can safely 
dispense with discussion of the human mind. Speech, after all, was nothing 
more than a matter of jawbones, tongues, and breath control. Skinner thereby 
implicitly dethroned the classical philosophical contention that it was 
speech—logos—that made human beings distinct from all other life forms.291 
Logos—from the ancient world onwards—was thought to confer on human 
beings a distinctiveness that made them unlike any other life form.292 But for 
Skinner, human speech was just another form of animal emission different in 
degree perhaps but not in kind from a pigeon’s cooing or a cat’s meow. 
 Indeed, Skinner made much of the idea that speech should be 
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classified as an “emission.”293 Seen biologically, and not as the product of 
“mentalistic processes,”294 Skinner proposed that speech-as-emission must 
be judged by its “strength.”295 “An energetic and prolonged NO! is not only 
a strong response, it suggests a strong tendency to respond which would not 
easily be overcome by competing forces.”296 
 The energy level and force of the spoken word were important for 
Skinner because it allowed him to further distinguish the types of speech he 
sought to categorize. We might consider one example, Skinner’s invention 
of a category of speech which he termed “the Mand.”297 Identifiable by the 
force with which they were emitted, Mands included commands, mandates, 
and other verbal emissions uttered in the imperative voice.298 
 One could go on about these things, but what matters particularly 
from the free-will versus determinist debate is the importance given to the 
social community in determining what one says, what one avoids saying, and 
how one speaks when one chooses to communicate. For Skinner, the role 
played by stimulus and reinforcement in human communication is crucial. 
“All verbal behavior is controlled by prior stimulation arising from an 
audience,” Skinner wrote in chapter five.299 And, regarding reinforcement, 
Skinner added: “Generalized reinforcement is the key to successful practical 
and scientific discourse.”300 
 Skinner explored in some depth the relationship of audience and 
speech. It was here, he contended, that the social dimension of verbal 
behavior was at its strongest. The professional public speaker will recycle 
“an anecdote or joke which has been particularly successful.”301 A successful 
writer must resist the temptation to rewrite the same book under the guise of 
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producing something new.302 A child raised in a family “which reinforces” 
speech habits “generously” “is likely to possess such behavior in great 
strength,” especially compared to a child not raised in such an 
environment.303 “Verbal behavior,” Skinner articulated his thesis, “usually 
occurs only in the presence of a listener.”304 “The listener” thus becomes “an 
essential part of the situation in which verbal behavior is observed,” and, 
indeed, constitutes both a “stimulus” and a source of reinforcement.305 
 Again, much more could be said, but it suffices to note that Skinner 
was confident that he could build from his theory of verbal behavior a science 
that could simultaneously predict human speech, condition it, and so improve 
upon it: “The extent to which we understand verbal behavior in a ‘causal’ 
analysis is to be assessed from the extent to which we can predict the 
occurrence of specific instances and, eventually, from the extent to which we 
can produce or control such behavior by altering the conditions under which 
it occurs.”306 “Engineering” human speech—nothing less—that was 
Skinner’s ultimate ambition.307 
 As in Walden Two, we see here the marriage of technocracy and 
determinism. If verbal behavior was not free, but determined, then experts 
can and should mold it to more socially desirable ends. It would be interesting 
to explore this topic to its logical conclusion, but it would also be a diversion 
from our main inquiry. Alas, we must therefore restrain ourselves, and focus 
instead on Noam Chomsky’s criticism of Skinner’s model. For it is in 
Chomsky’s response to Skinner that we see the reassertion of a humanistic 
conception of freedom.308 
 Chomsky criticized Skinner first for his over-broad use of the term’s 
“stimulus” and “response.”309 Suppose two persons looking at a painting by 
one of the old Dutch masters. Skinner might expect some comment on the 
quality of the art.310 But such a response need not be forthcoming at all. 
“Clashes with the wallpaper,” our interlocutors might agree; or “Tilted;” or, 
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“Hideous;” or one conversation partner might change the subject: 
“Remember our camping trip last summer?”311 Skinner might respond that 
each of these responses might be the product of some prior stimulus, but for 
Chomsky if that is the case, then Skinner’s goal of producing a predictable 
science fails since we are now forced to “identify the stimulus when we hear 
the response.”312 
 Chomsky criticized other aspects of Skinner’s thesis. “Strength” did 
not work as Skinner wished. When confronted with “a prized work of art,” 
Skinner suggested, the exclamation “Beautiful!” was the predictable 
response.313 But a subdued, understated admiration, Chomsky suggested, 
might be equally appropriate and equally foreseeable.314 Speech therefore 
cannot be measured by a blunt instrument, like the force with which it is 
“emitted.” Speech, in other words, must be conceived as something more 
than a mere “emission.” Chomsky’s treatment of “reinforcement” is equally 
scathing—he is led to assert that it lacks all objective meaning.”315 Chomsky 
concluded his review by articulating principles that would subsequently 
shape his theory of generative grammar.316 Writing two decades later, 
Chomsky “dismiss[ed] without further comment [Skinner’s] exotic though 
influential view” that one could separate speech from meaning yet predict its 
contents.317 
 This is certainly not the venue to explore Chomsky’s generative 
grammar and its relationship to conceptions of free will. Suffice it to say 
merely that Chomsky’s theory of language opened space for considerations 
of free will and that it thus assumes the place voluntas did for Lucretius as he 
embraced simultaneously Greek atomic theory and the capacity for self-
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directed human choice.318 It is the reassertion, in the face of deterministic 
opposition, of an unshakeable belief in human volition. The existence of free 
will, Chomsky asserted in another context, is both “obvious” and 
unexplainable, a paradox that we must acknowledge and contend with.319 
 We shall have more to say about Chomsky but let us return for the 
moment to B.F. Skinner. In the 1970s, Skinner published two major works 
of synthesis, About Behaviorism320 and Beyond Freedom and Dignity.321 
Skinner meant his book About Behaviorism as a major summary and 
restatement of his three decades of work in the field. But he meant it as 
something more also, and that was a declaration of the philosophy that 
animated behaviorism, especially of the sort that Skinner practiced and 
advocated for.322 And that brand of behaviorism, Skinner reiterated, should 
be called “Radical.”323 
 The radical behaviorist did not deny the possibility of an inner life of 
the mind. Human beings can and do engage in self-reflection, but, Skinner 
cautioned, even that assertion had to be carefully qualified.324 What the 
behaviorist most emphatically rejected was “Mentalism,” the belief that self-
reported states of mind possess any explanatory value vis B vis human 
behavior. “Feelings and states of mind have enjoyed a commanding lead in 
the explanation of human behavior.”325 This was an unfortunate state of 
affairs which Skinner now proposed to rectify. We know now that it is 
“environment,” not our mental states, that causes us to act in certain ways 
and not others, and behaviorism sought therefore to explain behavior without 
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reference to the subject’s inner disposition.326 
 Analysis of the environment, for Skinner, must commence with the 
biological necessities—food, safety, shelter, and those other requirements of 
survival and propagation.327 In the animal world, the scientist knows, certain 
behaviors conducive to these biological imperatives are reinforced.328 An 
animal might behave aggressively—and thereby is rewarded, with food, say, 
or the opportunity to reproduce.329 Or an animal might behave as a member 
of a herd, imitating the actions of others, and is rewarded by the safety that 
comes from numbers.330 The human being, for Skinner, operates along 
precisely the same principles: “[The human being] begins and remains a 
biological system, and the behavioristic position is that it is nothing more 
than that.”331 
 And if the human being is a biological entity that is as subject to 
environmental circumstances as porcupines or beavers, then human beings 
should display a similar set of responses to alterations in those circumstances. 
Human beings, like other animals, are subject to reinforcement: “It is 
commonly said that a thing is reinforcing because it feels, looks, sounds, 
smells or tastes good, but from the point of view of evolutionary theory a 
susceptibility to reinforcement is due to its survival value and not to any 
associated feelings.”332 Skinner folded free will within this larger analysis: 
“The critical condition for the apparent exercise of free will is positive 
reinforcement.”333 It is positive reinforcement that pushes the champion 
tennis player to practice, and its failure that leads the mediocre competitor to 
other pursuits.334 But human beings do not respond exclusively to positive 
reinforcement. Punishments—termed by Skinner “aversive 
reinforcements”—are also effective and “are just the reverse of [positive] 
reinforcing.”335 
 Skinner anticipated a major objection to his thesis: positive (and 
aversive) reinforcement might have their place—we all want food and 
shelter, and we also want to stay out of jail—but what of human originality? 
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The capacity to invent, to write, to do things that have never been done 
before? This set of questions led Skinner to consider the creative process, 
which he argued operated analogously to Darwinian natural selection.336 A 
mathematician consults what has gone before and “explores the results of 
changing a set of axioms.”337 Reinforcement might come in the way of the 
mathematician’s aesthetic pleasure at the new discovery. But even greater 
reinforcement awaits should the discovery prove important “in science and 
invention.”338 The same phenomenon, Skinner continued, is observable in the 
arts—the painter “varies his colors, brushes, and surfaces” while the 
musician “generates new rhythms, scales, melodies and harmonic 
sequences,” and they are reinforced (or not) by the reception accorded their 
fresh insights.339 
 Skinner explained the process of creativity in greater depth in an 
essay, A Lecture on ‘Having’ a Poem, published nearly simultaneously with 
About Behaviorism.340 Consider Shakespeare, he proposed, a poet of 
unquestioned originality. And, yes, Skinner conceded, Shakespeare’s poems 
were original in the sense that they were “unquestionably new.”341 But 
Shakespeare did not create them, any more than a mother can be said to 
“create” a baby.342 A mother’s child is the product of biology and 
environment, just as much as a poem is the result of the poet’s background. 
Shakespeare’s work can only be explained by reference to the politics of late 
Elizabethan and Jacobean England, the theatrical talent Shakespeare could 
draw from to effectuate his artistic vision, and the literacy and tastes of 
England’s theater-going public. Where is the author’s free will in this tangled 
network of contingencies? 
 Thus the title of Skinner’s lecture was explained: A poet “has” a 
poem in the same way a mother “has” a child.343 Biology only progressed, 
Skinner stated, when Darwin jettisoned the principle of a knowing, guiding 
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creator, and the field of literature will make similar progress only when we 
cast aside the myth of “the autonomy of the poet.”344 A so-called original 
poem is as much the product of a fertile combination of mutations—both 
genetic and literary—and environment as the emergence of a new species of 
hen.345 To claim otherwise, to assert autonomous creative powers, is to 
pretend to be “uncaused, and the uncaused is miraculous, and the miraculous 
is God.”346 
 Human progress, Skinner thus averred, becomes possible only when 
we abandon this futile quest to claim godlike powers and to acknowledge our 
animal natures, which are as much subject to the forces of contingency and 
external conditioning as any rooster or rock hen. If we but admitted this 
reality, Skinner ardently believed, then the world could be made a better 
place. Thus, as he had in Walden Two, Skinner, ever the social tinkerer, 
hoped to promote social improvement, which came, he said, not through “a 
compassionate therapist [or] a devoted teacher.”347 “We must look instead,” 
Skinner proposed, “at the conditions under which people govern, give help, 
teach, and arrange incentive systems in particular ways.”348 
 This objective, then, was precisely the project Skinner set for himself 
in his work Beyond Freedom and Dignity. In this work, Skinner expanded 
his field of inquiry. While he never became a so-called “mentalist”—and he 
continued to state his case against mentalism in this volume—he did raise a 
broader range of questions about the nature of the human person than in 
earlier works. Thus, he acknowledged that human beings were 
“introspective”349 and that they desired to follow “the classical injunction to 
‘Know Thyself.’”350 But he was equally quick to dismiss the possibility of 
deriving any real knowledge out of such insights or aphorisms. “Introspective 
vocabularies,” he thus wrote, “are by nature inaccurate.”351 
 Still, some forms of knowledge are possible. Skinner quoted from 
Isaiah Berlin, who had in turn paraphrased Giambattista Vico on this point: 
There is “‘the sense in which I know what it is to be poor, to fight for a cause, 
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terror, the omnipresence of a god, to understand a gesture, a work of art, a 
joke, a man’s character . . .’”352 Such knowledge, however, is derived not 
from introspection, not from self-examination, not from the exercise of some 
radical concept of free will, but from the surrounding environment—i.e., 
“direct contact with contingencies.”353 
 If knowledge, at least of a type, is possible, Skinner continued, then 
so also are values. Historically, values have come from outside the person. 
The first social organizations, in prehistoric times, Skinner asserted, must 
have promulgated norms like “‘Don’t steal.’”354 With the passage of time, 
such norms became the backbone of religious movements, such as Judaism 
and Christianity and acquired real normative force through the enactment of 
laws forbidding such conduct.355 And if values are important, Skinner deeply 
feared the erosion of values he witnessed occurring all around him. The 
disappearance of values, he fretted, led to “anomie,” “amorality,” 
“rootlessness,” “emptiness,” “and hopelessness.”356 From such sources as 
these there arises not only crime but self-destructive behavior.357 But the 
solution to the disappearance of values, Skinner cautioned, cannot be 
“reactionary.”358 It cannot consist of the passage of ever more punitive laws 
and sanctions.359 Some new and fresh approach is needed. 
 The novel approach that is called for, furthermore, cannot be a 
reassertion of the old value system of human autonomy and independence. 
Skinner was firm in stating the case against so-called “autonomous man.”360 
There were, Skinner explained, two problems with the autonomous human 
being. The first was the presupposition of freedom. It was, he contended, 
logically flawed. Human behavior is not “uncaused.”361 “Autonomous man” 
is thus a myth, and a highly dangerous one at that.362 Second, there was the 
belief in dignity. When Skinner used the word dignity, it must be made clear, 
 
352 Id. at 189–90. Cf. George Steiner, Books: Through Seas of Thought, Alone, 
THE NEW YORKER, May 9, 1970 (providing both Skinner’s source and the source 
of the Isaiah Berlin and Giambattista Vico quotations). 
353 Id. at 190. 
354 Id. at 114, 116. 
355 SKINNER, supra note 321, at 114–15. 
356 Id. at 118. 
357 Id. at 118–19. 
358 Id. at 119. 
359 Id. 
360 Id. at 19. 
361 SKINNER, supra note 321, at 19. 
362 Id. at 20. 
56  U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y [Vol. XV No. 1 
 
he did not employ it in the way modern human-rights thinkers use it, as 
something innate and inhering in every human being.363 For Skinner, dignity 
was inherently connected with ideas about merit and just deserts.364 Dignity 
was something that was earned, through hard work, through making the right 
choices, through being judicious in one’s words and deeds.365 
 Therefore, Skinner asserted, both of these major premises of the 
philosophical tradition—freedom and dignity alike—were flawed because 
they neglected the contribution of the environment to the shaping of the 
individual. And for Skinner, environment was decisive. Thus, he proposed to 
compare a contemporary American astronaut and a Mongolian pastoralist 
from the Siberian steppes.366 In physical gifts, in intelligence, in every 
imaginable respect, the one person could fill the other person’s role and 
responsibilities. Were the astronaut born in Siberia, he would doubtless make 
an excellent herder. And were the Mongolian pastoralist born in the United 
States, he would be an indubitably excellent astronaut. They are who they are 
not because they are uniquely fitted for their roles, but because of the 
circumstances of birth and upbringing.367 Environment and conditioning 
meant everything. 
 So, for Skinner, autonomy, freedom, independence, merit, dignity, 
personal responsibility—this entire constellation of ideas—misdescribe the 
human condition.368 Still, he had to concede that despite the obvious 
shortcomings, Western philosophy had deployed this language since ancient 
Greece.369 Why change now? Skinner implicitly asks. He answered this 
question by pointing to a host of large and compelling social problems. There 
was the “population explosion.”370 The threat of “world famine.”371 The 
prospect of “nuclear holocaust.”372 Technology alone cannot solve these 
problems; indeed, new inventions have in some measure made matters 
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worse.373 Thus there was, for Skinner, only one way out: “In short, we need 
to make vast changes in human behavior.”374 
 Should society use force and compel persons to adopt a different way 
of life? Skinner was troubled by the prospect. He believed that so-called 
aversive reinforcement might work as a temporary expedient in some 
situations, but that it was never a long-term solution and therefore lacked real 
effectiveness. The drill sergeant might brutalize his troops, and while they 
might become a better fighting unit, they might also break ranks and desert.375 
The student brow-beaten by parents or teachers might decide to go 
“truant.”376 Aversive conditioning might achieve its short-term goals, but it 
just as frequently leads to efforts to escape the harshness of the discipline. 
Another approach had to be found. 
 Skinner thought he had a better solution. Use positive 
reinforcement—incentives—to shape and mold persons to behave in the 
ways you want them to. Skinner looked to a judicial opinion by Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo for guidance. The case involved the taxing power of the 
federal government. Did the government have the power to condition receipt 
of a tax rebate on the taxpayer agreeing to do certain things? The taxpayer 
argued that it could not, since incentivizing behavior amounted to coercion. 
Cardozo rejected the claim. “Motive,” or inducement, he reasoned, was not 
compulsion.377 
 Skinner built on this premise. If the need for the general reform of 
human behavior was truly great; if all human beings were really the product 
of contingency, circumstance, and environment; if human behavior really 
was nothing but conditioned responses; and if incentives offered things that 
we actually wanted and not punitive measures that we sought to flee, then 
we, as a society, should try to build a better class of persons through 
inducements and rewards. 
 But on how great a scale might such incentives be used? Great minds, 
Skinner knew, had speculated about the creation of utopian societies ever 
since Plato and St. Augustine.378 Historically, a few visionary figures actually 
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succeeded in founding such places.379 Still, he recognized that “so far as the 
real world is concerned, the word utopian means unworkable.”380 He did not 
hope for anything so grand as making the world anew. But he believed that a 
proper set of incentives could improve the human condition incrementally. 
Education could be reformed; so also, the military; and the workplace.381 
Society, and its planners and engineers, could, with time, build more 
elaborate structures: “A science of behavior is not yet ready to solve all our 
problems, but it is a science in progress, and its ultimate adequacy cannot 
now be judged.”382 
 The objection might be raised, these super-empowered social 
engineers—are they not a new breed of totalitarian? Skinner rejected the 
suggestion, even if his answer rings unconvincingly. “The designer of a 
culture is not an interloper or a meddler,” Skinner replied, but rather one with 
the foresight to ensure the survival and ultimate success of the whole human 
species.383 Thus the technocrats, the unseen rulers and manipulators of 
society, should be the ones to identify the values which individuals should 
hold dear. And they must be the ones to devise the means to coach and coax, 
to prod and condition, the ordinary run of humanity to adopt one set of 
behaviors and not another, and to aim at certain goals and to reject others. 
 Noam Chomsky once again raised his voice in dissent, first in an 
essay in the New York Review of Books,384 and then in expanded form in a 
study published in the journal Cognition.385 Chomsky raised many 
objections, not least the problem of self-contradiction.386 Skinner’s exclusion 
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of the internal operations of the mind as a subject of study, furthermore, 
seemed especially unscientific since it ruled out on a priori grounds a field of 
inquiry that might yield helpful explanations of human behavior.387 Chomsky 
concluded by observing that Skinner’s “‘science’ neither justifies nor 
provides any rational objection to a totalitarian state or even a well-run 
concentration camp.”388 
 In truth, however, Skinner was at the height of his influence in the 
1960s and 1970s. In 1968, he agreed with the proposition that “he is the most 
important influence in psychology.”389 He advised educators;390 energy 
conservation programs;391 managerial scientists;392 and even weight-loss 
plans.393 His impact on law was equally outsized. There were efforts to apply 
Skinner’s theory to the rehabilitation of youthful offenders;394 the reform of 
the criminal law;395 the revamping of the law of divorce;396 and the 
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reconstruction of areas of law as diverse as tort,397 food and drug law,398 and 
school discipline.399 
 Was Skinner right about free will versus determinism? An overly 
broad question impossible to answer easily. But a few reflections seem in 
order. At one level, yes, of course he was right. A baby comfortably housed 
in a “Baby Tender” with the temperature set at seventy-eight degrees will 
behave one way. A baby lodged in a similar contrivance with the temperature 
set at ninety-eight, say, or fifty-eight will behave decidedly differently (and 
may actually be at risk of injury). So, yes, of course. 
 And such an insight can be extended. Shakespeare could not have 
conceived, or written, or performed Mozart’s The Magic Flute. London in 
1600 was very different from Vienna in 1791. Different languages, different 
traditions, different audiences. Shakespeare was not Mozart. 
 So, at a broadly descriptive level, Skinner was right. But he wished 
to do more with behaviorism than to state the obvious. He wished to create a 
science that was not only descriptive but also prescriptive and predictive. Let 
us take the prescriptive first. He wished to apply the insights of behavioristic 
determinism to social problems both small and large. Problems as simple and 
personal as weight loss and as large and intractable as the nuclear arms race. 
And, certainly, one can see where incentive-based programs might be helpful 
for both dieting and arms reduction. (Although we know, often personally, 
that incentive-based weight-loss programs sometimes fail, and that arms 
reduction negotiations frequently collapse amidst cheating and 
recriminations, leaving the military and strategic situation more dangerous 
than ever). 
 But finally, he aimed to create a behaviorism that was predictive—
he wanted to so refine his tools of observation and manipulation that he could 
predict in advance how persons would respond. If pigeons and mice respond 
in a particular way to stimulus, and their responses can be predicted, then in 
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theory the same principle should govern human behavior.400 But if this is a 
fair statement of Skinner’s thesis, it is also precisely where he encounters 
obstacles. To appreciate how challenging those barriers are to overcome, one 
might do well to consider yet another quotation from Noam Chomsky. 
“There has been very valuable work,” Chomsky wrote, “about how an 
organism executes a plan for integrated motor action—say, how a person 
reaches for a cup of coffee on the table. But no one even raises the question 
of why this plan is executed instead of some other one.”401 
 Skinner finally failed to answer Chomsky’s question. To understand 
why, let us return to Skinner’s Shakespeare, as found in his essay, On 
‘Having’ a Poem.402 The exigencies of the London stage, circa 1600, 
unquestionably served as a constraint on Shakespeare’s creativity. He could 
not have composed or staged The Magic Flute. But let’s consider the choices 
Shakespeare did in fact make. Why did he choose to write Henry V? As 
opposed to, say, King Alfred the Great (a play Shakespeare never wrote)? 
Why King Lear? Why not King Arthur (another made-up play)? Why The 
Two Gentlemen of Verona and not The Two Gentlemen of Geneva? All of 
these alternative possibilities would have fit the temper of the times, would 
have been within Shakespeare’s creative powers to produce, and would have 
proven entertaining and elucidating to Shakespearean theatergoers in their 
own distinct and different ways. 
 Yet Shakespeare chose one set of plays and not another. And this is 
Chomsky’s point. We can explain the contingencies that gave rise to the 
actual choices Shakespeare made, we can appreciate the constraints he was 
under, we can look to all sorts of extraneous environmental factors that 
determined word choice, plot devices, and character development. Yet it 
becomes exceedingly more challenging to explain why Henry V and why not 
Alfred the Great. Skinner might find refuge by pointing to some chance 
occurrence in Shakespeare’s life that conditioned the choice. Maybe 
Agincourt appealed to him in a way that Alfred’s vanquishing of the Great 
Heathen Army at Edington did not because of something that happened back 
at school? 
 Again, Chomsky might reply by reminding Skinner that had he 
inquired into the inner workings of Shakespeare’s mind—the dreaded 
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“mentalism” Skinner so much wanted to put behind him—he might have 
found an answer. Chomsky could also reiterate his criticism of Verbal 
Behavior and accuse Skinner of conflating stimulus and response. Suppose 
Shakespeare had chosen to commemorate Alfred’s victory at Edington in one 
of his plays. Skinner undoubtedly would be able to find something in 
Shakespeare’s background, or his audience’s, that could serve as stimulus 
and reinforcement for such a choice. And, Chomsky would refute the claim, 
declaring that there can be no predictive power in that. So, was Skinner right 
about free will versus determinism? 
D. The State of the Question Today 
 Scholars have not ceased to address the question of free will in the 
twenty-first century. Daniel Wegner (1948-2013), professor of psychology 
at Harvard University, challenged what he called “the illusion of free will.”403 
The illusion, he argued, was an almost naturally occurring feature of human 
developmental psychology. The human being, he argued, was singularly 
equipped to convince herself that she enjoyed free will and autonomy. Why? 
Because the human mind, as it developed, drew a sharp distinction between 
the world of animate objects—other human beings, dogs, orangutans, zebras, 
on the one hand,—and inanimate objects—power tools, toasters, wide-screen 
televisions, driverless cars, on the other.404 Animate objects were capable of 
choice—even dogs, orangutans, and zebras.405 Inanimate objects, on the 
other hand, were lifeless, without conscious awareness, and while they might 
be programmed and manipulated by conscious beings, they cannot be said to 
be capable of choice.406 
 The distinction humans draw between the animate and inanimate 
worlds—the psychological and the physical—is just the start for Wegner.407 
Human beings are also well supplied with a series of psychological devices 
to cement into place the illusion of free and conscious choice. We might 
begin with “intention.”408 Imagine I—or you, for that matter—are on a 
pitching mound. The catcher signals “two,” that is, we should throw the curve 
ball. We subtly adjust our grip on the baseball. Why? Because we intend to 
throw the curve ball, and a few seconds later, after the ball breaks in a sharp 
 
403 DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2003). 
404 Id. at 21–24. 
405 Id. at 16–17. 
406 Id. at 24–25. 
407 Id. at 22. 
408 Id. at 18. 
2021] State Of Mind, State Of Law 63 
downward trajectory, and the batter swings and misses, we see that the 
baseball is lodged safely in the catcher’s mitt. The crowd cheers. That is 
intention. We think of this phenomenon—our conscious thought, followed 
by its successful execution—as very real. 
 Our intention, at a particular moment, or so we perceive it, is a 
culmination of a long and deliberately conceived chain of desires and plans. 
Our desire from a young age might have been to become a major league 
pitcher. Most of the time, of course, a desire like that never comes to 
fruition,409 but that desire might burn strongly enough within us that we begin 
to make plans.410 We condition our arm, we learn the proper grip for a 
fastball, a curve ball, a slider, and, mostly, we practice. And now suppose 
that we are both really good and really lucky. We make the major leagues. 
We think we have accomplished this rare and great objective through 
enormous force of will.411 Desire, planning, willing—these are among the 
component parts of the illusion of conscious free choice. 
 But, Wegner, argued, this complex set of experiences, this melding 
of long-range planning and immediate intentionality, was “the mind’s best 
trick.”412 Thus Wegner stated his thesis: “The real causal sequence 
underlying human behavior involves a massively complicated set of 
mechanisms.”413 The biological composition of the human mind—a complex 
amalgam of neurons, neurotransmitters, synapses, and sophisticated 
structures—certainly plays a role, as does the person’s entire background, 
and even her “unconscious mind.”414 Wegner emphasized that he did not 
mean to deny every possibility of free choice. He wished rather to unmask 
the easy way we convince ourselves that all of our choices are freely and 
consciously willed and to challenge the standard dichotomy pitting free will 
versus determinism.415 
 “Conscious will,” Wegner concluded, “is the mind’s compass.”416 
Like a vessel’s navigational system, it helps to point the way in one direction 
and not in another, but the process of actually steering the ship remains an 
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interaction among many moving parts.417 Still, if the conscious will was an 
illusion, Wegner nevertheless believed that the illusion served an 
indispensable function. It created “an emotion of authorship,”418 and this 
emotion “serves key functions in the domains of achievement and 
morality.”419 We strive for greatness, we achieve our objectives, we assign 
moral responsibility, we impute criminal culpability on its basis. Take away 
the confidence that we have that our choices are the product of our free and 
conscious will, and demoralization will ensue. Indeed, the building blocks of 
personal development and social order might themselves be toppled or at 
least threatened. 
 Still, the scholarly community is not entirely composed of 
determinists, or their close associates. In 2012, Bernard Berofsky defended 
free will not in neurological or psychological terms, but as a matter of 
philosophical principle.420 As a good philosopher, Berofsky first defined the 
school of thought he intended to oppose, a movement which he labeled 
“necessitarianism.”421 
 Summarized in a sentence, necessitarianism amounted to “the 
doctrine [that] all events, including human actions and decisions, can be 
completely explained in terms of universal (nonprobabilistic) laws.”422 
Necessitarianism, he continued, has been a feature of western religious, 
philosophical, and scientific communities for over 2,500 years. It was once 
called “Fate;” it was later called “God;” and still later called “Science.”423 
Berofsky’s definition was surely sweeping and comprehensive. Still, it was 
defensible, given his objective. After all, if human events were only 
“incompletely explained” by reference to necessary laws, then at least some 
of the time indeterminate outcomes were possible, and if that were the case, 
then in at least some instances human beings must enjoy freedom. 
 But Berofsky understood that he had to do more than merely refute 
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a robust understanding of determinism. He wished to defend an affirmative 
vision of free will. This vision included “the openness to a deliberating agent 
of a variety of options.”424 If we lacked options from which to choose, then 
even if we enjoy psychological freedom, even if we are free of physical 
constraint, we cannot be said to enjoy freedom, since freedom requires the 
possibility of selecting among an array of possible objects. 
 Second, there must be some degree of negative freedom. In other 
words, we must, when choosing a course of action, be free of impediments.425 
But in identifying negative freedom as a central feature of free will, Berofsky 
did not mean to dismiss or denigrate positive freedom, which he associated 
with “the relevant capacities, knowledge, and skills to take advantage of 
negative freedom.”426 (While it is not a topic that we can pursue in this venue, 
Berofsky’s definition has implications for a law of contracts that all too often 
sees only negative, and not positive freedom as necessary to entering a valid 
contract.) 
 Berofsky, finally, sees two further elements embedded in claims to 
free will. These he labels “counterfactual power,” and “self-
determination.”427 Berofsky distinguishes subtly between them. 
“Counterfactual power” he asserts, “presupposes alternative possibilities.”428 
I wish to go out one evening. I can choose from among a restaurant, a theater, 
or a sporting event. I chose the restaurant. But I could have just as easily 
chosen one of the other possibilities. I have counterfactual power. What is 
counterfactual power’s absence? Imagine a tightly regulated prison where 
inmates must perform only the tasks assigned to them by the prison guards 
and are denied any possibility of choice. The prisoners lack counterfactual 
power. 
 Regarding self-determination, Berofsky wrote: “[T]the source of my 
decision must be me, myself.”429 Although Berofsky does not use the 
language of external versus internal, that vocabulary seems to describe the 
contrast that he is drawing. Counter-factual power must depend on some 
external factor, the availability of options and the concomitant capacity to 
choose among them, while self-determination comes from within. Free will, 
in other words, is the amalgam of an array of options and the individual’s 
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capacity to choose from among them. It is, to revert to Lucretius’ vocabulary, 
voluntas. 
 But philosophical free will, Berofsky also acknowledged, depends 
for its vitality on a particular scientific construct of the human person and the 
universe that the human being inhabits. It requires that the laws of nature are 
at least open to the possibility of human free choice. Determinism, on the 
other hand, depends on a different account of nature’s laws. As Berofsky put 
it: “Determinism tells us that all truths about the world follow logically from 
the past and the laws of nature.”430 Why? Because “I have no control over 
and cannot, therefore, alter the past or the laws of nature.”431 If what has come 
before me has so restricted my field of choice, or if the building-blocks of 
nature have predetermined an outcome for me, then I must lack free will, so 
goes the syllogism. 
 Thus has Berofsky defined the philosophical terms of the free-will 
debate. There are three prongs to his case for free will. First, is a rigorous 
definition of necessitarianism. The necessitarian believes in total 
determinism. B.F. Skinner was such a figure. But leave room for even the 
slenderest indeterminism into the equation and necessitarianism fails. 
Berofsky’s second prong is his own defense of freedom and free will. Allow 
for the possibility of meaningful choice within a given society, and the 
choices that are made are freely made. But third, Berofsky concedes that his 
cases are finally dependent upon a particular account of the “laws of nature.” 
If it happens that science refutes the possibility of free will, Berofsky loses. 
Still, Berofsky thought this scenario highly unlikely. 
 We should next take up the work of Brian Greene. Brian Greene is 
among those scholars who are even now rewriting the laws of nature. He is a 
Professor of Physics and Mathematics at Columbia University, a theoretical 
physicist, and a scholar who not only has done cutting-edge research in the 
field of string theory but has sought to bring these findings to a wider 
audience. His book, Until the End of Time, published in 2020, however, 
moves beyond a simple discussion of the mysteries of the universe’s 
structures. Broadly ambitious, its subject might be described as nothing less 
than the whole of reality, from the beginning to the end of physical 
existence.432 
 
430 Id. at 124. 
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432 BRIAN GREENE, UNTIL THE END OF TIME: MIND, MATTER, AND OUR 
SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN EVOLVING UNIVERSE (2020). 
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 With Brian Greene, we are simultaneously transported back to the 
world of Leucippus and Democritus while having our feet firmly planted in 
the twenty-first century. If Leucippus and Democritus began with atomic 
motion and understood all of the visible world—and the countless inferable 
worlds existing beyond the known universe—as the product of that motion, 
for Greene all of existence comes into being and is sustained through the flux 
and flow of particles. 
 The story of particles goes back almost to the birth of the universe—
to the Big Bang itself. Within the first few moments of existence, one could 
have witnessed—had there been anybody present to observe the scene—“a 
cascade of rapid particle reactions.”433 This “primordial bath” was quickly 
transformed “into a population of protons, neutrons, and electrons, the stuff 
of familiar matter (and, likely too, a supply of more exotic particles).”434 Over 
the span of hundreds of millions of years, thanks to the steady operation of 
gravity, these particles clustered together, in ever tighter formations, in a 
process that gave rise to the first stars.435 The first stars consisted only of light 
elements and were incredibly unstable. But through an explosive process of 
stellar creation and destruction, heavier elements came into being—indeed, 
all of those familiar members of the periodic table.436 
 From this vast starting point, Greene steadily narrowed his field of 
vision.437 Life, at least the only life forms of which we are aware, requires 
the elements of the periodic table to come into being—oxygen and hydrogen, 
yes, in the form of the atmosphere and of water, but even such elements as 
copper and iron.438 Life further required the formation of complex 
molecules—RNA and DNA—and the capacity to encode and transmit the 
information permits organisms to survive and replicate.439 
 Restricting his inquiry even further, Greene next turned his attention 
to human consciousness. And the starting point for such an investigation 
must be the human being’s essential physical reality. Greene once informed 
 
433 Id. at 56. 
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435 Id. at 62–63. 
436 Id. at 73–77. 
437 Id. at 118 (Embracing a “deep-seated reductionist commitment,” Greene 
felt compelled to proceed from the widest to the narrowest scope because of “the 
view that by fully grasping the behavior of the universe’s fundamental ingredients 
we tell a rigorous and self-contained story of reality.). 
438 BRIAN GREENE, UNTIL THE END OF TIME: MIND, MATTER, AND OUR 
SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN EVOLVING UNIVERSE 81–86 (2020). 
439 Id. at 106–07. 
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a television interviewer that he was “nothing but a bag of particles”—and 
Greene made it clear, so was every other human being.440 The human mind, 
furthermore, is “a swarm of interacting particles” and it is their myriad 
motions that give the brain the capacity to see, think, and experience all of 
our distinctively human attributes.441 
 Greene recognizes that there is considerable heavy lifting involved 
before arriving at the question of free will. In particular, he must both give 
an account of human consciousness and in so doing address the so-called 
“hard problem” posed by David Chalmers.442 As Greene summarized it, that 
question was the following: in every respect, the human being consists of 
material elements that, reduced to their component parts, are inanimate. The 
blood vessels that supply the brain consists of cells as does the blood that 
bathes the neurons and synapses that do our thinking. But blood does not 
think and neither do cells. The same is true for the synapses and neurons that 
comprise the brain. Remove these objects from the magnificent cognitive 
structures of which they are part, and they will be inert, lifeless. That which 
possessed consciousness will be entirely devoid of it.443 David Chalmers 
proposed to solve this problem by positing a kind of “proto-consciousness” 
that imbues and gives spark to the otherwise inanimate matter of the human 
brain. Human consciousness is possible, Chalmers claims, because at some 
fundamental level a background consciousness pervades the cosmos.444 
 While giving Chalmers his due,445 Greene is reluctant to move in his 
direction.446 Consciousness, its experiences and its choices, Greene attests, 
are likely not “beyond the explanatory reach of conventional science.”447 
 
440 Id. at 118. 
441 Id. at 125. 
442 David J. Chalmers, The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, 273 SCI. AM. 80–
86 (Dec. 1995). 
443 GREENE, supra note 432, at 132. 
444 David J. Chalmers, The Combination Problem for Panpsychism, in 
PANPSYCHISM: CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 179–214 (Godehard Brüntrup & 
Ludwig Jaskolla, eds., 2017) (describing Chalmers’ embraced form of 
panpsychism, which he has defined as “the view that fundamental physical entities 
have conscious experiences.”). Cf.  Giulio Tononi and Christof Koch, 
Consciousness: Here, There, and Everywhere? 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: 
BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 1–18 (2015) (reviewing the arguments and proposing a 
theory of consciousness that pervades some but not other physical objects). 
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Although acknowledging the tentativeness of scientific conclusions in the 
field of consciousness studies, Greene finds the work of Michael Graziano as 
most appealing if only because of its “physicalist” qualities.448 For Graziano, 
as for Greene, consciousness derives from explicable phenomena grounded 
in the operations of the human brain.449 
 What, then, of that seemingly special property of consciousness, 
“free will”—the subjective experience that “we influence the unfolding of 
reality through actions that reflect our freely willed thoughts[?]”450 
Acknowledging his debt to Democritus, who “jettison[ed] the capricious 
whim of gods in favor of immutable laws” and who saw all of human 
behavior as subject to “physical law,”451 Greene now proposed to restate the 
ancient claim in modern form. Echoing Democritus, Greene asserted that 
“you and I are nothing but constellations of particles whose behavior is fully 
governed by physical law.”452 Like Democritus, however, Greene never 
really explained how to solve the randomness problem—how does the 
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449 Id. Cf. MICHAEL GRAZIANO, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SOCIAL BRAIN 
(2013); Taylor W. Webb & Michael Graziano, The Attention Schema Theory: A 
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2017); Peter W. Barlow, The Natural History of Consciousness, and the Question 
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motion of particles lead to the emergence of complex forms of life?453 
 Greene reviewed the possibility that free will might lurk somewhere 
in the laws of physics. Perhaps somewhere in quantum mechanics we might 
locate an account of free will, though he doubted it.454 Concluding his 
analysis, Greene wrote: “To sum up: We are physical beings made of large 
collections of particles governed by nature’s laws. Everything we do and 
everything we think amounts to motions of those particles.”455 “Our choices 
seem free because we do not witness nature’s laws acting in their most 
fundamental guise.”456 Pull away the curtain, find some disembodied vantage 
point, travel with Archimedes to that corner of the universe with a lever long 
enough, and we can see clearly our utter subjection to a body of physical 
rules external to our subjective perceptions. 
 Thus, we have come full circle. We commenced this journey with 
the flashing insights of Democritus, and we have ended it more or less where 
we began. 
 And if this issue of the Journal of Law and Public Policy was 
concerned merely with the history of the free-will controversy, or with its 
philosophical or materialist dimensions, we might end our inquiry at this 
point. But the Journal is one preeminently concerned with the application of 
larger inter-disciplinary bodies of knowledge to the central policy and legal 
questions of the day. It is therefore to that, more practical, area of inquiry that 
we must now attend. 
II. THE CONTRIBUTORS 
A. Robert M. Sapolsky 
 As an adolescent, Robert Sapolsky had the driving ambition to 
become another species. He thought briefly of becoming a worker ant, in 
proud solidarity with his “elderly communist relatives,” but soon thought 
better of it.457 Lacking a grandfather, he was drawn to the “silverback male 
 
453 One possible solution to the question of the motion of particles leading to 
the emergence of complex forms of life has been proposed by Max Tegmark. MAX 
TEGMARK, OUR MATHEMATICAL UNIVERSE: MY QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE 
NATURE OF REALITY (2014); Cf. Charles J. Reid, Jr., God and the Multiverse, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 6, 2014 (exploring the relationship of divinity, reason, 
and the cosmos). 
454 Id. at 148. 
455 Id. at 150. 
456 Id. (emphasis in original). 
457 ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, A PRIMATE’S MEMOIR 13 (2001). 
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gorilla” housed at New York’s Museum of Natural History.458 In its majesty 
and its awesome command of its surroundings, the old gorilla seemed like 
the perfect substitute for the patriarchal presence that Sapolsky so keenly 
missed in his own life. And so, he pestered his mother more or less 
continuously to take him to visit the silverback.459 
 Even as a high school student, Sapolsky resolved to make the great 
apes the focus of his life’s work. He wrote to primatologists and even 
badgered his high school administration into offering him the chance to study 
Swahili so he might prepare himself for his future in Africa.460 As a college 
undergraduate, he met Dian Fossey—and volunteered to serve as her 
research assistant as she conducted her studies of the mountain gorilla (she 
encouraged Sapolsky to write her, and then never answered his letter).461 
 Driven by this interest and propelled by passion, Sapolsky obtained 
a position as a field biologist following graduation and commenced a years-
long study not of gorillas—that did not work out—but of baboons. His book, 
A Primate’s Memoir, is a recounting of those years. It is a compelling story. 
It operates on at least two levels. First, it is a marvelous coming of age 
story—the four sections of the book, after all, are entitled respectively “The 
Adolescent Years,”462 “The Subadult Years,”463 “Tenuous Adulthood,”464 
and “Adulthood.”465 
 As such, it is an intensely self-revealing volume. In his “adolescent” 
years—when Sapolsky was around 21 or 22—he recalled how he resorted to 
street scams in Nairobi to support himself when he ran out of research funds 
and could not bear to contact his parents for assistance.466 In the last days of 
Idi Amin, he traveled to Kampala, Uganda, to see for himself the overthrow 
of that bloody regime—because “I was twenty-one and wanted an adventure. 
I wanted to scare the shit out of myself and see amazing things . . . I was 
behaving like a late-adolescent male primate.”467 And the book concludes 
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his father,468 with his courtship and marriage,469 and, finally, with the death 
of many members of the tribe of baboons he had tracked for so many years, 
thanks to an entirely preventable tuberculosis pandemic.470 So, also, Sapolsky 
progresses steadily through the academic cursus honorum—Ph.D. 
candidate,471 post-doctoral researcher,472 university professor.473 
 But the book also provides a good scientific account of primates 
under stress. Sapolsky’s ambition at the outset had been “to study . . . stress-
related disease and its relationship to behavior.”474 Throughout the volume, 
Sapolsky wove in the scientific observation that hierarchy creates stress for 
its low-ranking members and that relative hierarchical ranking mattered a 
great deal for the health of the baboons under investigation.475 
 Just how much social rank mattered was revealed to Sapolsky when, 
quite fortuitously, high-ranking and low-ranking baboon mothers gave birth 
to infants within days of each other. Writing of the interaction between the 
two new baboon arrivals, Sapolsky noted: “Between [the high-ranking] 
Devorah and her dominating mother, Leah, the kid grew quickly and with no 
lack of confidence. By chance, the low-ranking Miriam had a daughter the 
same week, and the differences between the two were striking. Devorah’s 
daughter was larger, held her head upright first, walked first, sat on her 
mother’s back first. . ..  Miriam’s daughter, in contrast, could go only a few 
steps before Miriam would nervously retrieve her—the world was full of 
endless individuals who would be delighted to maul the kid.”476 
 And again: “On a day that each of the babies was about a week old, 
they interacted with each other for the first time. Devorah’s kid scampered 
toward Miriam’s, who scampered away and ran back to Miriam. A first 
dominance interaction had just occurred, and it shocked me to think that I 
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related disease.”). The relationship of stress and health remained a focus of 
Sapolsky’s work and is the subject of his book. ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, WHY 
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could go away that instant, go live decades of my life . . . and that asymmetry 
would probably still be in place.”477 (Sapolsky, it should be added, gave 
biblical names to most of his baboons. And even though Sapolsky did not 
draw the connection, one can see, in these and similar passages, some of the 
deep origins of his deterministic views). 
 In the latter 1980s, Sapolsky commenced his affiliation with 
Stanford University’s Department of Biology, where he now serves as the 
John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Professor and as Professor of Neurology and 
Neurosurgery. He has written or co-written approximately 300 articles and a 
handful of books. The range of his interests is vast, encompassing both 
narrowly technical studies of the intricacies of the brain, and more 
speculative explorations of the significance of these findings for the human 
condition. 
 It is useful to review, at least in cursory form, this body of work. 
Sapolsky, after all, knows well that what we do at a particular moment is the 
product of all that has gone before. And it is therefore fair to assert that his 
views on free will and determinism, and the ideas he presents as a contributor 
to this symposium, have their origin in this massive, impressive three-plus-
decade record of scholarship. 
 Alas, we can only sample lightly from this imposing body of 
scholarship. We might begin with stress, since that was a subject Sapolsky 
had begun to research at the earliest stages of his career. Sapolsky has 
authored or co-authored a series of articles on stress, especially chronic 
stress, and its negative physiological impacts. Long-term psychological 
stress, he has demonstrated, promotes the development of glucocorticoids—
naturally-occurring steroids—and that has deleterious consequences for 
aging,478 for depression,479 and for the nervous system.480 Viewing fear as 
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“both a psychological state and a set of bodily responses,” Sapolsky and two 
co-authors examined the interaction of “stress hormones” and the “fear 
circuitry.”481 Drawing on his field studies of baboons, Sapolsky agreed that 
the ability “to predict and control the outcome of social interactions and to 
find outlets for tension” are crucial for the management of stress.482 And, 
while “Stress Is Bad For Your Brain,”483 “Stress Hormones” might be either 
“Good” or “Bad,” depending upon context.484 
 Alzheimer’s disease and mental senescence have been another 
concern of Sapolsky’s,485 as has sleep deprivation.486 Sapolsky has 
additionally worked on the development of genetic therapy both for neural 
injury, whether by stroke, concussion, and aging,487 as well as for the 
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amelioration of behavioral and psychiatric disorders.488 
 Among his most interesting articles is a series of investigations of 
social hierarchy among baboons. In his early studies on baboon hierarchy, 
Sapolsky probed in particular the stresses experienced by low-ranking 
members of the baboon group. There is a barely concealed sense of 
sympathy, if not solidarity, in titles like The Influence of Social Hierarchy on 
Primate Health,489 The Importance of a Well-Groomed Child,490 and 
Hypercorticolism Associated with Social Subordinance or Social Isolation 
Among Wild Baboons.491 But Sapolsky also knows that there is more to the 
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story of stress than social hierarchy. Thus, in an important article, Sapolsky 
and a group of co-authors recognized that the concept of social subordination 
among primates is complicated,492 a point that Sapolsky pursued in greater 
detail in Social Subordinance as a Marker of Hypercorticolism.493 Finally, in 
Sympathy for the CEO, Sapolsky acknowledged that life at the top is not 
always easy.494 
 This ongoing body of research ultimately led Sapolsky to scrutinize 
the relationship of Social Status and Health in Humans and Other Animals, 
where Sapolsky demonstrated that “[a]s income inequality rises in a 
community, not only does crime increase, but levels of social capital also 
decline…Path analyses indicate that the links between income inequality, 
poor health, and high mortality rates are mediated predominately by the 
decline in social capital.”495 In other words, social capital—human 
relationships and interpersonal trust—is weakened or destroyed by 
inequality, with wide-ranging and damaging social consequences. In The 
Health-Wealth Gap, Sapolsky further developed the relationship within 
human populations of strong connections between economic and social 
inequality and diseases caused or exacerbated by chronic psychological 
stress.496 And most recently, Sapolsky has connected the biological stresses 
of social and economic inequality with the disparate impact COVID-19 has 
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study by Sapolsky and others of social hierarchy in a particularly refractory 
population). 
495 Robert M. Sapolsky, Social Status and Health in Humans and Other 
Animals, 33 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 393, 411 (2004). 
496 Robert M. Sapolsky, The Health-Wealth Gap, 319 SCI. AM. 62, 62–67 
(Nov. 2018). 
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had on less-advantaged communities.497 
 Interested in the boundary line between non-human animals and 
human beings,498 Sapolsky probed the question of culture. Groups of human 
beings have distinct cultures, but could the same be said for non-human 
primates? And, if so, how did their cultures differ from those experienced by 
human beings? The answers to these questions were, yes, primates other than 
human beings had distinctive forms of “material culture,” “food acquisition, 
processing, and consumption,” communication,” and “social interactions” 
that met threshold requirements of culture,499 even if “human culture differs 
markedly…in [its] complexity.”500 
 If, therefore, human culture is complex, Sapolsky was prepared to 
examine it in all of its complexity. This ambition led to essays on the forms 
of government, systems of crime and punishment, and the adhesive power of 
tribal loyalties. In The Evolutionary Origins of System Justification, Sapolsky 
and co-authors asked the question—it has been studied for more than a 
century—why do organized political communities tolerate or even support 
governing regimes that are corrupt, exploitive, and unjust in manifest 
ways?501 In The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, Sapolsky 
criticized retrograde trends in the treatment of insanity by the criminal law, 
particularly the re-emergence of the nineteenth-century M’Naghten 
 
497 Alessandro Bartolomucci & Robert M. Sapolsky, Psychosocial Risk 
Factors, Noncommunicable Disease, and Animal Models For COVID-19, 
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY e67, e67–e71 (June, 2021). 
498 In a talk delivered in 2009, Sapolsky identified the capacity of forgiveness 
as perhaps the most distinctive human trait: “We are not just a unique-ier species, 
we are the unique-ier-est’ simply because of this.” Louis Bergeron, Stanford 
Neuroscientist Explores What Is, and Is Not, Unique About Humans, STAN. REP., 
June 13, 2009; Cf. Robert M. Sapolsky, Psychiatric Distress in Animals Versus 
Animal Models of Psychiatric Distress, 19 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1387, 1387–89 
(2016) (“Behavioral continuity has repeatedly forced a narrowing of the definition 
of what it is to be human, as one ‘we are the only species that . . .’ after another has 
fallen.”). 
499 Robert M. Sapolsky, Social Cultures Among Nonhuman Primates, 47 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 641, 642 (2006). 
500 Id. at 647; Cf. Culture in Animals: The Case of a Non-Human Primate 
Culture of Low Aggression and High Affiliation, SOC. FORCES 217, 233 (2006); 
Robert M. Sapolsky & Lisa J. Share, A Pacific Culture Among Wild Baboons: Its 
Emergence and Transmission, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 0534, 0534–41 (2004) (further 
elaborating on the distinctive cultural organization and transmission of a single 
baboon troop in the Serengeti). 
501 Robert M. Sapolsky et al., Speculations on the Evolutionary Origins of 
System Justification, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 1, 1–21 (2018). 
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standard.502 
 Writing in Foreign Affairs, finally, Sapolsky delved into the question 
of the biological basis of nationalism.503 Admitting that social bonds and the 
allegiances and hatreds they promote may be a prevailing feature of the 
human condition, Sapolsky wrote: “Modern society may well be stuck with 
nationalism and many other varieties of human divisiveness, and it would 
perhaps be more productive to harness these dynamics rather than fight or 
condemn them.”504 On the other hand, thirteen years earlier, writing in the 
same journal, he reviewed the natural history of primate relations—including 
human relations—to conclude that “a world of peacefully coexisting human 
[beings]” was, indeed, possible, despite long odds.505 
 In all of this work, however, and despite the sometimes grim nature 
of his conclusions, Sapolsky remains an optimist about the human condition, 
thanks largely to the development of the scientific cast of mind: “This venture 
of doing, thinking, caring about science is not for the faint-hearted—we are 
far better adapted to face saber-toothed cats—and yet here we are, 
reinventing the world and striving to improve our lot in life one scientific 
question at a time. It’s our human nature.”506 
 Equipped with both a depth of scientific expertise and the daring to 
see where that body of knowledge leads, Sapolsky published in 2017 a 
commanding work of synthesis, Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best 
and Worst.507 Biology, Sapolsky has maintained, is the study of life so 
broadly understood that his claims for the discipline “often seem to border 
 
502 Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1787, 1794 (2004) (arguing for a 
system of criminal law that protects society while not “moralizing [offenders] into 
being sinners.”); Cf. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 E.R. 718, 718 (1843) (declaring that 
“every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to 
be responsible for his crimes . . .; and that to establish a defense on the ground of 
insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party 
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as 
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as not to know that 
what he was doing was wrong.”). 
503 Robert M. Sapolsky, This is Your Brain on Nationalism: The Biology of 
Us and Them, 98 FOREIGN AFF. 42, 42–47 (Mar./Apr. 2019). 
504 Id. at 47. 
505 Robert M. Sapolsky, A Natural History of Peace, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 104, 
120 (Jan. 2006). 
506 Robert M. Sapolsky, Super Humanity, 307 SCI. AM. 40, 43 (Sept. 2012). 
507 ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST 
AND WORST (2017). 
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on hegemony.”508 Still, from the standpoint of behavioral science, he went 
on, neurobiology provides decisive insights, and it must be much more than 
a mere static glance at the bodily functions of the actor at a given moment in 
time. We must understand how the person performing the act acquired the 
capacity to do such deeds. And this imperative introduces temporal and 
dynamic elements into the analysis. Thus, in assessing the causes of human 
conduct: “[O]ne must factor in neurobiological events 1 [second] before, but 
also endocrine events from days before, neuroplasticity from weeks before, 
epigenetic events in childhood, fetal environment, the genome in a fertilized 
egg, culture, ecology, and evolution.”509 
 This is precisely the organizational structure Sapolsky adopted for 
the first half of his large and imposing book. Consider a human being, and 
then think about some action that person has taken or is about to do. The 
person might be a sociopath, heavily armed and dangerous, preparing to 
perpetrate a mass killing. Or the person might be a soldier on the battlefield, 
equipped and ready to sacrifice his own life in a hail of bullets in order to 
preserve the lives of his comrades-in-arms. Both persons are prepared, in 
other words, to undertake acts of violence, one for the most heinous of 
reasons, the other to serve laudable and heroic ends. What is it that empowers 
such individuals? How, neurobiologically, do we tell them apart? For 
Sapolsky, the answer to those questions can only be understood in terms of 
what has gone before, both in the individual’s immediate past (the preceding 
seconds, or minutes) and in the ever-receding past of months, years, and 
generations. 
 That single second that immediately precedes the decision to shoot 
is the world of the amygdala and the frontal cortex. The amygdala governs 
aggression and anger, and is the place where mistrust and vigilance reside.510 
Disorders of the amygdala can give rise to acts of spectacular violence.511 
 
508 Robert M. Sapolsky, Double-Edged Swords in the Biology of Conflict, 9 
FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. (Dec. 2018). 
509 Id. 
510 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 31–32, 34–40. 
511 Sapolsky references in particular the case of the Texas clock tower 
gunman Charles Whitman, who shot and killed sixteen people from a high point on 
the University of Texas campus in 1966. Whitman, a decorated Marine and an 
honor student, had sought psychiatric help in the weeks before the shooting, 
believing that he was about to commit acts of unspeakable violence. Post-mortem, 
he was found to have a tumor on the amygdala. Id. at 32–33; Cf. RHAWN JOSEPH, 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, NEUROPSYCHIATRY, AND BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY 102 
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The frontal cortex—and the related pre-frontal cortex—are, on the other 
hand, “central” to the brain’s “executive function.”512 In describing the 
function of these brain regions, Sapolsky adopted the following definition, 
which he put in italics and declared “pertinent to every page of this book: the 
frontal cortex makes you do the harder thing when it’s the right thing to 
do.”513 
 It is also the world of dopamine, and the “dopaminergic system,”514 
which regulates human beings’ capacity for deferred gratification, something 
that is unique in the animal kingdom.515 That one second immediately before 
we take some momentous decision—like the decision to shoot, as elucidated 
above, or, something less momentous, like the choice to order champagne at 
dinner, or to go to a movie, or to stay home and watch Netflix—are all the 
product of the interaction of these three parts of the brain.516 
 What then of the “seconds to minutes” before?”517 This landscape is 
dominated by external stimuli and “sensory information.”518 It is filled with 
unconscious cues. Language—“word framing”—influences our choices.519 
Racial bias also comes into play.520 So also do the human senses. How we 
see, how we hear, how we smell, how we touch and taste, are among the 
sensory stimuli that drive decision-making because “[n]o brain operates in a 
vacuum.”521 And, since this stream of information often operates on a 
“subliminal level,” “in the moments just before we decide upon some of our 
most consequential acts, we are less rational and autonomous decision-
 
(1990); Micah Johnson, How Responsible Are Killers with Brain Damage?, SCI. 
AM. (Jan. 2018) (online only) (providing further details on the Whitman case). 
512 ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST 
AND WORST 46 (2017). 
513 Id. at 45. 
514 Id. at 65. 
515 Id. at 76 (“No gerbil works hard at school to get good SAT scores to get 
into a good college to get into a good grad school to get a good job to get into a 
good nursing home.”). 
516 Sapolsky thus spoke of “three hubs”—“the hub of fear, aggression, and 
arousal centered in the amygdala; the hub of reward, anticipation, and motivation 
of the dopaminergic system; and the hub of frontal cortical regulation and 
restraint.” Id. at 77. 
517 ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST 
AND WORST 77 (2017). 
519 Id. at 93. 
520 Id. at 85 (“Our brains are incredibly attuned to skin color.” The amygdala, 
Sapolsky notes, inclines one towards racial animus, while “the frontal cortex 
exert[s] executive control over the deeper, darker amygdaloid response.”). 
521 Id. at 98. 
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makers than we like to think.”522 
 Thus, the immediate context of our choices is framed by the interplay 
of brain regions and sensory perceptions. But what if we go further back, to 
“hours and days before?”523 In this time frame, we encounter the “hormones.” 
There is testosterone of course, which Sapolsky believes is regarded 
somewhat unfairly by popular culture.524 “Testosterone,” Sapolsky writes, 
“makes us more willing to do what it takes to attain and maintain status.”525 
That testosterone often leads to aggressive behavior, however, is, for 
Sapolsky, the result of social structures, not an innate feature: “Engineer 
social circumstances right, and boosting testosterone levels during a 
challenge would make people compete like crazy to do the most acts of 
random kindness.”526 Then there are the neuropeptides oxytocin and 
vasopressin. They contribute to “social interest and social competence,” and 
their impairment may play a role in the autistic spectrum disorders.527 
 The days to months before our fateful decision are filled with how 
we process information and learn from it. And when we speak of the learning 
process, Sapolsky emphasizes, we must take account of the “neuroplasticity” 
of the brain.528 The human brain is not fixed, constant, and unchanging. On 
the contrary, it changes continuously, as it acquires new information, as it 
encounters new experiences, or, for that matter, as it matures and finally 
senesces.529 To be sure, there are limits to the brain’s capacity to change—
“[o]therwise, grievously injured brains and severed spinal cords would 
ultimately heal.”530 But the brain that did something rash and horrifying on 
Tuesday will not be quite the same brain three or five Tuesdays hence, and 
may, if given the opportunity, sorrowfully and sincerely repent of that awful 
choice. 
 In this manner, Sapolsky works his way backwards through the 
various influences that come to determine what someone does at a particular 
moment in time. So, in the chapter entitled “Back to When You Were Just a 
 
522 Id. 
523 Id. at 99. 
524 ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, THE TROUBLE WITH TESTOSTERONE: AND OTHER 
ESSAYS ON THE BIOLOGY OF THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT 147–59 (1997). 
525 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 107. 
526 Id. 
527 Id. at 114. 
528 Id. at 147–50. 
529 Id. at 151. 
530 Id. at 152. 
82  U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y [Vol. XV No. 1 
 
Fertilized Egg,”531 Sapolsky considered the significance of genes to human 
behavior, although he cautioned that the influence of genes on behavior is 
complex and must be understood against the background of environmental 
factors.532 Not only do our genes influence our behavior, Sapolsky wrote, but 
the ways in which genes come to be expressed also have an impact. And the 
study of genetic expression belongs to the province of epigenetics—subtle 
changes in DNA or proteins brought about not only by one’s environment, 
and by one’s own’s pre-natal experience, but by the experiences of parents 
or grandparents that are then passed down.533 
 So now that we have reached the moment when you were first 
conceived, when you but a mere fertilized ovum, can we finally stop moving 
backwards in time? What possible relevance does that vast landscape of the 
past—the time before you were even conceived—have on who you are and 
what you are likely to say or do today? Sapolsky’s chapter, “Centuries to 
Millennia Before,”534 is intended to resolve these questions and does so by 
 
531 ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST 
AND WORST 221 (2017). 
532 Id. at 253 (Sapolsky expresses “horror” at the ways in which evidence of 
so-called genetic proclivities towards violence has been used in criminal 
proceedings); Cf. Robert M. Sapolsky, It’s Not “All in the Genes,” NEWSWEEK, 
Apr. 10, 2000 (“you can’t dissociate genes from the environment that turns genes 
on and off.”). 
533 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 239–40; See generally Eileen R. Gibney & 
C.M. Nolan, Epigenetics and Gene Expression, 105 HEREDITY 1, 4–13 (2010). The 
impact of epigenetics on subsequent generations has been documented across a 
range of human experiences. Thus, scholars have now begun to write of the genetic 
“memory” of traumatic events, passed down from survivors to their offspring. See, 
e.g., Stanley Krippner & Deirdre Barrett, Transgenerational Trauma: The Role of 
Epigenetics, 40 J. MIND & BEH. 53, 53–62 (2019); Rachel Yehuda & Amy Lehrner, 
Intergenerational Transmission of Trauma Effects: Putative Role of Epigenetic 
Mechanisms, 17 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 243, 243–57 (2018); Rachel Yehuda et al., 
Influences of Maternal and Paternal PTSD On Epigenetic Regulation of the 
Glucocorticoid Receptor Gene in Holocaust Survivor Offspring, AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 872, 872–80 (2014). Researchers have also identified epigenetic 
influences on inter-generational addictive behavior. See, e.g., Fair M. Vassoler et 
al., The Impact of Exposure to Addictive Drugs on Future Generations: 
Physiological and Behavioral Effects, 76 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 269, 269–75 
(2014); Fair M. Vassoler & Ghazeleh Sadri-Vakili, Mechanisms of 
Transgenerational Inheritance of Addictive-Like Behavior, 264 NEUROSCIENCE 
198, 198–206 (2014). More optimistically, it has been proposed that epigenetics 
might be a source of altruistic behavior. See, e.g., D. Telen Hashem et al., The 
Silent Cooperator: An Epigenetic Model for Emergence of Altruistic Traits in 
Biological Systems, COMPLEXITY (2018). 
534 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 266–327. 
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asking: “Where [are] we[?]” “[And] how…most likely [did we get] here?”535 
Posing these questions permitted Sapolsky to examine the cultural and 
civilizational structures that characterize the contemporary world. 
 Much of that discussion is taken up by trying to identify what counts 
as cultural and what counts as the essential nature of human beings. Are 
human beings innately warlike and aggressive? Or are they, by nature, 
peaceful and cooperative? Sapolsky dramatically posed the question by 
asking who was right: Thomas Hobbes, with his contention that life in the 
state of nature is “nasty, brutish and short;”536 Or Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
who declared that “man is born free and is everywhere in chains,” and sought 
in his writings to free humankind from its shackles and restore it to its 
primitive goodness?537 
 It was a deliberately hyperbolic dichotomy, and Sapolsky knew it. 
Still, it allowed him the latitude to discuss a highly pertinent question: Did 
human nature predestine us to be at war with our fellows? Are human beings 
always fated to fight, to quarrel, to make bloody conflict when we cannot get 
our way? Or, on the other hand, are we by nature, peaceful, cooperative 
beings? Are human beings, in other words, sociable creatures, meant to live 
in harmony and community with others, and destined to share and 
collaborate? 
 Sapolsky’s effort to resolve this controversy reveals him at his very 
best. He acknowledges that the question has become intensely ideological, 
and he hoped to break through the logjam.538 Both sides, he believes, misuse 
or at least misunderstand the historical record. The evidence of endemic 
paleolithic war cited by the Hobbesians turns out to be pretty ambiguous.539 
Well, then, if that evidence doesn’t work, perhaps we are more like 
chimpanzees, who are infamous for their brutal territorial conflicts?540 Or 
maybe we are more like peaceful, cooperative, matriarchal bonobos, who 
 
535 Id. at 326. 
536 Id. at 305; Cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, XIII (1651). 
537 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 305; Cf. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. I, ch. 1 (1762). 
538 One side, Sapolsky writes, accuses the other of the desire to dismantle 
civilization and “return to tribal conditions,” while the other sees its opponents as 
“promoting a fictitious, colonialist image of a backward Brutal Savage.” 
SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 315.  
539 Id. at 306–12, 321. 
540 Id. at 316–17. 
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fight only rarely?541 And if these analogies don’t hold, then maybe our 
ancestors were like some contemporary warrior-hunter-gatherer tribe, like 
the Amazonian Yanomamö, made notorious by Napoleon Chagnon.542 
Again, Sapolsky expertly disassembled the claims, including the erroneous 
but widespread belief that the Yanomamö are a uniquely bloodthirsty tribe—
“Chagnon’s finding,” Sapolsky reports, following the work of Douglas Fry, 
“is an artifact of poor data analysis”543 and evidence like his “should not be 
considered [a] stand-in for our prehistoric past.”544 
 In all of this, what one sees at work are careful sifting of evidence, 
fair-mindedness, and a willingness to take account of and credit a wide range 
of divergent scholarship, all in the service of arriving at a highly original 
synthesis. And that is that Hobbes and Rousseau were each half-right.545 “The 
[hunter-gatherers] who peopled earth for hundreds and thousands of years 
were probably no angels, being perfectly capable of murder. However, 
‘war’—both in the sense that haunts our modern world and in the stripped-
down sense that haunted our ancestors—seems to have been rare until most 
humans abandoned the nomadic [hunter-gatherer] lifestyle.”546 Agriculture, 
and the urban clustering that soon followed, on the other hand, with their 
“unequal distribution of surplus,” with their socioeconomic hierarchies, with 
their concentrated forms of violence and cruelty, and with their unsanitary 
living conditions, “was one of the all-time human blunders.”547 
 If humankind unfortunately stumbled into the present state of 
affairs,548 Sapolsky certainly did not express any desire to repeal the past five 
 
541 Id. at 317; Cf. FRANS DE WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES (1989) 
(examining the other side of the “violent primate” thesis). 
542 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 312–13; Cf. NAPOLEON CHAGNON, 
YANOMAMÖ: THE FIERCE PEOPLE (1968); NAPOLEON CHAGNON, NOBLE SAVAGES: 
MY LIFE AMONG TWO DANGEROUS TRIBES—THE YANOMAMÖ AND THE 
ANTHROPOLOGISTS (2013) (setting out Chagnon’s views). 
543 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 313; Cf. Douglas Fry, Dangerous Tribes, 54 
EUR. J. SOC. 531, 531–36 (2013). 
544 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 314. 
545 Id. at 325. 
546 Id. 
547 Id. at 326. 
548 Sapolsky’s arguments bear some resemblance to those of James C. Scott, 
which similarly sees in the rise of the earliest agriculturally based city-states the 
seeds of future despotism and human oppression. JAMES C. SCOTT, AGAINST THE 
GRAIN: A DEEP HISTORY OF THE EARLIEST STATES (2017); Cf. Samuel Moyn, 
Barbarian Virtues, THE NATION, Oct. 5, 2017 (describing Scott’s book as 
“sparkling,” but finding its thesis more convincing, perhaps, to bourgeois 
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thousand years. Rather, he sought, in the other half of “Centuries and 
Millennia Before,” to explain its main outlines. He did so because human 
beings are not merely the end result of biological processes, but they are also 
cultural artifacts, shaped and molded by the experiences of growing up 
inculturated in one set of beliefs and practices and not in some other. As 
Sapolsky put: “culture matters. We carry it with us wherever we go.”549 
 Sapolsky offers numerous proofs of this assertion. Consider, he 
notes, the performance of girls versus boys on mathematics tests in primary 
and secondary school. “[I]n 1983,” he writes, concerning the United States, 
“for every girl scoring in the highest percentile on the math SAT, there were 
eleven boys.”550 Even today, there are commentators who are still treated 
seriously as public intellectuals despite having suggested that these outcomes 
are somehow preordained.551 But culture matters. Sapolsky drove the point 
home by looking at the data assembled in a 2008 article published in 
Science.552 This article found that “girls’ underperformance in math relative 
to boys is eliminated in more gender-equal culture[s].”553 In Iceland, “the 
most gender-equal country on earth at the time,”554 “the ratio of girls who 
score above the 99th percentile” is higher than it is for boys.555 
 But if our behavior is at least in part the product of culture, then what 
counts as culture? In answering this question, we might home in on the 
microscopic. Countless discrete cultures might be identified; universities 
have distinct cultures, employers do, states and regions do, even families are 
sometimes said to differ culturally from one another. Sapolsky, however, 
 
academics than persons living at the margins of society); Cf. Jedidiah Britton-
Purdy, Paleo Politics: What Made Prehistoric Hunter-Gatherers Give Up Freedom 
for Civilization?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 1, 2017 (praising Scott’s book for 
raising discomfiting questions about our automatic assumptions about linear human 
progress). 
549 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 267. 
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551 Daniel J. Hemel, Summers’ Comments on Women and Science Draw Ire, 
THE HARVARD CRIMSON, Jan. 14, 2005; Scott Jaschik, What Larry Summers Said, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED, Feb. 18, 2005; Nancy Hopkins, Academic Responsibility and 
Gender Bias, MIT FACULTY NEWSLETTER, Mar./Apr. 2005; Mary Dooe, Larry 
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THE WORLD, Jan. 31, 2015. 
552 Luigi Guiso et al., Culture, Gender, and Math, 320 SCI. 1164, 1165 
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554 SAPOLSKY, supra note 507, at 267. 
555 Guiso et al., supra note 552, at 1164. 
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eschews such a narrow focus. He chooses rather to paint with a broad brush. 
He distinguishes first between individualist and collectivist cultures, the 
former associated with the United States, the latter with East Asia, principally 
China.556 In drawing this distinction, it must be emphasized, Sapolsky is not 
engaging in geopolitics—he does not propose that one culture is superior to 
the other or that they should face off in competition. Rather, he merely means 
to take account of differences. “In individualist cultures, people more 
frequently seek uniqueness and personal accomplishment, use first-person 
singular pronouns more often, define themselves in terms that are personal 
(‘I’m a contractor’) rather than relational (‘I’m a parent’) . . . .”557 “In 
contrast, those from collectivist cultures show more social comprehension; 
some reports suggest that they are . . . more accurate in understanding 
someone else’s perspective—with ‘perspective ranging from the other 
person’s abstract thoughts to how objects appear from where she is 
sitting.”558 
 But this is not the only cultural differentiation Sapolsky identifies. 
Pastoralists—“people wandering the desert, steppes, or tundra with their 
herds”559—have tended to be monotheistic and militarist.560 Then there are 
also “honor cultures,” which foster “rules of civility, courtesy, and 
hospitality,”561 but which also carry darker undertones: “Even more so, 
cultures of honor are about taking retribution after affronts to self, family, or 
clan, and reputational consequences for failing to do so.”562 The practice of 
honor-killings—still found to occur with lamentable frequency—is a feature 
of some contemporary honor cultures.563 Historically, the American South 
was an honor culture, and it remains characterized by “high rates of 
violence.”564 
 
556 ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST 
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563 Id. at 288–91. 
564 Id. at 285, 287–88. And road rage. It is anecdotal, to be sure, but I lived in 
the Southern United States for eleven years, and witnessed, personally or through 
second-hand accounts, truly spectacular incidents of road rage unlike anything I 
have experienced elsewhere. Cf. Jackie Salo, Texas Boy, 9, Accidentally Shot By 
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 At the conclusion of his book, Sapolsky summarizes the problem of 
the causes of human behavior by saying, simply, “‘It’s complicated.’”565 And 
this review of Sapolsky’s main themes certainly bears witness to that 
observation. When anyone of us is called to act in the moment, the choices 
we make are the sum total of all that has gone before—from the structure and 
strengths of our amygdalas and frontal cortices, to the interplay of hormones, 
to the traumas our parents and grandparents suffered, all the way to whether 
our honor has been aggrieved. 
 We might instructively compare Sapolsky and B.F. Skinner. Skinner 
was a reductionist. He sought simple, universally valid general rules for all 
animal life forms without differentiation or distinction. Pigeons are like rats 
are like persons. And persons are all interchangeable. He truly believed that 
the Mongolian pastoralist and the astronaut would perform exactly alike, 
given the same training and conditioning. B.F. Skinner was behaviorism for 
an age of mass production. All of his subjects could have come fully formed, 
manufactured at General Motors’ Willow Run assembly plant (or, for that 
matter, at an East German Trabant manufacturer). “Soulless droid”—thus 
Sapolsky dismissed Skinner.566 
 For Sapolsky, it is all complexity, contingency, and circumstance. 
Behavior is the unique product of the unreplicable coming together of factors 
that will always be slightly different, whether those differences manifest 
themselves in the neurons, in the hormones, in the brain’s innate 
neuroplasticity, or in the cultural or historical past. Skinner’s pastoralist and 
astronaut are not interchangeable because it is not in the nature of human 
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beings to be interchangeable. We are all subtly different from one another, 
and, indeed, we are subtly, or not so subtly different even from the older and 
younger versions of ourselves. Heraclitus famously said that no one steps 
into the same river twice.567 Sapolsky might amend that insight by saying that 
no one performs the same deed twice. Sapolsky belongs not to the age of 
assembly lines and gray conformity, but to the world of cultural pluralism, of 
diversity, of fractals, chaos theory, artisanal food and drink, and the 
multiverse. 
 Noam Chomsky criticized Skinner’s determinism as unscientific 
because in the end it was unpredictive. Skinner’s conception of prior 
conditioning was so broad it could be used to “explain” whatever actions the 
subject took. Can the same criticism be made of Sapolsky’s work? No. 
Sapolsky’s work, in fact, refutes the charge. For Sapolsky, the science of 
neurobiology remains in its infancy. It is impossible, therefore, to state with 
any degree of comprehensiveness or conviction the governing principles of 
human behavior. But, importantly for Sapolsky’s thesis, neurobiology is 
moving inexorably in the direction of greater predictability. The scientific 
rules governing human behavior may be vast, may be complicated, may be 
sophisticated, may be highly tailored to individual circumstance, but 
ultimately they are knowable, and in the fullness of time, they will become 
known.  
 Yet both Skinner and Sapolsky count themselves as determinists. So, 
we should next turn to Sapolsky’s views on free will, which are stated in 
chapter sixteen of Behave and embedded in a larger discussion of the 
criminal-justice system. There are, Sapolsky begins, three stances possible 
regarding free will: “1. We have complete free will in our behavior. 2. We 
have none. 3. Somewhere in between.”568 
 There are, Sapolsky submits, very few free-will fundamentalists. He 
illustrates this point with a series of hypothetical problems: Suppose an 
epileptic unexpectedly experiences a grand mal seizure, topples over, and in 
the process knocks an expensive vase to the floor and shatters it.569 Or 
suppose a paralyzed bystander who cannot come to someone’s need.570 Or a 
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soldier who faints while “standing in formation” because he is “diabetic and 
needs his insulin.”571 These are all instances where the limits of human 
biology frustrate human purposes. Realistically, Sapolsky declares, even the 
strictest believers in free will would not find the epileptic guilty of the 
criminal destruction of property, or the paralytic cold and heartless, or the 
soldier lacking in courage.572 There are really very few free-will 
fundamentalists. Most members of the general public, Sapolsky asserts, if 
questioned closely about it, would concede to a belief in “mitigated free 
will.”573 
  The criminal justice system, Sapolsky continues, shares this 
commitment to mitigated free will. Nearly everyone wants to see punished 
those who are understood to choose to do wrong—those who freely choose 
to steal others’ property, or to injure others, or poison their pets, or vandalize 
their homes and automobiles, or, for that matter, commit various and sundry 
so-called white-collar crimes. The key concept here is “willingness,” 
“voluntariness.” The law therefore distinguishes between those who are 
capable of choosing to commit crimes and those who are not. To effectuate 
this distinction, the law borrows the Latin phrase mens rea—literally, “the 
guilty mind.” To be found guilty of a crime, it is the common teaching of the 
courts that one must have a “blameworthy mind,” or “malice aforethought,” 
or “guilty knowledge and the like.”574 Or, as the Supreme Court put it in 
Morissette v. United States, “wrongdoing must be conscious to be 
criminal.”575 
 In keeping with their commitment to mitigated free will, courts will 
therefore entertain arguments that mens rea was lacking or diminished in 
particular instances. It is the case that not every defendant is found guilty. 
Sapolsky takes note of the accommodations that courts sometimes make.576 
“[T]he issue,” he notes, “becomes where a line is drawn on a continuum.”577 
 The lines the Courts have drawn are not usually sympathetic to the 
defendant, but they do exist. Sapolsky reviews them. There is the 
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which the Supreme Court has sought to fashion constitutional guidelines 
regarding the punishment of adolescents—Roper v. Simmons (banning the 
execution of those who committed capital offenses while minors);579 Graham 
v. Florida (banning the imposition of mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences for non-homicidal crimes);580 and Miller v. Alabama (forbidding 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences even in capital cases).581 
 What is constant in all of this, however, is the continued commitment 
by the courts and the general public to a system that makes free will the 
guiding principle for securing criminal convictions while mitigating its 
operation only occasionally. This is where Sapolsky boldly announces his 
own position. He falls into the camp of those who believe that we entirely 
lack free will. And this in turn leads him to call not for the reform of the 
criminal justice system, or its perfection, but for its obliteration.582 
 Sapolsky proceeds to demonstrate what he takes to be the 
fallaciousness of those who would defend the criminal justice system by 
saying that we possess free will and so we are properly morally and 
criminally condemned when we do wrong. He does so with a rather 
extravagantly drawn hypothetical. But before examining his hypothetical, we 
might do well to recapitulate how the defenders of free will we have thus far 
examined conceive of it. There is Lucretius who identifies free will as 
voluntas, a self-initiating force that exerts autonomy over otherwise ceaseless 
atomic motion; there is Chomsky, who locates free will in the endless 
creative powers of language; and there is Berofsky, who finds it in an 
individual’s self-determination when presented with a range of options. 
 Wishing to reveal the hidden structure of claims such as these, 
Sapolsky contends that all defenders of free will must posit the existence of 
a “homunculus”—“a little man (or woman, or agendered individual) . . . 
made of a mixture of nanochips, old vacuum tubes, crinkly ancient 
parchment, stalactites of your mother’s admonishing voice, streaks of 
brimstone, rivets made out of gumption.”583 This self-made invention stands 
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apart from all of the neurobiological phenomena that Sapolsky had already 
reviewed—all of the “genes and hormones,” one’s culture, one’s history of 
trauma, one’s ancestors’ history of trauma, all of the “epigenetic effects, gene 
transpositions during neurogenesis,” and so on and on.584 “A homunculus 
[that is] in your brain, but not of it, operating independently of the material 
rules of the universe that constitute modern science.”585 And from this neutral 
vantage point, free and untethered from its surrounding physical body, it 
exercises dominion and control over one’s actions and decisions.586 
 It goes without saying that Sapolsky has encountered opposition in 
this two-fold stance—i.e., that there is no free will and that the criminal 
justice system should consequently be abolished. Among his critics is 
Stephen J. Morse, the Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law at the 
University of Pennsylvania and Associate Director of the Center for 
Neuroscience and Society. In an essay published in 2011, which Sapolsky 
cites and proposes to refute, Morse commenced by expressing two very real 
fears: first, that a neuroscience that finally disproves the existence of free will 
both super-empowers the state to deprive persons of their liberty;587 and, 
second, that it thereby annihilates personhood itself by destroying the 
principle “that conscious, intentional, rational, and uncompelled agents may 
properly be held responsible.”588 
 Morse, however, is relieved that these threats do not seem to be 
imminent. He is especially forceful in denying the possibility that 
neuroscience will ever erase personhood and that is because free will, for 
Morse, is an unshakeable human truth. He offers numerous proofs for this 
proposition. We have the experience of free will, and our shared intuition that 
our choices are free should serve as at least a partial proof of our agency.589 
The shared evolutionary history of humankind reveals that we are “self-
conscious creatures that act for reasons and are responsive to reasons.590 If 
we are capable of self-reflection and can change our minds and hearts on that 
basis, then surely that should also serve as at least a partial proof of free will’s 
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behavior” might improve with advancing scientific insights,591 but he is 
equally sure that neuroscience is “unlikely ever to pose” a dire threat to 
human integrity.592 Why? Because while Morse thinks it is remotely possible, 
somewhere in the far distant future, that neuroscience might gain predictive 
power, it is presently incapable of making predictions about most forms 
sophisticated human conduct.593 
 Sapolsky fully appreciates the challenge that Morse presents, and he 
meets Morse head-on. He admits that neuroscience presently lacks real 
predictive power. A person with a broken leg will be unable to walk on the 
leg; a person with “serious inflammatory lung disease” will find it 
challenging to carry on daily activities.594 Effect follows cause.  Medical 
science, even in its present state, can predict these outcomes with almost total 
certainty.595 
 But now consider an expert witness called to testify about “the 
extensive damage that the defendant sustained to his frontal cortex when he 
was a child.”596 It is well established that damage to the frontal cortex 
correlates with an increase in violent crime.597 But when the expert is asked: 
“Has every such person [who suffered such an injury] at least engaged in 
some sort of serious criminal behavior?” the expert is forced to answer, 
“No.”598 The prosecutor presses forward: “Can brain science explain why the 
same amount of damage produced murderous behavior in the defendant?”599 
Again, the answer must be, “No.”600 
 This is exactly Morse’s point. Correlation, yes, association, yes, but 
causation is another matter—it is very difficult to prove. But Sapolsky 
produces in response a two-pronged rebuttal. First, behavioral science is 
“multifactorial.” Suppose, Sapolsky hypothesizes, someone suffering from 
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depression who is experiencing a crisis.601 What are the neurobiological 
factors that may have contributed to this setback? Serotonin, yes, but also her 
genetic makeup, and her family circumstances. Did her parents die during 
her childhood? Was she raised in poverty? Is she living alone? If not, with 
whom does she live? What kind of stress is she experiencing? Has there been 
a build-up of glucocorticoids?602 “Add enough factors, many of which, 
possibly most of which, have not yet been discovered, and eventually your 
multifactorial biological knowledge will give you the same predictive power 
as in the fractured-bone scenario.”603 
 And this leads to the second prong of Sapolsky’s response. 
Behavioral science is still in its infancy. Most papers on oxytocin and trust, 
and oxytocin and social behavior have been published in the last decade and 
a half.604 A majority of the papers published on the amygdala and aggression 
have appeared since 2010.605 Indeed, the relationship of epigenetics and 
behavior was barely known in 2010, but since that date it has attracted over 
1,000 papers.606 “[N]ot that long ago,” Sapolsky notes, “we didn’t know” that 
these relationships even existed.607 Scientific techniques are improving on a 
daily basis, and our font of knowledge is expanding. This awareness leads 
Sapolsky to adopt Marvin Minsky’s definition of free will as “internal forces 
I do not understand.”608 
 Sapolsky ends his argument with an appeal to humanity. Should 
behavioral science progress along the lines Sapolsky believes possible, how 
will we be viewed in a hundred years? In a thousand? “Will the people of the 
future “look back at us as we do at the purveyors of leeches and bloodletting 
and trepanation, as we look back at the fifteenth-century experts who spent 
their days condemning witches . . . and think, ‘My God, the things they didn’t 
know then. The harm that they did.’”609 
 Sapolsky therefore would hasten the day when the criminal-justice 
system might be abolished. Abolition would not mean that criminals would 
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be permitted to walk the streets. “People must be protected from individuals 
who are dangerous. . ..  Rehabilitate such people if you can, send them to the 
Island of Misfit Toys forever if you can’t and they are destined to remain 
dangerous.”610 The American criminal-justice system, it must be added, once 
at least had an inkling of how to do this, although, again, it has regressed 
substantially over the last half-century. Thus, the notorious serial killer Ed 
Gein was initially found unfit by reason of insanity to stand trial611 and when, 
years later, he was put on trial, he was given a life sentence not to be served 
in prison but in a psychiatric hospital, where he died of natural causes.612 
Compare his fate to that of Jeffrey Dahmer, another notorious serial killer 
from Wisconsin. Dahmer was found guilty, placed in the general prison 
population, and quickly beaten to death.613 Same criminal justice system—
Wisconsin’s—thirty years apart.  
 One might compare Sapolsky’s arguments to Berofsky’s.  Berofsky 
defends free will in part by claiming that free will is likelier than 
determinism. A determinist, he asserts, must be a “necessitarian”—
embracing determinism as a total explanation for human behavior.614 Open 
the door even slightly, concede in even one instance the possibility of an 
indeterminate outcome, and the case in favor of determinism crumbles. 
Sapolsky, in essence, embraces Berofsky’s challenge. He says “yes,” “this is 
the appropriate field of battle, and yes, I am a necessitarian.”615 When, finally, 
science assembles a complete explanation for human behavior, one can read 
Sapolsky as saying, it will reveal free will to be a chimera, an illusion that 
might have been sustaining to some and reassuring to many, but should now 
be consigned to the world of myth, alongside mermaids, the Minotaur, and 
the kraken. 
 This review of the main lines of Sapolsky’s contribution to the free-
will/determinism debate brings us finally to Sapolsky’s contribution to the 
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Journal of Law and Public Policy. It is a predictably provocative paper. It 
builds upon and expands arguments made in Behave and in other venues. 
Four features deserve special attention. 
 First, is the paper’s commitment to progress. Scientific insight is 
seen as expanding. It is transforming the way we see ourselves and order our 
lives, and, for Sapolsky, this is a welcome development. The Western world, 
at least, once viewed epilepsy first as a form of demonic possession, and then 
as active collaboration with Satan, and we no longer do so. Autism, whose 
onset is generally early in childhood, and schizophrenia, whose onset occurs 
typically at the end of adolescence, were once blamed on bad mothering, 
loading parents with sometimes unbearable burdens of guilt and remorse. We 
no longer torture parents like this. And we no longer do these things, we no 
longer burn innocents at the stake, or impose immense emotional harm, 
because science now knows better. The world has made progress, and it can 
be expected to make further progress. 
 Second, are the damaging consequences of social hierarchy, 
especially to those who reside on its lowest rungs. Children born into poverty 
have higher levels of cortisol due to greater chronic stress. Sapolsky pays 
particular attention to the so-called ACE score—the “Adverse Childhood 
Experience” score—and its strong correlation with future patterns of 
behavioral pathology. These are children who in the saddest sense of the 
term, never stood a chance. 
 Third, is the role contingency plays in how persons turn out as adults. 
Sapolsky contrasts ACE scores with what he calls the RLCE score—the 
“Ridiculously Lucky Childhood Experience” score. Children born into 
homes with loving parents, and enriched learning environments, in safe 
neighborhoods, and in situations of economic security if not affluence, will 
manifest commensurately healthy behaviors as adults. Surveying his 
audience, he reminded them that they—at least most of them—would score 
pretty highly on the RLCE scale, and that they must therefore be mindful of 
the need to ameliorate the harms of rigid and destructive social hierarchies.616 
 A reform Sapolsky could have called for—and has, in other 
venues—is the urgent need to redress socioeconomic imbalances. If we want 
a society where all persons are enabled to thrive, where everyone is capable 
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of maximizing their potential, where every individual has the opportunity to 
enjoy a happy and healthy existence—and such an outcome should seem to 
be self-evidently desirable—then the socioeconomic crisis gripping the 
United States must be resolved. 
 Such a call, furthermore, should resonate most particularly with 
those born into advantage. Those who begin their lives with built-in 
advantages need to appreciate that, as has been said before, “to whom much 
is given, much is required.”617 It is not too much to ask for a thorough-going 
reform of the distribution of benefits in the Western world. 
 The final lesson one might draw from Sapolsky’s paper—and from 
his entire project—might be summarized by the expression, “the qualities of 
mercy”—compassion, forgiveness, understanding. His work expresses a 
broad and ecumenical humanism,618 and nowhere is it more evident than at 
the conclusion of his contribution to this volume of essays. Sapolsky thus 
teaches the scrupulous, “It is not all your fault.” We have all done atrocious 
things that we wish we could do over. So, be easy on yourself. And he 
reminds all of us, forgiveness must be at the heart any theory of 
responsibility. There are always extenuating circumstances. It is not that 
other person’s fault, either. Forgive yourselves, forgive one another, restrain 
those who cannot help themselves and who would otherwise threaten society, 
but be decent about it, and, finally, practice humility and understanding in all 
things. 
B. Adina L. Roskies 
 Adina L. Roskies is the Helman Family Distinguished Professor of 
Philosophy at Dartmouth University where she also chaired the Cognitive 
Science Program (2015-2019) and serves as Affiliated Professor in the 
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences. She holds two doctoral 
degrees—one, from the University of California at San Diego, in 
Neuroscience, granted in 1995; the other from the Massachusetts Institute of 
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Technology, in Philosophy, granted in 2004. She subsequently earned a 
Masters in the Science of Law from Yale Law School, in 2014. Her work 
represents a magnificent synthesis of several strands of thought: 
neuroscience, of course, but also philosophy, and law. 
 We should comment first on her contributions to the application of 
neuroscience to law. With Stephen Morse, she co-edited A Primer on 
Criminal Law and Neuroscience.619 The volume contains a number of 
important essays. There is, for instance, Henry Greely’s Mind-Reading, 
Neuroscience, and the Law.620 The essay addresses emerging techniques for 
discovering a person’s present mental state, and looks at situations where 
such information might be helpful in litigation ( such as, is the plaintiff 
actually experiencing pain?621 How biased is the defendant?).622 Or, take 
another article, co-authored by Stephen Morse and Stanford University 
neuroscientist William T. Newsome, Criminal Responsibility, Criminal 
Competence, and Prediction of Criminal Behavior, which takes for granted 
the “folk psychological” view of the human person embedded in the criminal 
law’s treatment of mental health,623 and proceeds to summarize such criminal 
defenses as “automatism” and “legal insanity.”624 
 Roskies herself contributed three essays to the volume. Her article 
Brain Imaging Techniques is precisely what it promises—a strong and 
thorough survey of the technology, as it existed in 2013, for ascertaining 
brain function.625 She makes important points, such as “normality and 
abnormality are complicated concepts,”626 and she closes the chapter with a 
checklist of questions practitioners should consider asking “when trying to 
assess the design, interpretation, and relevance of brain scans in a legal 
context.”627 In Other Neuroscientific Techniques, Roskies takes up methods 
and “techniques for understanding brain structure and function” omitted from 
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the Brain Imaging chapter.628 A wide-ranging survey, the chapter discusses, 
among other topics, the electroencephalograph,629 optimal imaging 
techniques,630 and even the latest developments in genetics and 
epigenetics.631 
 Roskies and Morse then provide a co-authored conclusion that aims 
to predict future trends in the field of neuroscience and the law.632 Roskies 
and Morse begin on a cautionary note. It is difficult to forecast precisely how 
neuroscience will impact the future path of the law,633 but, they assert, they 
are on firm footing with several predictions. First, they believe that 
neuroimaging, which had not yet gained general judicial acceptance, would 
soon come to be admitted as evidence “on a non-trivial number of issues.”634 
Second, they believe that “mind-reading”—made possible through the use of 
fMRI scans635—may acquire sufficient accuracy “to detect subjective states,” 
and, in particular, to determine whether a defendant or witness is lying.636 
 Third, although they admit that the capacity to use neuroscience to 
ascertain a defendant’s mens rea at the moment of the crime not only does 
not exist but is not foreseeable, reliance on neuroscience to establish 
affirmative defenses will soon be routine, if only because evidentiary 
standards are more relaxed post-conviction than at trial.637 More ominously, 
they also envisage the use of neuroscience to predict “recidivism and other 
dangerous behavior.”638 They summarize their predictions: “Currently the 
law operates with notions of personhood and agency that take seriously 
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637 Id. at 246–48. 
638 Id. at 247. Cf. James Gaines, Brain Scans in the Courts: Prosecutor’s 
Dream or Civil Rights Nightmare? INSIDE SCI. (2018) (updating the threats to 
privacy and self-incrimination posed by neuroscience). 
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concepts of volition, control, choice, belief, desire, and responsibility. It is 
possible that neuroscientific advances will require revisions in some of these 
concepts . . ..”639 
 In addition to the Primer, Roskies has written some one hundred 
articles, book chapters, and essays on the intersection of law, philosophy, 
moral reasoning, volition, and neuroscience. One might begin with her work 
on neuroimaging and its forensic uses—a series of essays that really represent 
further amplification of her contributions to the Primer. She began this series 
of studies with an exploration of neuroimaging as it is understood by those 
who view the images. “[T]he image format is familiar and accessible,” 
Roskies writes, while the data they represent are far more challenging and 
difficult to interpret.640 
 What makes neuroimages particularly challenging is their superficial 
resemblance to photographs.641 Neuroimaging is representational, in that it 
produces images that are perceived and interpreted visually, but the images 
thus produced differ from photographs in that the “visual characteristics of 
brain activity are not faithfully reproduced in the image. Since neural activity 
has no relevant visual properties, the conventions of the brain image are 
representational translations of certain nonvisual aspects of properties related 
to neural activity.”642 In fact, the images depict not the direct operations of 
neurons or synapses but relative blood flow.643 The use of neuroimages in a 
forensic setting therefore poses special risks, especially because of the ease 
with which they can be confused with photographs.644 Since such images 
“provide us with important, sometimes invaluable information about brain 
 
639 Roskies and Morse, Neuroscience, in Morse & Roskies, supra note 619, at 
251. 
640 Adina L. Roskies, Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance: The Perils of 
Pictures, in FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES IN HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING STEPHEN 195–96 
(José Hanson &Martin Bunzl 2010). 
641 Adina L. Roskies, Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance, 1 
NEUROETHICS 19–30 (2008). 
642 Id. at 29. 
643 Arno Villringer and Ulrich Dirnagl, Coupling of Brain Activity and 
Cerebral Blood Flow: Basis of Functional Neuroimaging, 7 CEREBROVASCULAR 
BRAIN METABOLISM REV. 240, 240–76 (1995).; Geoffrey K. Aguirre, Functional 
Neuroimaging: Technical, Logical, and Social Perspectives, HASTINGS CTR. REP., 
2014; How Neural Activity Spurs Blood Flow in the Brain, SCI. DAILY, June 28, 
2008. 
644 Adina L. Roskies, Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain?, 74 
PHIL. SCI. 860, 860–72 (2007). 
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function,”645 their utilization should not be prohibited, but without careful 
interpretation, their use might lead to “misleading and potentially harmful 
results.”646 
 This work, then, helped to provide Roskies with a foundation to 
evaluate the judicial application of neuroimaging. In 2008, Roskies, writing 
with co-authors, was skeptical that brain images, at least as they existed at 
that time, could prove useful in criminal trials,647 though she thought they 
might be helpful at time of sentencing, say, in seeking to avoid a capital 
sentence for reasons of extenuating circumstances.648 In Brain Images as 
Evidence in the Criminal Law, Roskies and a co-author considered two 
questions—was neuroimaging probative? Or, conversely, was it misleading 
and caused jurors to give it too much weight?649 Cautiously, they 
recommended the conditional use of such images, admonishing that much 
more must be learnt about the relationship of neural activity and human 
conduct.650 
 In 2011, Roskies and collaborators announced the results of 
experiments probing even more deeply into the neuroimages-in-the-
courtroom problem. They asked, how might jurors receive and interpret their 
use?651 “Across four experiments,” Roskies and her research group wrote, 
“we attempted to identify a biasing effect of neuroimages on juror decision 
making.”652 The fear had been that the presentation of images to groups of 
persons chosen to stand in for jurors—vivid, picture-like images, as opposed 
to the use of bar graphs or text-based scientific reports—would lead to 
prejudice, causing the “jurors” to favor the outcome sought by those making 
use of the images.653 The use of neuroimages, however, did not produce the 
 
645 Id. at 871. 
646 Id. 
647 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al., Brain Images as Legal Evidence, 5 
EPISTEME 359, 359–66 (2008). 
648 Id. at 371. 
649 Adina L. Roskies & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Brain Images as Evidence 
in the Criminal Law, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 97–114 (Michael Freeman ed. 
2011). 
650 Id. at 113. 
651 N.J. Schweitzer, et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense, 
17 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, L., 357–93 (2011). 
652 Id. at 382. 
653 Id. at 358–62 (the hypothesis was based on empirical studies showing that 
jurors were often unduly influenced by the use of “gruesome” evidence—blood, 
broken limbs, gore—to convict defendants at higher rates). Cf. David A. Bright & 
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hypothesized effects.654 
 Writing two years later, having satisfied herself regarding the non-
prejudicial effects of neuroimaging, Roskies was prepared to advocate for its 
careful use, hopeful that the introduction of such evidence at trial might, 
perhaps, “mak[e] the law more just.”655 And, in December 2020, as 
neuroimages attained greater judicial favor, Roskies returned to the subject, 
co-authoring the “Scientific Issues” section to the chapter on 
“Neuroimaging” in the online treatise Modern Scientific Evidence.656 The 
section provides a masterful restatement of the technology for assessing brain 
states and a lucid explanation of their main features and their strengths and 
shortcomings.657 
 So, what conclusions can we reach about Roskies, the scholar? She 
is careful in identifying the problems she intends to address, the evidence she 
is prepared to use, and the conclusions she is willing to draw. Step-by-step, 
methodically, meticulously, she examines the different aspects a particular 
problem might present—what is a neuroimage? It is an image, but is it a 
picture? What impact does the image have on the sophisticated interpreter? 
On a naive interpreter? Can it qualify as probative evidence under the Federal 
Rules? Ought it to qualify as probative? Does its use tend to bias the average 
juror? What are the limitations—perceptual, biological, and legal—posed by 
its introduction into evidence? Carefully, with appropriately drawn 
qualifications, Roskies solved each of these problems. And her work in this 
field has accordingly gained widespread acceptance.658 As we consider other 
 
Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and 
Jury Decision-Making, 30 L. HUM. BEHAV. 183, 183–202 (2006) (a principal 
source for the use of “gruesome evidence”). 
654Id. at 389–90. 
655 Adina L. Roskies, ET AL., Neuroimages in Court: Less Biasing Than 
Feared, 17 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE 99, 100 (2013). 
656 Adina L. Roskies & Kimberly Farbota, Scientific Issues, in MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David L. 
Faigman, et al. eds., 2020). 
657 Consider, for instance, section 20.30, “Image Acquisition—Uncertainty 
Regarding the Hemodynamic Signal.” Roskies and her co-author point out that 
“fMRI measures hemodynamic changes, not neural changes. That is to say, it 
measures blood flow, not neural activity.” They add: “In addition, the blood flow 
response is not temporally coincident with neural activity.” They go on to identify 
the weaknesses that these biological facts present for the interpreter and, by 
extension, the court.  
658 See, for example, Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner 
Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past 
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dimensions of her work, we should keep in mind the methodological caution 
she employs whenever she puts pen to paper. 
 Roskies has written numerous essays on aspects of the philosophy of 
neuroscience. They are too many in number for a comprehensive review. 
Only a sampling will therefore be attempted. A review of her work suggests 
several overarching themes. She has written several essays examining the 
significance of the philosophy/neuroscience interface. In a series of studies, 
she has explored the relationship of neuroscience and moral choice; another 
group of articles investigates the question of free will, volition, and 
neuroscience. And, finally, there are the articles that scrutinize the 
relationship of consciousness, choice, and action. 
 Let’s begin with the essays that take up the general relationship of 
neuroscience and philosophy. In a study entitled simply Neuroscience, and 
published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology,659 Roskies 
considers several ways in which neuroscience and philosophy intersect. Does 
it remain possible to hold “a dualistic view of mentality,” or must we hold to 
a strict materialist account of brain science? she asks, and responds that the 
ranks of the dualists “are increasingly in the minority,” neatly side-stepping 
a commitment to one side or the other.660 She proposes, furthermore, that 
neuroscience can provide information, and sometimes even answers, to 
questions that have long been the subject of philosophical speculation.661 She 
reviews the scholarly debate on whether neuroscience can be normative, 
again, without tipping her hand,662 and she concludes by stating her view that 
 
Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1126 (2010); Sjors L.T.J. Ligthart, Coercive 
Neuroimaging, Criminal Law, and Privacy: A European Perspective, 6 J. L. 
BIOSCIENCES 289, 301(2019); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a 
Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform 
Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. TECH. L. REV. 235, 248 & 279 (2012); and Michael 
J. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “My Brain Is So Wired:’ Neuroimaging’s Role in 
Competency Cases Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities, 27 B. U. PUB. INT. 
L. J. 73, 81, note 48 (2018). Neuroimaging is now being used in the courtroom. 
See, for example, Owens v. Stirling, 967 F. 3d 396, 426–28 (4th Cir. 2020) (alleging 
that failure to conduct neuroimaging of defendant amounted to ineffective 
representation by counsel). 
659 Adina Roskies, Neuroscience, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY 587–606 (Herman Cappelen, et al. eds., 2016). 
660 Id. at 589. 
661 Id. at 593–94 (on acquired sociopathy and moral reasoning). 
662 Id. at 596–99 (reviewing the debate between, on the one hand, Joshua D. 
Greene, et al. An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 
293 SCI. 2105, 2105–08 (2001); Joshua D. Greene, et al., The Neural Bases of 
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neuroscience will likely never fully resolve the free will/determinism 
controversy.663 
 In Philosophy of Neuroscience, Roskies reflects on the purpose and 
nature of philosophy and neuroscience respectively.664 Philosophy is, loosely 
speaking, a disciplined inquiry into reality, which might be physical, 
biological, emotional, social, or something else. Philosophers who engage in 
neuroscientific methods mean to come to a better knowledge of those larger 
realities through the application of the latest developments in brain science, 
and thereby hope to clarify questions that have long haunted the discipline—
what is the nature of “conscious experiences?” what is our “capacity for 
understanding?” how do we “make decisions on the basis of reasons?”665 In 
part, Roskies reviews the latest work in these areas of inquiry. But she also 
takes time to reflect, yet again, on the free-will debate. In doing so, she 
acknowledges that “[o]ne thread of research that has attracted philosophical 
discussion concerns the causal relevance of conscious decision-making to 
action”666—a subject that Professor Roskies takes up in her contribution to 
this volume. 
 In her article Neuroethics Beyond Genethics,667 Roskies focuses on 
the differences between the philosophy informing neuroscience and the set 
of core beliefs and commitments shaping genetics. She identifies among the 
concerns of the neuroscience/philosophy nexus “moral cognition,” volition 
or free will, and “consciousness.”668 
 Moral reasoning and neuroscience—it is there where we turn next. 
Where does moral reasoning come from? Is it innate, instinctive, God-given, 
as some religious traditions teach? Is it learned, taught by parents or society, 
and therefore conventional and culturally determined? Or is it at least in part 
neurological? That is, is moral reasoning biologically based, and so 
 
Cognitive Conflict and Control In Moral Judgment, 44 NEURON 389, 389–400 
(2004); Joshua D. Green, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in The Neuroscience of 
Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development 35–79 (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong ed., vol. 3 2008); and, on the other hand, Selim Berker, The Normative 
Insignificance of Neuroscience, 37 PHIL. PUB. AFFS. 293, 293–329 (2009). 
663 Roskies, supra note 632, at 600. 
664 Adina L. Roskies, Philosophy of Neuroscience, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (Paul Humphreys ed., 2016). 
665 Id. 
666 Id. 
667 Adina L. Roskies, Neuroethics Beyond Genethics, 8 EMBO Reports, S52–
S56 (2007). 
668 Id. at S52. 
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determined and defined by the intersection of the countless neurons and 
synapses of the human brain? And if it is neurological/biological, then what 
implications for philosophy and jurisprudence? 
 In a set of three articles, Roskies proposed to explore the 
neurological dimension of moral reasoning by examining cases involving 
brain pathology. In her earliest study of the question, in 2003, Roskies 
proposed to use empirical evidence to refute a claim commonly “held to be 
immune from the empirical . . . [that is,] the relation between moral facts and 
moral motivation.”669 What did Roskies mean by this sentence? That moral 
principles—i.e., the values, or justifications, or moral facts that impel us to 
choose a path that to us, at least, seems morally good—are intrinsic, or 
internal to the person.670 And if they are internal, Roskies continued, certain 
implications must inevitably follow. She explains: 
Three characteristics of the internalist claim are worthy of 
note: necessity, intrinsicness, and specificity. First, 
necessity: internalism says not merely that it happens to be 
the case that motivation accompanies belief or judgment, 
but rather that it must be so . . ..  Second, internalism has a 
characteristic I call intrinsicness: internalist claims are 
committed to the view that the connection between moral 
belief and motivation must hold in virtue of the content of 
the moral belief itself, not in virtue of some contingent or 
auxiliary non-moral fact or reason. . .. Third, internalist 
positions were originally inspired by the conviction that 
moral facts are different in kind from other facts, or that 
moral reasoning differs in specific ways from non-moral 
reasoning.671 
 Morality, motivation, and action—one can summarize the series of 
connections Roskies has drawn. We hold a belief, we are motivated to act in 
accord with that belief, and we are therefore impelled to act. A neat, tight, 
tripartite arrangement impermeable to external, empirical verification or 
challenge. Roskies in particular wishes to focus on the following two claims: 
first, that the connection between belief and action is “impervious to 
empirical evidence;”672 and, second, that belief always and necessarily 
 
669 Adina Roskies, Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons 
From “Acquired Sociopathy,” 16 PHIL. PSYCH. 51 (2003). 
670 Id. 
671 Id. at 52. 
672 Id. at 51. 
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impels action.  Having defined the internalist position, Roskies added that it 
was her intention to demonstrate that it “is empirically false.”673 
 She did so through a study of individuals who had suffered 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex injuries. As noted above, the cortex, and most 
especially the prefrontal cortex, controls the brain’s “executive function.”674 
Injury to this part of the brain accordingly results in the impairment or loss 
of executive function. Such loss is manifested in socially inappropriate 
conduct, even if the patient’s intelligence is otherwise unimpaired and the 
content of the patient’s moral values remains unaltered. Following the work 
of Antonio Damasio, Roskies called this phenomenon “acquired 
sociopathy.”675 
 What interested Roskies was the divergence between professed 
moral values and behavior. Patients who have suffered damage to the 
prefrontal cortex continue to retain moral beliefs. “[T]hey have moral 
knowledge and thus moral belief.”676 In other words, they know right from 
wrong. What is missing is “the motivation which normally co-occurs with 
such beliefs.”677 In other words, moral knowledge did not lead to moral 
action.  Roskies was satisfied that the internalist position, at least in the form 
that she articulated, was thereby refuted. Strong internalism, she determined, 
“is empirically false.”678 
 In a pair of responses to critics, Roskies expanded and elaborated on 
these themes. In Patients with Ventromedial Frontal Damage Have Moral 
Beliefs,679 she answered Michael Cholbi’s defense of internalism.680 Cholbi 
argued that “moral beliefs are necessarily motivating . . . an agent’s 
possessing a moral belief cannot fail to move her to act in accordance with 
that belief.”681 Cholbi was unconvinced that Roskies had presented sufficient 
 
673 Id. at 55. 
674 Sapolsky, supra note 507—and accompanying text. 
675 Roskies, supra note 669, at 56. Cf. Ralph Adolphs, et al. 
Neuropsychological Approaches to Reasoning and Decision-Making, in 
NEUROBIOLOGY OF DECISION-MAKING 157–79 (Antonio R. Damasio et al. eds.) 
(Roskies’ source). 
676 Roskies, supra note 669, at 59. 
677 Id. 
678 Id. at 55. 
679 Adina Roskies, Patients with Ventromedial Frontal Damage Have Moral 
Beliefs, 19 PHIL. PSYCH. 617–27 (2006). 
680 Michael Cholbi, Belief Attribution and the Falsification of Motive 
Internalism, 19 PHIL. PSYCH. 607–16 (2006). 
681 Id. at 607. 
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evidence to prove her case.682 Cholbi, Roskies replied, was putting too much 
weight on the word “belief.” Looking to Donald Davidson’s criteria of belief 
and the empirical data that she had previously studied, Roskies was able to 
separate moral belief from moral action and thereby refute Cholbi’s claim of 
an inseparable connection between the two.683 
 In “Internalism and the Evidence from Pathology,”684 she countered 
the argument of Jeannette Kennett and Cordelia Fine.685 In her answer to 
Kennett and Fine, Roskies reiterated the internalist claim that there must be 
a necessary connection between moral belief and action. “[N]ecessity is part 
of the standard view of internalism.”686 Thus “a single counterexample is 
sufficient to refute [internalism],” and Roskies concluded that she had met 
this burden of proof.687 
 Roskies further elaborated her views on the relationship of 
neuroscience and moral reasoning in several non-polemical essays. In A Case 
Study of Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral Judgment, Roskies once again 
utilized evidence drawn from victims of ventromedial damage.688 In 
particular, she paid close attention to the quality of the moral reasoning 
demonstrated by those patients who had been interviewed. On the one hand, 
some of these victims were able to attain very high scores on the Kohlberg 
Stages of Moral Development test.689 There was, for example, EVR—known 
only by initials—who attained “a level of sophistication that surpasses the 
 
682 Id. at 608 (“[T]he evidence that [ventromedial] patients in fact possess 
moral beliefs is weak.”). 
683 Roskies, supra note 679, at 623. Cf. DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO 
TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 155–70 (1984); and Donald Davidson, SUBJECTIVE, 
INTERSUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE 95–106 (2001). 
684 Adina L. Roskies, Internalism and the Evidence from Pathology, in 3 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY 191–206 (Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. 2008). 
685 Jeannette Kennett & Cordelia Fine, Internalism and the Evidence from 
Psychopaths and “Acquired Sociopaths,” in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE 
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY 173–90 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. 2008). 
686 Roskies, supra note 684, at 192. 
687 Id. at 195. (Roskies, however, concedes that the interviews which uses as 
proof “were carried out by neurologists and neuroscientists who were not guided by 
the philosophical questions we are considering” and so “is far from ideal.”). 
688 Adina L. Roskies, A Case Study of Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral 
Judgment, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY 17–32 (Judy Illes ed.2004).  
689 Id. Cf. Lawrence Kohlberg & Richard H. Hersh, Moral Development: A 
Review of the Theory, 16 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 53–59 (1977) (summarizing the 
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highest level reached by many normal people.”690 But on the other hand, 
Roskies also noticed subtle differences. Although quite capable of resolving 
the famous Trolley Problem,691 patients who had experienced ventromedial 
damage were prone to be more ruthlessly utilitarian in their solutions than 
those who had not experienced comparable brain damage.692 
 Why does this line of inquiry matter for the free-will controversy? It 
is often—usually—taken for granted that knowledge of right and wrong will 
result in the person selecting the morally appropriate course of action. But 
what Roskies identified was a class of persons who have knowledge—
sometimes quite sophisticated knowledge—of right and wrong but are 
indifferent to choosing one or the other path. And the source of their 
indifference arises not from some deep perversity or wickedness of will—to 
use moralistic language—or from some innate antisocial tendency, but injury 
to a portion of the brain. The physical structures of the brain, in other words, 
determines our moral choices. The implications for a materialist account of 
human volition are self-evident. 
 Moral Motivation, co-authored with Timothy Schroeder and Shaun 
Nichols, represents a synthesis of philosophical speculation and neuroscience 
on the question of moral action.693 Why do we do good things? An 
“instrumentalist” believes that we act to satisfy “intrinsic desires” but only 
when circumstances suggest action is likely to lead to change.694 The 
“cognitivist” sees belief and judgment as fundamental.695 The sentimentalist, 
meanwhile, grounds moral action in the emotions,696 while the personalist 
looks to “good character.”697 Roskies and her co-authors proposed to ground 
each of these schools of thought in the frontal cortex,698 and devoted much 
 
690 Roskies, supra note 688. 
691 The first statement of the Trolley Problem appeared in Philippa Foot, The 
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REVIEW 5–15 
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HANDBOOK 72–110 (John M. Doris, ed. 2010). 
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of the remainder of the article to exploring the consequences of this 
neuroscientific foundation for each of these approaches.699 
 Finally, there is “Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth,” co-
authored with Shaun Nichols.700 The article reported on an experiment 
conducted to determine popular perceptions of the relationship of free will, 
determinism, and moral responsibility. A number of scholars—such as Saul 
Smilansky701—have argued that even though free will does not truly exist, it 
is imperative that the public’s belief in free will be maintained lest 
fundamental principles of merit, responsibility, and wrong-doing disappear 
and are replaced by disabling arbitrariness and pervading nihilism.702 Roskies 
and Nichols, however, conclude more optimistically: “our results indicate 
that should neuroscience or philosophy lead the folk to come to think, 
correctly or mistakenly, that our minds are mechanistic and our choices are 
determined, our judgments about moral responsibility will remain largely 
intact.”703 
 As with neuroimaging, so with moral reasoning. Roskies’ 
methodology begins with discrete problems, but then expands to fill an entire 
tapestry of insight. Thus, from ventromedial damage and moral reasoning, 
we journey through types of moral reasoning, and finally arrive at popular 
beliefs about neuroscience, free will, and human responsibility. 
 A review of Roskies’ work on moral reasoning and moral choice 
leads us naturally to consider her studies of free will and volition. 
Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility was among her 
first contributions to the debate and remains among the most important.704 
She opened this study by reviewing the threats free will is perceived to face. 
Historically, a religious conception of God, an omnipotent deity, the master 
of human affairs, was at least seemingly incompatible with free will,705 
 
deliberations, one’s principles of action, values, or choices. Nonetheless, if these 
things are real (as we have no reason to doubt), then they are realized in the higher-
level structures of the cortex.”). 
699 Id. at 81–103, including the authors’ interesting discussions of “weakness 
of will” (explained as the interaction of competing neural processes) and “altruism” 
(explained as an intrinsic desire of at least certain individuals). Id. at 103–06. 
700 Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols, Bringing Moral Responsibility Down 
to Earth, 105 J. PHIL. 371–88 (2008). 
701 See SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION (2000). 
702 Id. at 189. 
703 Roskies & Nichols, supra note 700, at 388. 
704 Adina Roskies, Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and 
Responsibility, 10 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 419–23 (2006). 
705 Id. at 419. 
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though Roskies was more concerned with the challenges posed respectively 
by modern deterministic and indeterminist claims.706 The problems presented 
by determinism have already been reviewed at length. But indeterminacy 
also seems irreconcilable with free will. Why? Because the opposite of 
determinism is not human deliberation, choice, and autonomy, but 
randomness and chance, and that seems like a problem for free will every bit 
as large as determinism.707 
 Roskies responded to this dilemma with a series of refined 
distinctions. First, one must distinguish between “mechanism” and 
“determinism.” She confidently wrote: “Can neuroscience indicate that we 
live in a deterministic universe? No: neuroscience will remain silent on this 
matter.”708 Why? Because neuroscience, at least as it is understood today, is 
“mechanistic,” but that need not mean deterministic.709 Roskies explained 
why this distinction mattered: “[O]ur current best models,” she asserted, are 
“infused” with “probabilistic processes.”710 “Whether or not a neuron will 
fire, what pattern of action potentials it generates, or how many synaptic 
vesicles are released have all been characterized as stochastic [i.e., probable] 
phenomena in our current best models.”711 
 What did Roskies mean by “mechanism” in this context? As she 
explained in another context, to say that the brain is “mechanistic” means 
that human action is grounded in its “physical parts.”712 These physical 
components may or may not follow determinist principles—a point not yet 
proven by science.713 
 On the other hand, Roskies continued, she did not want to discard 
determinism entirely. The brain, in its larger structures, observes laws and 
produces regular results, “so that its future activity can be reliably predicted 
on the basis of its past.”714 She notes that “many scientists” “adhere to” 
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assumption,” lacking conclusive proof.715 
 Thus, Roskies found herself in a challenging position. She was not a 
determinist, although she saw at least some value in the determinist position; 
similarly, she was not ready either to accept or reject free will. Indeed, she 
contended that evidence sufficient to reject free will remains lacking:  
[A]lthough scientific successes are evidence that behavior is driven 
by biological mechanism rather than ‘the soul,’ neuroscientific 
results cannot prove that we are nothing more than mechanism. An 
understanding of the potential yields of neuroscientific techniques 
reveals them to be rather impotent for exacerbating the status of the 
free will problem.716 
 Although Roskies has substantially refined and developed her 
arguments since writing this article, it remains a pretty good summary of the 
core of her position on the free will debate. The brain is material, its cognitive 
processes reflect its component parts, its regular, predictable functioning 
causes many to assume it is deterministic, but free will is not thereby erased. 
One friendly critic, Robert H. Kane of the University of Texas, has described 
Roskies as a “compatibilist,” a scholar who has been able to consistently 
defend claims of free will even within a deterministic account of the universe 
and human behavior.717 
 In 2015, she explored yet another dimension of the free-will 
controversy in a study entitled Monkey Decision Making as a Model System 
for Human Decision Making.718 The article was an analysis of a series of 
experiments examining the response of rhesus macaque monkeys to a 
stimulus that was made deliberately “ambiguous or noisy,”719 and they 
revealed that particular neurons (known as LIP neurons) “play[ed] a causal 
role in the decision process.”720 Roskies extrapolated from these findings to 
investigate the neuronal basis of human decision making. What are the 




717 Robert H. Kane, Free Will, Mechanism, and Determinism: Comments on 
Roskies, “Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues About Free Will?”, in 4 MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 127–29 (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, ed. 2014). 
718 Adina L. Roskies, Monkey Decision Making as a Model for Human 
Decision Making, in SURROUNDING FREE WILL: PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, 
NEUROSCIENCE 231–54 (Alfred R. Mele ed. 2015). 
719 Id. at 233. 
720 Id. at 235. 
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For sure, human beings make decisions of much greater sophistication than 
those tested in the experiments: “[T]he human decisions that interest us are 
complex, propositional, and discursive.”721 Roskies thus followed with a 
question: “Can [a] model [derived from the study of rhesus macaques] 
accommodate such propositional complexity?”722 
 Roskies answered in the affirmative. Even complicated decisions 
that call for the weighing and balancing of relative pleasures723 “must be 
represented by neural activity [and therefore] there must be some neural way 
of encoding these propositions in the activity of populations of neurons.”724 
Roskies considered an objection to this conclusion. In human beings, it is 
self-evident that most decision-making is linguistic.725 Does the comparison 
between monkey and human decision-making still hold? Roskies believes 
that it is at least possible: “Even if human decision making is fundamentally 
linguistic, decision processes operating on linguistically represented 
elements could employ the same mechanisms as decisions operating on [the] 
perceptual representations [used in the monkey experiments].”726 
 Next, Roskies sketched the outlines of what amounts to a plausible 
mechanistic account of human decision-making. Neuronal movement seems 
to be its foundation. But notice in particular the heavy lifting that is being 
done in this argument by the word “mechanistic” and the neuroscientific 
theory that lies behind it.  Roskies has effectively, if obliquely, responded to 
Sapolsky’s homunculus. There is no hunched-over, gnomish fellow 
independently pulling the gears and levers of human consciousness and 
thereby creating space for human freedom and autonomy. As she noted, 
“there could be populations of neurons representing options of going to the 
Highlands, or going to see Brian Eno.”727 Thus, on Roskies’ account, human 
decision-making is broadly similar to other primates and is neuronally based. 
It is mechanistic, but indeterminacy—the possibility of “on the one hand, or 
on the other”—may be built into the brain’s mechanical structure. The 
process of choosing between the Highlands and Brian Eno is, in other words, 
meaningful, and its outcome cannot be predicted in advance.  
 
721 Id. at 241. 
722 Id. 
723 Roskies, supra note 718 at 241. 
724 Id. 
725 Id. at 244 (“When we introspect about our decisions, it seems that most of 
our decision making is fundamentally linguistic.”).  
726 Id. at 245. 
727 Id. at 241. 
112  U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y [Vol. XV No. 1 
 
 But is monkey decision making in all respects similar to human 
decision making? Roskies identifies possible differences. There is, of course, 
the difference in linguistic capacity, already alluded to.728 Human beings also 
seem to have a “consciousness of self” that is almost certainly more 
sophisticated than anything monkeys possess.729 A person, furthermore, 
conceives of herself or himself “as an extended entity over time,” and as 
capable of assuming “moral responsibility” and bearing “accountability.”730 
Can monkeys feel guilt? The evidence thus far is lacking. Roskies ended her 
essay with a series of questions, but it is certainly fair to conclude that she 
also answered some important concerns. 
 Roskies returned once more to the free-will debate in an article 
whose title bears the question, Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues About Free 
Will?731 She commenced her article by exploring foundational claims made 
by theoretical physics and evolutionary biology. Is the universe determined 
or indeterminate? If we look to physics, and in particular, to quantum 
mechanics, it would seem “that indeterminism reigns at the quantum 
level.”732 So does this mean that there is free will? There are some who would 
take this leap.733 But Roskies cautions, not so fast: “Physicists are still 
searching for a grand unified theory.”734 Until such a theory is established, it 
is impossible to say whether the universe is determinist or indeterminate.735 
 What, then, of evolutionary biology? Roskies looked in particular to 
the work of Paul W. Glimcher, who has asserted that game theory 
demonstrates that “indeterminacy is a requisite feature of efficient behavior 
in a competitive world,”736 and that evolution thus almost certainly favored 
 
728 See supra, notes 725–26 and accompanying text.  
729 Roskies, supra note 718 at 248. 
730 Id. 
731 Roskies, supra note 712, at 104–26. 
732 Id. at 106. 
733 See ROBERT H. KANE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL 172–74 (1996); 
David Hodgson, Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 85–110 (Robert Kane ed., 1st ed. 2002); cf. Mario de 
Caro & Hilary Putnam, Free Will and Quantum Mechanics, 103 MONIST 415–26 
(2020) (identifying problems with grounding free will in quantum mechanics). 
734 Roskies, supra note 712, at 106. And, as noted above, some physicists, 
like Brian Greene, claim that the universe is determinist. See supra notes 440–56 
and accompanying text. 
735 Roskies, supra note 712, at 106–08. 
736 Paul W. Glimcher, Indeterminacy in Brain and Behavior, 56 ANN. REV. 
PSYCH. 25, 33 (2005). 
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those organisms that could optimize indeterminate behavior.737 Roskies, 
however, remained unpersuaded: “Abstract arguments of this sort seem 
unable to give the fans of freedom what they want.”738 
 Can neuroscience provide the requisite defense for human freedom, 
given the apparent failures of physics and biology? Roskies, no fan of 
determinism, chose this moment to inform her readers that neuroscience will 
not be coming to the rescue: “I will argue that neuroscience today is not in a 
position to resolve the free will debate as currently conceived, and more 
importantly, neither is any foreseeable neuroscience.”739 
 What about neurons? In her Monkey Decision Making paper, Roskies 
asserted that neurons were likely probabilistic in their motions, but now, 
following the work of Zachary Mainen and Terrence Sejnowski,740 she 
wanted to introduce greater precision and caution.741 Single neurons seem to 
behave deterministically, but “neural transmission” seems to be 
“probabilistic.”742 And so she withheld judgment as to whether “the nervous 
system is or is not fundamentally (in)deterministic.”743 
 She next took up a term she had used in other contexts, “[t]he concept 
of mechanism.”744 Use of the term is likely to stoke fear in many persons but 
that is because of “a rather uncritical acceptance of the folk conception of 
causation as a push-pull mechanical relation.”745 But words like 
“mechanism” or “mechanistic” should not be thought of in such a reductive 
sense.746 Even if neuroscience lent “support for thinking of ourselves as 
 
737 Id. at 34–35 (“[T]heoretical analysis suggests that, at least from the point 
of view of other individuals in the same species, evolution would drive behavior 
toward unpredictability.”). Cf. PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY, 
AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF NEUROECONOMICS 273 (2003) (“Classes of 
behaviors can be shown to exist that are uncertain not because of our 
epistemological limitations but because they are, in fact, irreducibly uncertain”). 
738 Roskies, supra note 712, at 108. 
739 Id. at 103. 
740 Zachary F. Mainen & Terrence J. Sejnowski, Reliability of Spike Timing in 
Neocortical Neurons, 268 SCIENCE 1503–06 (1995). 
741 Roskies, supra note 712, at 114. 
742 Id. at 114–15. 
743 Id. at 115. 
744 Id. at 118. 
745 Id. 
746 Roskies, supra note 712, at 120 (“The concept of mechanism crosscuts the 
concept of determinism, for we can have both deterministic mechanisms that 
produce apparently indeterministic behavior, such as your computer’s random 
number generator, and indeterministic mechanisms that produce such behavior, 
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physical mechanisms, it is unlikely to deliver on the level that would truly 
substantiate the fear.”747 
 So, is there free will? Answering this question, Roskies finally 
acknowledged, “is a job for philosophy, not empirical science.”748 If forced 
to give a philosophical account of free will, Roskies stated that she would 
single out for importance “notions of self-control, and the phenomenon of 
identifying with or endorsing one’s choices.”749 “[W]e ought to explore the 
possibility that freedom is a concept derivative on more robust intuitions 
about responsibility, rather than vice versa.”750 There are philosophers who 
are doing important work in this area, and she specifically endorsed the book 
by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza.751 
 Finally, in The Neuroscience of Volition, Roskies reviewed the 
relationship of the “will” and the light neuroscience might shed on it.752 
“[F]reedom of the will,” she acknowledged, “is of major philosophical 
concern.”753 But to come to an understanding of what any given speaker 
means by the words “will,” or “volition,” is daunting. The term could mean 
anything from being free from “stimulus-generated action” to the opportunity 
to make “longer-term plans.”754 
 In the end, Roskies identified “five topics” around which she 
organized her analysis.755 These included: “Volition as Initiation of 
Action;”756 “Volition as Intention;”757 “Volition as Decision-Making;”758 
 
such as a machine that takes the scintillation counts from radioactive decay of a 
sample of uranium as input to a deterministic random number generator 
algorithm.”). 
747 Id. at 119. 
748 Id. at 122. 
749 Id. 
750 Id. at 121. 
751 Roskies, supra note 712, at 122. Cf. JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK 
RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(1998). 
752 Adina L. Roskies, The Neuroscience of Volition, in DECOMPOSING THE 
WILL 33–59 (Andy Clark et al. eds. 2013). 
753 Id. at 33. 
754 Id. at 34. 
755 Id. 
756 Id. at 35–38. 
757 Adina L. Roskies, The Neuroscience of Volition, in DECOMPOSING THE 
WILL 38–41 (Andy Clark et al. eds. 2013). 
758 Id. at 41–46. 
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“Volition as Executive Control;”759 and “Volition as Feeling.”760 
 Summarizing her investigation, Roskies wrote that “notions of 
intention, choice, and the experience of agency” are not undermined by 
neuroscience.761 She feared that developments on the relationship of 
neuroscience and volition might be misunderstood by “the folk”—the great 
mass of untrained laypersons. Studies, after all, have demonstrated that 
persons who encounter determinist accounts of neuroscience tend to lose 
faith both in freedom and in responsibility.762 Still, Roskies saw benefits in 
this development, if only because it presented an opportunity to increase the 
sophistication of the lay audience.763 
 Roskies concluded her paper on volition by indicating that “the 
greatest effect of neuroscience has been to challenge traditional views of the 
relationship between consciousness and action.”764 The “folk conception of 
volition” is to see consciousness and choice as inextricably bound together.765 
The common understanding of this relationship, she restated her views, 
requires both revision and greater precision.766 
 This insight leads us into a discussion of Professor Roskies’ 
contribution to the Journal of Law and Public Policy. There are two 
dimensions to her paper. The first portion of it addresses the relationship of 
free will and determinism. Professor Roskies is confident that neuroscience 
will never disprove the possibility of free will, if only because the 
physiological complexity of the human brain makes this an impossible task. 
The brain is too complex, too interconnected, for human beings to understand 
at the requisite “level of detail.” And if the brain shall forever remain a 
mystery, at least at the granularity required to prove or disprove free will, 
then we are left with our informed guesses, intuitions, and hypotheses, and 
nothing more definitive than that. 
 The second part of her paper, then, is focused on the relationship of 
 
759 Id. at 46–47. 
760 Id. at 48–49. 
761 Id. at 51. 
762 See Eddy Nahmias et al., Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and 
Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions, 31 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 214–42 
(2007); and John Monterosso et al., Explaining Away Responsibility: Effects of 
Scientific Explanation on Perceived Culpability, 15 ETHICS & BEHAV. 139–58 
(2005). 
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consciousness, determinism, and free will. This relationship has been a 
consistent concern of her work.767 Benjamin Libet and others have 
demonstrated through a variety of experiments the possibility that action—
lifting our arm, say, moving our finger—precedes our conscious choice to do 
so. Libet’s claims are premised on the proposition that for an action to be 
freely chosen, we must be consciously aware of choosing to act. If the act 
comes first, however, then what does that do to free will? Free will, on this 
view, is merely a post-hoc rationalization for an action that occurs prior to 
conscience awareness. And, to close the circle, no conscience awareness, no 
free will. Answering this challenging question is the task that Professor 
Roskies has set for herself in her paper. It is an important question to have 
answered. And she answers it very well indeed, arguing that despite their best 
efforts, determinists have thus far failed to prove their case against free will, 
and that future prospects for their success are bleak. As she asserts, 
“[n]euroscience is not going to resolve the determinism question.”  
C. Francis X. Shen 
 Francis Shen, Professor of Law and McKnight Presidential Fellow 
at the University of Minnesota, has established a reputation for excellence in 
several fields of scholarly endeavor. He did early and important work on 
American war casualties, documenting the case that in the America of the 
twenty-first century the burden of suffering that comes with military service 
in combat zones is imposed disproportionately on the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged.768 He is also the co-author of a compelling work entitled The 
 
767 See, e.g., Adina L. Roskies, Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to 
Free Will, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN 
LIBET 11–22 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel, eds. 2011); Adina L. 
Roskies, Freedom, Neural Mechanism, and Consciousness, in FREE WILL AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS: HOW MIGHT THEY WORK? 153–71 (Roy F. Baumeister et al. eds. 
2010); Alexander Schlegel et al. Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness Potentials with Non-
Conscious Volition, 33 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 196–203 (2015); and 
Alexander Schegel et al., Barking Up the Wrong Free: Readiness Potentials Reflect 
Processes Independent of Conscious Will, 229 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RSCH. 329–
35 (2013). 
768 Douglas L. Kriner & Francis X. Shen, THE CASUALTY GAP: THE CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN WARTIME INEQUALITIES (2010); Douglas L. 
Kriner & Francis X. Shen, Conscription, Inequality, and Partisan Support for War, 
60 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1419–45 (2016) (“demonstrat[ing] the historical importance 
of equality norms” when resort is had to conscription); Douglas L. Kriner & 
Francis X. Shen, Reassessing American Casualty Sensitivity: The Mediating 
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Education Mayor.769 Intended as both a study of the effectiveness of mayoral 
control of municipal education policy and a manifesto for reform, the volume 
received favorable reviews.770 
 The major focus of Shen’s work, however, has been on the 
relationship of neuroscience and the law. He has been a member of the 
MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project and has written 
extensively on the subject. He is the co-editor of a casebook, Law and 
Neuroscience,771 now in its second edition.772 His research within the field of 
neuroscience and the law, furthermore, has been wide-ranging. He has 
 
Influence of Inequality, 58 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1174–1201 (2014) (“Americans are 
less willing to accept casualties in future military endeavors when informed that the 
costs of war fall disproportionately on the shoulders of a disadvantaged few”);  
Douglas L. Kriner & Francis X. Shen, Responding to War on Capitol Hill: 
Battlefield Casualties, Congressional Response, and Public Support For the War in 
Iraq, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 157–74  (2014) (“High constituency casualties may 
encourage even presidential copartisans to break with their party leader”); Douglas 
L. Kriner & Francis X. Shen, How Citizens Respond to Combat Casualties: The 
Differential Impact of Local Casualties on Support For the War in Afghanistan, 76 
PUB. OP. Q. 761–70 (2012) (examining “the local connection that citizens feel 
when ‘one of their own’ falls on a foreign battlefield”); Douglas L. Kriner & 
Francis X. Shen, Limited War and American Political Engagement, 71 J. POL. 
1514–29 (2009) (examining the negative impact of prolonged and unsuccessful war 
on American political engagement); Douglas L. Kriner & Francis X. Shen, Iraq 
Casualties and the 2006 Senate Elections, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 507–30 (2007) 
(electoral impact of casualty rates on senatorial supporters of war policies). In 
Invisible Inequality: The Two Americas of Military Sacrifice, 46 Memphis L. Rev. 
545–636 (2016), Douglas Kriner and Francis Shen write: “America’s economic 
downturn means that increasingly it is not the governing class, but the working 
class that disproportionately sends soldiers to fight and bears the burdens of 
physical and mental war wounds.” Id. at 546–47. Kriner and Shen wrote this 
passage early in the presidential campaign cycle of 2016, before Donald Trump’s 
rise became evident. It is worth speculating, however, how much of Trump’s 
success can be attributed to the appeal his anti-war message had for one of his core 
constituencies—the white working class. Cf. Trip Gabriel, Supporters Join Trump 
Outside G.O.P. Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016) (documenting the surprising 
but visceral appeal Trump’s anti-Iraq war message had on many veterans of the 
Iraq conflict). 
769 KENNETH K. WONG ET AL., THE EDUCATION MAYOR: IMPROVING 
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (2007). 
770 See, e.g., Charles L. Glenn, Review, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 190–92 (2009); Cf. J. 
Celeste Lay & Michael D. Tyburski, The Buck Stops with the Education Mayor: 
Mayoral Control and Local Test Scores in U.S. Urban Mayoral Elections, 45 POL. 
& POL’Y 964–1002 (2017) (pursuing themes initially advanced by Wong et al.). 
771 OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (1st ed. 2014). 
772 OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2d ed. 2021). 
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written, or co-written, several studies on concussions and the risks of 
youthful participation in contact sports.773 He has explored a number of 
questions on the interface between neuroscience and ethics—such as the 
creation and use of “human-animal neurological chimeras;”774 ethical 
problems involving “highly-portable and cloud-enabled neuroimaging;”775 
and privacy issues implicated by emerging developments in neuroscience.776 
He has proposed ways that prosecutors might address opposing counsel’s 
neuroscientific defenses (“emphasize that abnormal brains cannot fully 
explain criminal behavior;”777“use brain evidence to show future 
dangerousness”).778  
 Professor Shen has also contributed significantly to the developing 
public policy on neuroscience and the law. In Neuroscience 2.0, published in 
2016,779 Shen surveyed the early relationship of neuroscience and law and 
proposed areas where we might witness future advances, such as in the use 
of “brain biomarkers and brain-based predictions,”780 “brain-based memory 
recognition,”781 and “cognitive enhancement through direct brain 
 
773 Sydney Dieckmann et al. The Failure of Youth Sports Concussion Laws 
and the Limits of Legislating Health Education, 19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., AND 
ETHICS 1–214 (2019); Francis X. Shen, Are Youth Sports Concussion Statutes 
Working?, 56 DUQ. L. REV. 7–34 (2018); Carly Rasmussen et al., How Dangerous 
Are Youth Sports for the Brain? A Review of the Evidence, 7 BERKELEY J. ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 67–192 (2018). 
774 Andrew T. Crane et al., Concise Review: Human-Animal Neurological 
Chimeras: Humanized Animals or Human Cells in an Animal?, 37 STEM CELLS 
444–52 (2019). 
775 Francis X. Shen et al., Ethical Issues Posed by Field Research Using 
Highly Portable and Cloud-Enabled Neuroimaging, 105 NEURON 771–75 (2020). 
776 Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653–714 (2013). Cf. Joshua Preston, et al., The Legal 
Implications of Detecting Alzheimer’s Disease Earlier, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 1207–17 
(2016). 
777 Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience: Possibilities for Prosecutors, 33 
CDAA PROSECUTOR’S BRIEF 19–20 (2011). 
778 Id. at 21. 
779 Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience 2.0, 48 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1043–86 
(2016). 
780 Id. at 1062– 63 (detailing the legal implications outside of criminal law of 
the discovery of biomarkers for routine psychiatric disorders). 
781 Id. at 1065–66 (describing the use of neurological markers to distinguish 
truth-telling from deceit). Cf. Francis Shen et al. The Limited Effect of 
Electroencephalography Memory Recognition Evidence on Assessments of 
Defendant Credibility, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 330–64 (2017) (reporting the results 
of research regarding neurological evidence of the veracity of memories). 
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intervention.”782 
 In Red States, Blue States, and Brain States, Shen and a co-author 
considered the significance of partisanship for the future of neuroscience’s 
use particularly in the field of criminal law.783 In a pair of articles, Shen 
examined a range of legislative developments in the field of neurolaw.784 In 
a second pair of articles, Shen addressed different dimensions of the 
relationship between age, cognitive condition, and judicial performance.785 
Finally, Shen has conducted an important historical survey of the relationship 
of brain science and the law, from the nineteenth century to the present, with 
the goal of challenging his colleagues to “learn from this history.”786 
 Shen’s largest contributions, however, come in the area of 
neuroscience and criminal law. In Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, Shen 
summons criminal-law scholars to rethink the concept of “bodily injury.”787 
Biological science has demonstrated that the old dividing line between the 
“mental” and the “bodily” is permeable if it exists at all, and, Shen argues, 
the law must take account of this physical reality.788 In Sorting Guilty Minds 
 
782 Shen, supra note 779, at 1069–70. 
783 Francis X. Shen & Dena M. Gromet, Red States, Blue States, and Brain 
States: Issue Framing, Partisanship, and the Future of Neurolaw in the United 
States, 658 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 86–101 (2015). 
784 Francis X. Shen, Neurolegislation: How U.S. Legislatures Are Using 
Brain Science, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 495–526 (2016); Francis X. Shen, 
Legislating Neuroscience: The Case of Juvenile Justice, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 985–
1018 (2013). 
785 Francis X. Shen, Aging Judges, 81 OHIO STATE L.J. 235–314 (2020) 
(acknowledging that brains age at different rates and proposing confidential 
cognitive testing for members of the judiciary); and Morris B. Hoffman et al., The 
Intersectionality of Age and Gender on the Bench: Are Younger Female Judges 
Harsher with Serious Crimes?, 40 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128–65 (2020) (using 
data from “sixteen years of criminal trials in the State of Colorado” to find that 
“[y]oung female judges punished high harm crimes substantially more than their 
male and older female colleagues”). 
786 Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked History of Neurolaw, 85 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 667, 668 (2016). 
787 Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
2036–2175 (2013). 
788 Id. at 2042 (“If society increasingly comes to see mental injuries as real, 
biological-based physical injuries, then the criminal law will have to explain why it 
differentiates between injuries to the body and injuries to the mind”). Cf. Francis X. 
Shen, Sentencing Enhancement and the Crime Victim’s Brain, 46 LOY. UNIV. CHI. 
L.J. 405–45 (2014) (proposing that neural injuries must be taken more seriously by 
the criminal justice system. “Injuries to the brain are physical and often 
exceedingly complex. Sentencing enhancement policies should reflect both 
realities.”). 
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and The Language of Mens Rea, Shen and co-authors described empirical 
research they conducted on juries’ ability to distinguish between grades of 
culpability.789 They proposed that jury instructions might be more clearly 
drafted but also express a fear that jurors do not always understand the Model 
Penal Code’s degrees of criminal responsibility.790 
 In Minority Mens Rea, Shen reviewed the results of a series of 
experiments he conducted to determine whether racial bias played a role jury 
decision-making. He concluded that while “implicit bias” certainly exists, 
not all jury verdicts are tainted by it.791 Finally, in Neuroscience, Artificial 
Intelligence, and the Case Against Solitary Confinement, Shen proposed to 
reform “the ugly, punitive, soul-crushing system of supermax prisons”792 
through the use of artificial intelligence that might both document the 
neurological damage long-term solitary confinement imposes on inmates and 
utilize comprehensive surveillance as a substitute for this barbarous form of 
incarceration.793 
 In his contribution to this symposium issue, Dr. Shen draws deeply 
from this entire reservoir of knowledge to explore the range and boundaries 
of “Neurolaw.” What is it? He asks. And he responds expansively, “Every 
story is a brain story.” It is related to psychology, but distinguishable in its 
focus on the biological qualities of the brain. But so limited, the field is still 
vast, and Professor Shen surveys the vastness well. Traumatic brain injury 
implicates neurolaw. So does criminal law. What about injuries that have 
been traditionally classified as “psychological,” like post-traumatic stress 
 
789 Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306–60 
(2011); Matthew R. Ginther et al. The Language of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1327–72 (2014). 
790 Ginther et al., supra note 789, at 1363–64; Shen et al., supra note 789, at 
1354–55. Cf. Matthew Ginther et al., Decoding Guilty Minds: How Jurors Attribute 
Knowledge and Guilt, 71 VAND. L. REV. 241–84 (2018) (reporting the results of 
further studies that demonstrate both that jurors are often successful in managing 
the Model Penal Code distinctions but that some jurors continue to struggle with 
“knowing” and “reckless” conduct. Id. at 276–78.). 
791 Id. at 1046 (“My results show that assessments of minority mens rea are 
not biased by race. Do implicit racial biases exist? Yes. But do they affect every 
decision in the justice system? My results suggest the answer might be no. And if 
this is true, it demands that we further deconstruct implicit racial bias claims to 
better understand how, exactly, those biases lead (or do not lead) to unjust 
outcomes.”) (emphasis in original). 
792 Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and the Case 
Against Solitary Confinement, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 937, 1016 (2019). 
793 Id. at 1016–17. 
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disorder? If neuroimaging can reveal the presence of PTSD, should that count 
as a physical injury for purposes of litigation against a government agency? 
The brain, after all, is biological, and if it is biological, it is also physical. 
What of addiction? 
 As we reflect on what does, and does not, belong to neurolaw, Dr. 
Shen cautions us to show some humility. He reminds his readers that in 1949, 
Antonio Egas Moniz was awarded the Nobel Prize for perfecting the frontal 
lobotomy. Shen points out the warm reception the invention of this device 
was given by the legal community. He notes that the Yale Law Journal voiced 
its approval.794 Yale was hardly alone. So did many other major academic 
venues.795 But we know today that the practice of lobotomy was a tragic, 
destructive detour on the road to building a more humane world. 
 Professor Shen ends with a prediction, and it is a prediction bound to 
come true: Neurolaw will pervasively shape our lives in ways we cannot even 
dimly perceive in our present moment. 
D. Stacey A. Tovino 
 Dr. Stacey A. Tovino is Professor of Law at the University of 
Oklahoma. Over an academic career of nearly two decades, she has 
established herself as one of the nation’s leading authorities on health law 
and neurolaw, having published a textbook and over sixty law review articles 
and book chapters on these themes. 
 Like Adina Roskies, Professor Tovino has written several important 
studies of neuroimaging and the law. In Neuroimaging Research Into 
Disorders of Consciousness, Dr. Tovino examined the use of neuroimaging 
to probe such disorders as “coma, vegetative state, and minimally conscious 
 
794 Toward Rehabilitation of Criminals: Appraisal of Statute Treatment of 
Mentally Disordered Recidivists, 57 YALE L.J. 1085, 1097 (1948). 
795 See, e.g., Roy F. Proffitt, An Analysis of the Missouri Narcotic Drug Laws, 
17 MO. L. REV. 252, 278 (1952) (recommending frontal lobotomy where narcotic 
addiction is caused by “intractable pain”); Harry R. Lipton, The Psychopath, 40 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 584, 594 (1950) (recommending prefrontal lobotomies 
where less intrusive, conventional treatments failed to induce improvement in the 
“psychopathic personality”); Beatrice Talbot et al., Alcoholism and Lobotomy, 12 
Q.J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 386–94 (1951) (reporting that the use of lobotomy as a 
treatment for alcohol abuse achieved mixed results); Hugh Alan Ross, Commitment 
of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945, 1006 
(1959) (recommending the use of lobotomies for treatment of the mentally ill even 
without the consent of the patient). 
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state.”796 There are problems inherent in such studies—including the 
impossibility of the study-subjects to give consent and the lack of any 
obvious personal benefit where they are concerned.797 After a close 
consideration of the checkered history of experimentation on vulnerable 
subjects,798 Tovino advanced a series of ethical criteria to guide future testing 
in this field.799 
 Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function is a 
deliberately provocative study looking at both once popular but now 
debunked practices like phrenology and at the novel science of neuroimaging 
to understand both the threat and the promise of new technology.800 
Functional Neuroimaging Information addresses compelling ethical 
questions concerning the types of (often stigmatizing) information that can 
be produced from functional magnetic resonance imaging of the brain.801 
Finally, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law802 assesses innovative uses 
to which neuroimaging might be put: what can it tell us, for instance, about 
the human instinct for ownership of goods?803 Or, can it be used to clarify 
what really is or is not deceptive advertising?804 
 Tovino has investigated a wide variety of other neuro-scientifically 
themed legal questions. In Will Neuroscience Redefine Mental Injury? 
Professor Tovino considered “the implications of advances in neuroscience 
for more traditional civil and regulatory health law issues,” in particular 
“disability benefit law,” “federal mental health parity law,” and “federal and 
state disability discrimination law.”805 In A Right To Care, Dr. Tovino took 
to task a system that prefers to warehouse victims of brain disorders as 
 
796 Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of 
Consciousness: Moral Imperative or Ethical and Legal Failure, 13 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 2 (2008). 
797 Id. at 5. 
798 Id. at 22–42. 
799 Id. at 53–57. 
800 Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: 
A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 193, 193–228 (2007). 
801 Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for 
Neuro Exceptionalism, 34 FLA ST. UNIV. L. REV. 415, 415–90. (2007).  
802 Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for 
Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 44–56 (2007). 
803 Id. at 45. 
804 Id. at 46–47. 
805 Stacey A. Tovino, Will Neuroscience Redefine Mental Injury: Disability 
Benefit Law, Mental Health Parity Law, and Disability Discrimination Law, 12 
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 695, 696 (2015). 
2021] State Of Mind, State Of Law 123 
 
opposed to providing much-needed “skilled care and rehabilitation.”806 And 
in On Health, Law, and Religion, Tovino researched “the intersection of 
health, law and religion”—a little studied but significant nexus.807 
 It is, however, in the area of the law and neuroscience of addiction, 
in particular gambling, that Professor Tovino has published a quite 
formidable body of scholarship. The House Edge: On Gambling and 
Professional Discipline investigates, in particular, the disbarment and 
rehabilitation of attorneys addicted to gambling.808 Dying Fast: Suicide in 
Individuals with Gambling Disorder studied the connections between 
gambling, suicide, and inadequate health insurance coverage.809 Lost in the 
Shuffle is a more detailed examination of insurance and disability issues 
surrounding gambling disorder.810 
 In her contribution to the symposium, Professor Tovino continues to 
expand upon her work on gambling disorder and the law. Tovino notes that 
since 2016, a number of studies, utilizing neuroimaging and other measuring 
tools, have determined that the brains of gambling addicts are “skewed” in a 
number of ways. Has the law taken account of this new information? This is 
the question Dr. Tovino seeks to answer. While modest improvements have 
occurred, Tovino asserts, health insurance and disability law “have not kept 
pace” with the evolving science. 
E. Jennifer Brobst 
 Jennifer Brobst, Associate Professor of Law at Southern Illinois 
University, brings a breadth of experience to her presentation. She is 
internationally trained—with a bachelor’s degree from the University of 
Cape Town, South Africa, and an LL.M. from Victoria University of 
Wellington (New Zealand) Law School. She has worked as a prosecutor, a 
 
806 Stacey A. Tovino, A Right to Care, 70 ALA. L. REV. 183, 189 (2018). 
807 Stacey A. Tovino, On Health, Law, and Religion, 74 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1623, 1629 (2017). 
808 Stacey A. Tovino, The House Edge: On Gambling and Professional 
Discipline, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1253–1312 (2016). 
809 Stacey A. Tovino, Dying Fast: Suicide in Individuals with Gambling 
Disorder, 10 ST. LOUIS UNIV. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 159–76 (2016). 
810 Stacey A. Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle: How Health and Disability Laws 
Hurt Disordered Gamblers, 89 TULANE L. REV. 191, 191–252 (2014). Cf. Stacey 
A. Tovino, Substance Use Disorder Insurance Benefits: A Survey of State 
Benchmark Plans, 52 CREIGHTON L. REV. 401, 401–10 (2019); Stacey A. Tovino, 
Fraud, Abuse, and Opioids, 67 UNIV. KAN. L. REV. 901, 901–40 (2019) (exploring 
other legal aspects of addictive behavior). 
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victims’ rights advocate, and more generally in the fields of sexual assault 
and domestic violence. 
 Professor Brobst’s published work represents a synthesis of these 
issues. Thus, her article The Impact of Secondary Traumatic Stress Among 
Family Attorneys Working with Trauma-Exposed Clients811 addresses a 
crucial concern: lawyering is stressful, and it is especially stressful for those 
whose calling is to represent clients who have suffered grievous traumatic 
injury. Many of these lawyers fall victim to what is known as “secondary 
trauma”—the emotional and psychic wounding that comes from vicariously 
experiencing the pain of others. Brobst recognizes that this is a problem “not 
adequately addressed” in the profession,812 and she proposes a number of 
steps that bar associations, and less formal groups and networks of lawyers 
might take to furnish support and relieve stress.813 
 In Miranda in Mental Health,814 Professor Brobst explores the cross-
purposes at which therapeutic intervention operates in the juvenile-justice 
setting: “court-ordered therapy that seeks to elicit disclosures of additional 
criminal activity may place violent but vulnerable juvenile offenders at risk 
of additional charges.”815 Juvenile offenders have often been the victim of 
serious forms of abuse, addiction, and trauma, and are in need of mental-
health intervention.816 Too often, however, where such intervention seeks full 
disclosure of past behavior, young offenders put themselves at additional 
legal jeopardy by sharing the secrets of their past. Brobst sensitively probes 
this problem, both from the standpoint of lawyers who are required to 
ethically advise their young clients, and from the standpoint of the juveniles 
themselves, who may find it “legally [im]possible” to receive the therapy 
they need because full disclosure would result in unacceptable legal 
consequences.817 
 In these articles and in others, Brobst displays a sympathy and a 
humanity for persons placed in challenging, even impossible, situations. Her 
empathy for the plight of others is on vivid display in her contribution to this 
 
811 Jennifer Brobst, The Impact of Secondary Traumatic Stress Among Family 
Attorneys Working with Trauma-Exposed Clients: Implications for Practice and 
Professional Responsibility, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1–54 (2014).  
812 Id. at 3. 
813 Id. at 42–53. 
814 Jennifer Brobst, Miranda in Mental Health: Court Ordered Confessions 
and Therapeutic Injustice for Young Offenders, 40 NOVA L. REV. 387–424 (2016).  
815 Id. at 388–89. 
816 Id. at 389. 
817 Id. at 422. 
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symposium. In her essay, Brobst displays a keen, well-developed sense of 
the tragic; not in the sense that the word is popularly used, but in its deeper, 
original meaning. The Greek tragedies were tragic precisely because the 
protagonists were propelled by forces outside of their capacity to control. 
Foreseeably, inevitably, these forces drove the individuals caught in their 
snares to great loss, ruination, and even total destruction. 
 Brobst’s article is tragic in precisely this meaning of the word. She 
vividly portrays the converging forces: a tough-on-crime movement that has 
resulted in mass incarceration. Often, however, the incarcerated are 
themselves mentally ill or experiencing other neurological concerns. “The 
typical prisoner,” Brobst writes, “is neuroatypical.” Then there is the victims’ 
rights movement. Victims are terribly harmed by criminal wrong-doing—
they are maimed, murdered, sexually assaulted, their homes invaded, their 
belongings ransacked—and the victims’ rights movement has laudably given 
voice and visibility to their suffering. 
 Enter COVID. The focus of Professor Brobst’s paper then becomes, 
with the emergence of the pandemic and the obvious threat that it poses to 
closely housed, incarcerated inmates, what is the proper place of 
compassionate release. Who is to be spared? The elderly inmate with 
Parkinson’s Disease? Inmates with anxiety disorders? Or addiction 
disorders? The inmate with HIV? What criteria are to be used? Should the 
crime victim have a say in the outcome meted out to the inmate? If the victim 
favors compassionate release, should the courts accede? Needless to say, her 
article makes for compelling reading. 
F. John T. Philipsborn and Melissa Hamilton 
 John Philipsborn and Melissa Hamilton have both contributed 
significantly to the development of criminal law and the evolving law of 
mental sanity. Who are they? John Philipsborn is a private practitioner, 
whose principal office is located in San Francisco, and whose name has 
become synonymous with criminal justice in California.818 He is a graduate 
of Bowdoin College (bachelor’s degree), and Antioch College (master’s), 
and the University of California School of Law. As a young lawyer in the 
1970s, he was a protégé of the legendary civil-rights and labor lawyer Charles 
 
818 A fellow San Francisco criminal defense lawyer, Steven Gruel, compared 
Philipsborn’s preparation and professionalism to San Francisco wide receiver Jerry 
Rice, widely regarded as one of the best football players in history. Jeff Chorney, A 
Defense Team of Good Sports, RECORDER, June 7, 2005. 
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R. Garry.819 
 While there might be many ways to measure the large impact that 
Philipsborn has had on legal development, particularly within California, one 
important gauge of his influence is the sheer number of appellate cases in 
which he has played a role either as counsel for appellant, or, more often, as 
amicus curiae acting on behalf of either the California Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice or the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. He has not 
been invariably successful in his appeals. Indeed, more often than not, he 
didn’t prevail. But it is clear, in reviewing his record, that what has always 
mattered more than winning, for Philipsborn, was standing for justice and 
providing representation for defendants who lack power or popularity, and 
who might otherwise go unrepresented. 
 Philipsborn appreciates that an indispensable element of justice is 
dealing fairly with the accused. Thus, a large number of the cases in which 
he submitted appellate briefs can be boiled down to the vindication of this 
principle. He has vigorously sought the disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
and other documentation from police and prosecutors.820 He has objected to 
efforts to introduce recorded jailhouse conversations as evidence,821 and 
defended prison inmates’ right to counsel.822 He has stood for the robust 
application of the Miranda rules.823 He has defended immigrants in 
 
819 Tucker Carrington, The Role of Judging Fifty Years After the ‘Chicago 
Seven:’ A Remembrance of Charles R. Garry, 50 LOY. UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 969, 
969–70 (2019), (Philipsborn’s association with Garry); Cf. Charles R. Garry, 
Attacking Racism in Court Before Trial, in MINIMIZING RACISM IN JURY TRIALS : 
THE VOIR DIRE CONDUCTED BY CHARLES R. GARRY IN PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA V. 
HUEY P. NEWTON, 86–96 NAT’L LAW. GUILD (Ann Fagan Ginger ed., 1969), (an 
example of Garry’s civil-rights focus); and Katherine Bishop, Charles R. Garry, 
82, a Lawyer Known for Radical Clients in ‘60's, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/18/us/charles-r-garry-82-a-lawyer-known-for-
radical-clients-in-60s.html (summarizing Garry’s career). 
820 See, for example, People v. Tillis, 956 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1998) (exculpatory 
evidence); United States v. Etienne, 2019 WL 5212978 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(exculpatory evidence); Galindo v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2010) 
(disclosure of prison records of hostile witnesses); Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 
P.3d 203 (Cal. 2000) (access to inmate witnesses); Smith v. Superior Court, 235 
P.3d 1 (Cal. 2010) (personnel records of police). 
821 People v. Loyd, 45 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2002). 
822 County of Nevada v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2015). 
823 People v. Storm, 52 P.3d 52 (Cal. 2002); People v. Neal, 72 P.3d 280 (Cal. 
2003). 
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complicated criminal prosecutions.824 He has raised serious questions about 
government entrapment practices.825 When a defendant attempted to 
represent himself in a capital murder case while shackled by court order, 
Philipsborn assisted in the appeal.826 
 Philipsborn has challenged verdicts on the basis of ineffective 
representation of counsel827and  prosecutorial misconduct,828 and has not 
been afraid to ask for state funding to ensure that indigent defendants receive 
their day in court.829 He has sought to enforce the requirement that a jury 
truly comprise a cross-section of the community.830 When the Republic of 
the Philippines sought counsel to represent its interests in the capital murder 
trial of a citizen of that nation, Philipsborn served as an amicus in its 
behalf.831 
 And if justice requires that attention be paid to procedural fairness, 
Philipsborn knows that it also demands that statutes and precedents be 
carefully read, interpreted, and applied. Thus, in People v. Valencia, 
Philipsborn participated in an appeal seeking a more careful definition of the 
word “burglary.”832 People v. Christian S. concerned the definition of 
imperfect self-defense.833 People v. Pulido, meanwhile, addressed the 
distinction between accomplice liability and aiding and abetting in a first-
degree murder case.834 He succeeded in having the Crime Victims’ Reform 
initiative apply prospectively only and not retrospectively.835 What of 
criminal vehicular homicide? Could simple negligence suffice for a guilty 
 
824 People v. Martinez, 304 P.3d 529 (Cal. 2013); In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 
1171 (Cal. 2001); People v. Salazar-Merino, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001). 
825 People v. Smith, 80 P.3d 662 (Cal. 2003); Cf. Mike McKee, Entrapment 
Ruling Rapped As, RECORDER, Dec. 23, 2003 (Philipsborn expressing his views of 
the Smith opinion). 
826 People v. Miracle, 430 P.3d 847 (Cal. 2018). 
827 People v. Hernandez, 273 P.3d 1113 (Cal. 2012); United States v. Mett, 65 
F.3d 1531 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2002). 
828 People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Cummiskey 
v. Superior Court, 839 P.2d 1059 (Cal. 1993). 
829 Gardner v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
830 People v. Horton, 906 P.2d 478 (Cal. 1995); Alfaro v. Superior Court of 
Marin County, 272 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020). 
831 People v. Enraca, 269 P.3d 543 (Cal. 2012). 
832 People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920 (Cal. 2002). 
833 People v. Christian S., 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994). 
834 People v. Pulido, 936 P.2d 1235 (Cal. 1997). 
835 Tapia v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 807 P.2d 434 (Cal. 1991). 
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conviction? Philipsborn was also part of that appeal.836 In an entire series of 
cases, Philipsborn participated in appeals that aimed at a more just and 
humane application of California’s “three-strike” statute.837 
 High-profile, precedent-making cases have also figured prominently 
in Philipsborn’s portfolio. In Facebook v. Superior Court, he was part of an 
appeal that sought and gained access to communications on Facebook.838 In 
Haskell v. Harris, Philipsborn participated in a federal challenge to the 
constitutionality of California’s DNA data base,839 and in Valdivia v. 
Schwarzenegger, he joined a constitutional challenge brought in state court 
to California’s parole revocation statute.840 He similarly objected to the use 
of DNA evidence in a twenty-six-year-old cold case.841 He has questioned 
the use of cell-phone tracking data as a means of placing a defendant at a 
particular location.842 Philipsborn knows the importance of being involved in 
such cases because of their profound impact on the path of the law.843 
 He has similarly been vigorous in efforts to protect the right of 
juveniles caught up in the justice system. He has argued for a narrow 
interpretation of the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act.844 
He argued against the application of California’s hate crime statute to 
juveniles.845 He defended a juvenile accused of possessing a small knife on a 
 
836 People v. Bussel, 118 Cal.Rptr. 2d 159 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2002). 
837 People v. Valencia, 397 P.3d 936 (Cal. 2017); People v. Superior Court 
(Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996); and People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272 (Cal. 
1994). 
838 Facebook Inc. v. Superior Court, 417 P.3d 725 (Cal. 2018); Facebook, Inc. 
v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 471 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2020). 
839 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). 
840 Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 2008 WL 1990800 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
841 People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49 (Cal. 2008). 
842 United States v. Nelson, 2021 WL 1391591 (N.D. Cal. 2021). Philipsborn 
has also successfully challenged the integrity of scientific testing performed by 
local crime laboratories. See e.g. Kate Moser, Fiasco for Law Enforcement is Feast 
for Defense Bar, RECORDER, Apr. 5, 2010; and Jaxon Van Derbeken, Lab Cited in 
Murder Case, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 6, 2010 at A1 (Philipsborn’s doubts about the 
integrity of San Francisco’s laboratory procedures proved well-founded, to the 
benefit of his and other attorneys’ clients). 
843 Dennis Opatrny, Cases for the Ages; A Few High-Profile Crimes, Like 
That of Dan White, Prompt Big Changes in the Criminal Law, RECORDER, May 21, 
1999 (quoting and discussing Philipsborn’s views). 
844 Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002); Williams v. Superior 
Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).  
845 People v. M.S., 896 P. 2d 1365 (Cal. 1995). 
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school campus.846 
 Philipsborn has also taken up the cause of highly unpopular 
defendants. People v. Daniels involved the appeal of defendant’s conviction 
for the murder of two police officers.847 United States v. Williams, a criminal 
prosecution brought in Hawaii federal court, concerned a member of the U.S. 
Army accused of killing his five-year-old daughter.848 Although convicted, 
the defendant was able to avoid the death penalty.849 In the course of a series 
of proceedings extending over several years, Philipsborn was part of a team 
that overturned the death penalty in the case of Donald Fell, a notorious 
Vermont killer.850 
 The marginalized have also been a concern of Philipsborn. This 
interest has taken Philipsborn to distant corners of the globe, in an effort to 
promote orderly and fair judicial procedures. In 1990, he wrote of the 
challenges confronting the Nicaraguan justice system in the wake of that 
nation’s election.851 In the summer of 1992, he traveled to Thailand to assist 
Cambodian refugees planning a return to that nation on the proper 
construction of a new legal order.852 And around the time of the September 
11 attacks, Philipsborn found himself in Pakistan, lecturing and learning 
about that country’s legal system.853 
 
846 In re Randy G., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516 (Cal. 2001). 
847 People v. Daniels, 802 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1991). Philipsborn also represented 
a group of armed militants who were accused of killing a police officer in 1971 but 
only arrested in 2007. Philipsborn assisted in negotiating a plea bargain for some of 
the suspects. See, for example, Eight Men Charged With 1971 Police Officer’s 
Murder, BAY CITY NEWS SERV., Dec. 4, 2007; Terry Collins, Charges Dropped 
Against 4 in SF Cop Killing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 7, 2009; and Evan Hill, Cop-
Killing Cases End in Light Plea Deal, RECORDER, July 7, 2009. 
848 United States v. Williams, 2007 WL 3085447 (D. Haw. 2007). 
849 Jim Mendoza, Naeem Williams Gets Life in Prison for Killing 5-Year-Old 
Daughter, HAW. NEWS NOW, June 28, 2014. 
850 United States v. Fell, 2018 WL 4258111 (D. Vt. 2018); Alan J. Keays, 
Donald Fell, sentenced to life in federal case, won’t face state charges, VTDIGGER, 
Oct. 2, 2018; Patrick Mcardle, Fell Sentenced to Life in Prison, TIMES ARGUS, 
Sept. 28, 2018. 
851 Mac LaFollette & John T. Philipsborn, After the Election, Nicaragua 
Discusses Reforms, 74 JUDICATURE 102, 102–05 (1990). 
852 Richard Barbieri, Defense Lawyers Visit Thai Camps to Aid Refugees, 
RECORDER, June 29, 1992; John T. Philipsborn, Returning Law to the People of the 
Killing Fields, RECORDER, Aug. 6, 1992; and John T. Philipsborn, As Law Returns 
to the Killing Fields, 76 JUDICATURE 204, 204–07 (1993). 
853 John T. Philipsborn, Unsteadily to Center Stage: An Overview of 
Pakistan’s Justice, 85 JUDICATURE 228, 228–36 (2002). Cf. John T. Philipsborn, A 
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 But if international outreach comprises one half of Philipsborn’s 
solicitude for the marginalized, he has also remained keenly involved in the 
legal representation of those who found themselves entangled in the criminal 
justice system. There is probably no class of offender who subsists at the 
outer boundary of American life more than sex offenders. Thus, it is to 
Philipsborn’s credit that he has been zealous in their defense.854 
 The mentally impaired and the psychiatrically disordered are other 
groups of defendants Philipsborn has represented. In Baker v. Superior Court 
and People v. Lamport, Philipsborn unsuccessfully sought the release of 
several inmates civilly committed under a subsequently-repealed statute 
permitting the indefinite extensions of confinement of sex offenders.855 In 
People v. Superior Court of Tulare County and in In re Hawthorne, 
Philipsborn participated in appeals concerning cognitively impaired 
defendants.856 People v. Meta, Maldonado v. Superior Court, and Hill v. 
Ayers involved insanity defenses,857 while Verdin v. Superior Court 
concerned allegations of diminished capacity due to severe alcohol 
intoxication.858 Philipsborn’s defense of Donald Fell also implicated 
psychiatric issues.859 
 It should therefore not be surprising that Philipsborn has also written 
on the subject of mental competency. In Competently Lawyering 
Competency, Philipsborn has stressed the attorney’s obligation to ensure that 
her client is competent to stand trial;860 And in Searching For Uniformity, 
 
Visit from the Colonies: Judges and Lawyers Teach and Learn in Portugal, 74 
JUDICATURE 163–64 (1990) (discussing his experiences at the Center for the 
Training of the Judiciary in Lisbon). 
854 People v. Frazier, 982 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1999); People v. Superior Court 
(Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949 (Cal. 2002). People v. Leal, 94 P.3d 1071 (Cal. 2004); 
People v. Black, 161 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2007); People v. Lee, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018); People v. Tillman, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); 
Hatch v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 94 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000); People v. Godinez, 2014 WL 99188 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
855 Baker v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 677 P.2d 219 (Cal. 1984); 
and People v. Lamport, 211 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
856 People v. Superior Court of Tulare County (Vidal), 155 P.3d 259 (Cal. 
2007); In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2005). 
857 People v. Meta, 2006 WL 3651132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Maldonado v. 
Superior Court, 274 P.3d 1110 (Cal. 2012); and Hill v. Ayers, 2008 WL 683422 
(N.D. Cal. 2008). 
858 Verdin v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d 1250 (Cal. 2008). 
859 United States v. Fell, 2018 WL 3970917 (D. Vt. 2018). 
860 John T. Philipsborn, Competently Lawyering Competency, 32 CRIM. JUST. 
34, 34–39 (2017). 
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Philipsborn argues both that competency is an essential element to due 
process and that generally-agreed-upon standards of competency should be 
developed by the judiciary and practicing bar as features of every capital 
murder case.861 In his contribution to this symposium, Philipsborn draws both 
from his vast treasure-house of litigation experience and his concern that only 
the mentally competent should actually be made to stand trial. 
 Philipsborn’s collaborator in his paper is Dr. Melissa Hamilton, who 
holds a law degree from the University of Texas, a Ph.D. from the University 
of Surrey, in the United Kingdom, and who presently teaches courses on 
criminal law and domestic violence at Surrey. 
 Like Philipsborn, Dr. Hamilton comes with an impressive record of 
accomplishment. One might single out several of her articles for comment. 
She has done important work on the use of algorithms to determine an 
offender’s recidivism risk. Such algorithms are intended to draw conclusions 
from similarly situated persons to predict the behavior of the defendant 
standing before the bench. Did the defendant come from a broken home? Do 
the defendant’s parents or siblings have criminal records? Who are the 
defendant’s friends? Do those friends have criminal records? What of the 
defendant’s mental health records? In some far-distant future, one could in 
fact see such algorithms eventually employ all of the factors that Dr. 
Sapolsky has written about in order to make a prediction about a particular 
defendant. And, in fact, such algorithms attempt to accomplish just that, by 
taking in large amounts of data, matching the collected information to 
thousands of similar offenders, and so producing a forecast about a particular 
defendant’s future conduct. The use of such tools poses obvious problems for 
a justice system that is concerned with individuals and not aggregates. As 
Hamilton herself has written, “Scientists study groups. But the law sentences 
the individual.”862 
 In a series of three articles, Hamilton investigated the problems 
inherent in the use of such programs. Examining the use of algorithmic 
assessment of Hispanic defendants’ likelihood to reoffend, Hamilton 
 
861 John T. Philipsborn, Searching for Uniformity in Adjudications of the 
Accused’s Competence to Assist and Consult in Capital Cases, 10 PSYCH., PUB. 
POL’Y, & L. 417, 417–42 (2004); Cf. Mike McKee, California Justices Appoint a 
Guardian for Condemned Man, LAW.COM, Aug. 2, 2002 (Philipsborn’s 
involvement as co-counsel, sees decision as “potentially a wide-ranging 
development”). Id. 
862 Melissa Hamilton, We Use Big Data to Sentence Criminals. But Can the 
Algorithms Really Tell Us What We Need to Know?, CONVERSATION, June 5, 2017.  
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concluded: “The tool fails to accurately predict actual outcomes in a linear 
manner and overpredicts risk for Hispanics.”863 She performed a similar 
assessment of algorithmic tools in the case of women defendants and again 
concluded: “This study shows strong evidence of systematic gender bias.”864 
 Are algorithms therefore “fair?” Hamilton deliberated on this 
question in a study devoted to putting to the test allegations made by the 
investigative journalistic group known as ProPublica that a popular algorithm 
was systematically biased against African-Americans.865 Although she 
identified problems with ProPublica’s reporting, Hamilton nevertheless 
concluded, yet again, that “Black recidivists and non-recidivists receive 
significantly higher . . . scores on average than whites. Mean scores for 
recidivists and non-recidivist [B]lacks are more than one decile higher than 
for whites within those same categories.”866 
 Hamilton has explored yet other dimensions of the relationship of 
neuroscience, broadly understood, and the law. Does the field of trauma 
studies have anything to teach law about the accuracy of victims’ descriptions 
of assaults they have suffered?867 Recognizing that “[t]he psychophysiology 
of stress response” is such that “peri-traumatic reports of traumatic events 
may not be accurate despite the sincerest of intentions on behalf of the 
declarants,”868 Hamilton calls for the reform of the evidence of law to take 
account of this insight.869 “Should “Sex Crimes” be adjudicated as “Mental 
Disease?”870 There is, Hamilton acknowledged, a certain plausibility to 
taking such a step, since some sexual paraphilias—such as “pedophilia,” 
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(2019). 
865 Melissa Hamilton, Debating Algorithmic Fairness, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. 
ONLINE 261, 261–96 (2019). 
866 Id. at 294. Hamilton subsequently accused the corporate owner of the 
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Cf. Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual 
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“exhibitionism,” and “voyeurism”—are classified as disorders in the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual and 
are also criminalized.871 
 Both prosecutors and defense counsel have seen advantage in using 
the paraphilias forensically.872 Hamilton, however, perceives risks: “The 
collaboration [of psychiatry and law] threatens not only the liberty and 
privacy interests of those who commit sex-based offenses. The potential 
exists for a contagion effect whereby interest groups might be encouraged to 
qualify all manner of criminal behaviors as distinct mental disorders.”873 
Finally, in Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science, Hamilton 
argues that many so-called actuarial predictors of the likelihood that sexual 
offenders might reoffend amount to little more than pseudo-science and 
should be “ban[ned].”874 
 In their jointly authored contribution to this symposium, Philipsborn 
and Hamilton focus on the constitutional requirement that criminal 
defendants be mentally competent to stand trial. The case law makes clear 
that defendants must be active, not passive in their participation, that they 
must enjoy autonomy, and be capable not only of knowing what their 
attorneys are doing in their behalf, but to give guidance and direction to 
counsel. Philipsborn and Hamilton trace the history of this constitutional 
doctrine, connect it to the evolving field of forensic psychiatry, and look to 
the special responsibility lawyers have to satisfy themselves that their clients 
are, indeed, mentally fit to stand trial. 
 Along the way, Philipsborn and Hamilton review the resources 
lawyers and judges might utilize in assessing the competency of defendants 
and share their concerns that participants in the judicial process must truly 
become well-versed in this field. After a thorough literature review, 
Philipsborn and Hamilton conclude with a survey of some leading cases (my 
own favorite is the authors’ meticulous reconstruction of the case of mob 
boss Vincent Gigante).875 Philipsborn and Hamilton have succeeded in 
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creating that rarest of academic texts: a work simultaneously of great 
sophistication and easy access. 
G. Oluwatemilorun Adenipekun 
 Oluwatemilorun Adenipekun is a graduate student in law at the 
Wake Forest University School of Law in North Carolina. She has 
contributed an important paper exploring the mental health rights of 
individuals under international law. She begins boldly, by acknowledging 
two basic premises: first, that human rights are not concessions by the state 
but are inherent in the human person. And second, that among those human 
rights, is the right to health, enshrined in the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization, ratified by all the original members of the United Nations—
including the United States—in 1946.876 
 Mental health, Ms. Adenipekun persuasively argues, must be 
counted as an essential element of health as a human right. She points to 
many reasons the right to mental health is frustrated in practice—such as the 
existence of outdated laws, and the lack of resources. And she notes that these 
are not problems confined to poor nations. Even very wealthy ones fail to 
provide adequate funds. 
 But Ms. Adenipekun is particularly concerned with the problem of 
involuntary confinement. It is the case that some persons suffering from 
mental illness will require confinement. What are—and what should be—the 
international standards? In her quest to answer this question, Adenipekun 
turns to a variety of sources. She looks to the decisions and opinions of 
leading international tribunals—such as the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. She also consults 
major international agreements and conventions—such as Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Principles for the Protection of 
Persons with Mental Illness. Synthesizing all of this, Adenipekun distills 
certain basic principles—care should be minimally intrusive; there must be 
fair hearings and regular reviews anytime someone is involuntarily confined; 
conditions of confinement must be humane. 
 As the world converges, and as the nations of the world opt for 
decency and cooperation, these practices and norms will become increasingly 
compelling. Ms. Adenipekun has done a valuable service—for the entire 
 
876 “The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, 
political belief, economic or social condition.” CONST. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
preamble. 
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global community—by identifying the major sources of the human right of 
mental health and elucidating how it might be defended and expanded. 
H. Nadine Liv 
 Nadine Liv is at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel. She 
has written several articles of significance. In Deep Fakes and Memory 
Malleability, Liv and her co-author explore the insidious ways in which deep 
fakes—the ability to use artificial intelligence to create convincing sounds 
and images of events that never actually happened—can be used to implant 
false memories.877 In A Comprehensive Doctrine For an Evolving Threat, 
Liv and a co-author propose the creation of legal mechanisms that might 
allocate third-party liability to social networks that facilitate communication 
among terrorists and that might employ the threat of onerous monetary 
judgments to impose responsibility on complicit social media.878 Finally, in 
a short publication entitled Identifying Money Transfers and Terror Finance 
Infrastructure, Liv and co-authors examine the use of Bitcoin and other 
digital currencies as methods of payment among terrorist networks.879 
 Liv’s contribution to the symposium is focused on “brain-computer 
interfaces.” She defines the term as the use of “devices that can read brain 
signals and convert them into control and communication signals.” At the 
moment, such devices are used principally for therapeutic purposes, 
allowing, for instance, an immobile amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) 
patient—think Stephen Hawking—to communicate with the world. But such 
devices are rapidly gaining in function. In the near future, they might be 
utilized as ever more sophisticated medical devices. But they might also be 
used to optimize human performance, or even to allow human beings to 
transcend what would otherwise be normal “human” limitations. The 
possibilities, in other words, are large, expanding, and liable to grow in ways 
that are as yet unforeseeable. 
 Much of Liv’s paper is dedicated to exploring the legal significance 
of such developments. What of criminal law? Can we still speak of an actus 
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reus in the absence of human action? Does mens rea still apply where an 
artificially intelligent device acts on one’s behalf but not under one’s control? 
Is it possible—it likely will be someday soon—for malicious actors to hack 
such devices and thereby gain control of an individual’s mind? What 
becomes of the privilege against self-incrimination when an intelligent 
external device keeps a record of one’s deepest thoughts? Does the right of 
privacy survive in any meaningful form? These are some of the questions 
Nadine Liv ponders in her very thought-provoking paper. 
I. Rose Tempowski 
 Rose Tempowski is a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Law, Science, 
and Policy, at Birmingham City University, in the United Kingdom. Her 
paper represents a portion of her doctoral research, and her co-authors 
include professors who have advised, supervised, and collaborated with her 
on her project. 
 Ms. Tempowski’s work should concern anyone interested in the 
relationship of neuroscience and the law. It is all well and good to address 
questions of free will, to press legal argument in novel ways, to explore 
questions of criminal liability, and to reflect on emerging brain-computer 
technology. But how does any of this get translated into public policy? What 
arguments are being used today when questions of neuroscience and the law 
arise at the legislative level? What are the sources consulted? Who counts as 
an expert? And how can the quality of these arguments and sources be 
improved, so that they reflect not the passing prejudices of the moment, but 
the considered views of researchers and scientists? 
 To phrase the question in this way is to propose examining 
something vast and unmanageable. Fortunately, Ms. Tempowski has 
narrowed the investigation considerably by focusing on a single discrete 
problem. It is a problem presented by a clash between what is an emerging 
consensus in neuroscience—the realization that the human brain continues to 
evolve and mature beyond one’s eighteenth birthday—and a legal system that 
has thus far failed to take account of this scientific insight. 
 Thus, consider how the legal system treats someone who has 
celebrated her eighteenth birthday. Congratulations, the Law says, you have 
now acquired a set of rights and have been encumbered with a set of duties 
that you did not possess the day before. You can sign a contract, cast a ballot, 
and be tried as an adult in almost every jurisdiction in the United States. 
 Still, some state legislatures have come to question this state of 
affairs. Tempowski selected the legislative debates of four states for close 
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consideration—Connecticut, Vermont, Michigan, and Wisconsin. All four 
states have wrangled with the possibility of raising the age at which an 
offender can no longer be tried as a juvenile and must be tried as an adult. 
And one of the four states—Vermont—has, in fact, raised juvenile 
jurisdiction from eighteen to twenty. 
 Tempowski’s concern was to grade the quality of the scientific 
literature utilized in these debates. The results are sure to be disappointing. 
State legislators, whether they are supporters or opponents of reform, failed, 
for the most part, to rely on sophisticated scientific opinion. Indeed, 
Tempowski writes: “[T]he groups who were least commonly represented [in 
legislative debate] were scientists and medical professionals.” Tempowski’s 
point, put in simple terms, is this: “We can do better. Indeed, we must do 
better.” Perhaps this symposium will help. 
